Foreign policy, globalization and global governance -
The European Union's structural foreign policy

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“Globalization”, in short the “widening, deepening and speeding up of global interconnectedness” (Held et al. 1999: 14) that has predominantly been observed over the past two decades, has effects on just about every aspect of social life (Scholte 2005). Not in the least, it poses a challenge to (i) the territorial organisation of politics, calling the state-centric view of the international system into question, but, according to some, also to (ii) politics itself.

About a decade ago, this general observation led New York Times analyst Thomas Friedman to predict that globalization would become “the next great foreign policy debate” (quoted in Rodrik 1997: 1). Had it really been held, this debate would probably have focused on two related questions. Firstly, it would have had to explore what globalization means for the making and conduct of foreign policy, “whether foreign policy remains a key site of agency in international relations, or whether it is being steadily emptied of content” (Hill 2003: 16). From a radical “end of history” perspective (Fukuyama 1992), this question would have been answered negatively arguing that globalization has “rendered foreign policy redundant” (Hill 2003: 13). In this view, it is not so much the “foreign” that is necessarily bound to disappear, but the “policy”: if liberal democracy and the free-market economy become the dominant organizing forms of social interaction in all parts of the world, not much is left to negotiate about. By contrast, more moderate voices would have pointed out that it is not so much foreign policy as such, but rather certain dimensions of it, like classical diplomacy, which globalization places on the “endangered species list” (Cox 1997, cited in Jönsson 2002). A second dimension of the debate would have parted from this latter position - that foreign policy transforms, but does not vanish with globalization - to focus on the role 21st century foreign policy can play in shaping and politically containing processes of globalization.

Quite surprisingly, amidst all discourse about social changes, this “great foreign policy debate” has never really happened. No explicit link between the controversies of our times about globalization - and global governance as the political reaction to it - on the one and foreign policy (analysis) on the other hand has been made to date. Paradoxically, a very good example of how foreign policy analysis and globalization and global governance studies have been ignoring each other is the European Union (EU). Around the time Friedman predicted his great debate, the EU made important steps towards becoming a serious foreign policy actor in its own right. Yet, both the discipline of IR (Hill/Smith 2005) and, strangely enough, also the new schools of globalization and global governance studies (Jørgensen et al. 2007) have been neglecting the EU and EU studies, including EU foreign policy (analysis). And from a bottom up perspective, EU foreign policy analysts have been so preoccupied with understanding the complex EU internal institutional set-up and the question of how the EU can be a foreign policy actor at all (e.g. Caporaso/Jupille 1998; Allen/Smith 1990) that they paid little attention to the evolving external environment that this actor is embedded into. This mutual neglect is puzzling, as the EU’s foreign policy is probably one of the best examples of the type of foreign policy that emerges under conditions of globalization and global governance. It is also for this reason that the EU will be used as an example when analyzing 21st century foreign policy in this contribution.

Against this background, our contribution intends to pick up on some important, unsettled questions: what will foreign policy - as the exercise of agency - look like in a context of globalization and global governance? What will be its role in 21st century world politics? And from an ana-

1 Other radical positions contend that globalization has rendered agency in general redundant, as everything has been absorbed by global structures (Urry 2003).

2 Recent attempts to analyze the EU and global governance (Ortega 2005) or to see what global governance and EU studies can learn from each other (Warleigh-Lack 2007) are somehow exceptions to this rule, but conceptual efforts to systematically link EU foreign policy analysis to globalization and global governance concepts have yet to be made.
lytical perspective: how can we make sense of it? We will argue that foreign policy will continue to play an important role in world politics, but in a partially transformed manner.

Getting to the bottom of these questions requires a very concise picture of foreign policy and the context it is conducted in. The globalization and global governance literatures have innovatively responded to the observation that “a time of political transformation inevitably calls into question the available concepts and categories through which that transformation can be understood” (Kelstrup/Williams 2000: 3), introducing new concepts and tools to understand a novel global context. By contrast, foreign policy analysis has often been criticized as “a rather sterile field which has been devoid of innovation” (White 1999: 39). Even if concepts exist that have proven their analytical worth in analytical frameworks (e.g. the foreign policy systems approach - Clarke/White 1989) - and efforts have recently been made to inject some fresh ideas into the academic analysis of foreign policy (White 1999; Neack 2003; Webber/Smith 2002) - , the field is generally characterized by a non-negligible degree of conceptual and theoretical pauperism. Foreign policy analysts have only occasionally worked on the “general fault-line between the study of foreign policy (looking from the inside out) (…) and the study of international relations” (Clark 1999: 22), using the premises of classical IR theories to inform foreign policy concepts (Ritterberger 2001; Smith et al. 2008). Generally, however, scholars of foreign policy and of IR have not systematically engaged in explicit dialogues (Carlsmaes 2002: 331), even though many of them implicitly share a lot of assumptions. Globalization and global governance and what they represent make this relative isolation of foreign policy analysis increasingly untenable (cf. Harnisch 2002: 4). At the same time, they call into question the usefulness of classical IR theories for examining current global politics.

To bridge the identified gaps between (EU) foreign policy and new conceptual thinking in IR studies and to conceptually and theoretically reinvigorate the analysis of foreign policy in a context of globalization and global governance, we suggest thus linking the core concepts of foreign policy analysis systematically to the core findings in the globalization and global governance literature. So far, such a linkage has, to the best of our knowledge, been claimed (Garrison 2003), but not undertaken. In filling this void, we hope to be able to contribute to ongoing debates in both IR studies and foreign policy analysis, with a particular focus on the EU.

The paper has been divided into three main parts. Firstly, to frame our discussion of various approaches to foreign policy, we find it useful to recall the key components of foreign policy analysis (II.). Building on this brief overview, we will, secondly, engage in conceptual discussions (III.). Following a recapitulation of how these core components have been interpreted by IR theories, we engage in a discussion of globalization and how it challenges this traditional view. To get to an alternative view of foreign policy, we will subsequently apply insights from the literature on global governance - as the emergent political and conceptual response to globalization - to the core analytical units of foreign policy studies. This exercise results in a catalogue of features that we believe to require greater attention in foreign policy analysis. Based on this, the third main part of the paper advances a re-conceptualisation of foreign policy, embedded in an analytical framework that combines elements of traditional foreign policy analysis with new insights (IV.). Core features of this new framework include the fact that it is not limited to the study of foreign policy as nation-state activity and that foreign policy is perceived as an activity targeted not exclusively at other actors, but at creating and shaping structures. What we term a “structural foreign policy” lens is then applied to the EU to see whether and how it helps us in better understanding and explaining its foreign policy behaviour in an era of globalization. The account concludes with

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3 Major recent books on foreign policy mention globalization and global governance as context factors (e.g. Smith et al. 2008), but do not engage in bridging the gap between the core concepts used in these literatures and those employed in foreign policy analysis. Vice versa, even the less radical literature on globalization and global governance has not paid explicit attention to it (Held et al. 1999, 2002).
observations on how the analysis of (EU) foreign policy could be further developed to suit the analytical needs of understanding transforming global politics.

II. Analytical framework: core components of foreign policy analysis

To enable a systematic discussion of various theoretical and conceptual perspectives on foreign policy, a concise depiction of the subject of study is needed. Much scholarly effort has been spent on defining foreign policy. Instead of randomly reviewing definitions - an exercise which can only ever be incomplete -, a brief review of the core analytical units developed in the discipline of foreign policy analysis allows us to identify what can be considered as the (timeless) gist of the concept of foreign policy.

Logically, the existence of a “foreign policy” presupposes a distinction between inside - an actor and its domestic context - and outside/foreign - the environment the actor faces - , and some form of political relationship between the two. To set the three components of this basic, generic description of foreign policy analytically into relation, we can rely on a process-oriented approach often adopted in classical foreign policy analysis (Clarke/White 1989; Ginsberg 2001; Smith/Webber 2002: chapt. 1-4; Smith et al. 2008).

Firstly, everything that takes place in the domestic or internal sphere has been discussed under the term “foreign policy decision-making” (Gross Stein 2008). With the intention of explaining foreign policy behaviour (Harnisch 2002), classical foreign policy analysis focused a lot on this dimension by analysing the decision-making process itself (Snyder et al. 1954; East et al. 1978) and the psychological, political and social context in which decision-makers are embedded when designing foreign policies (Sprout/Sprout 1956). In essence, the study of foreign policy decision-making requires answering each of the following questions: by whom (actors), on what basis (capacities/foreign policy instruments), for what purpose (interests/objectives) and by what means (decision-making procedures) are foreign policy decisions made?

Secondly, the view foreign policy analysts hold of the external environment depends largely on the chosen level of analysis: some approach it from an actor-based perspective, focussing - classically - on states, but also on other, non-state actors; others have taken a structure-focussed (top down) approach (cf. Carlsnaes 2008). For the analytical purposes of this paper, both (multiple sorts of) actors and structures will be considered as constituting the external sphere.

Finally, to incorporate the politics dimension into this process-based approach of foreign policy, analysts have distinguished between foreign policy decision-making and “foreign policy implementation” (Smith/Clarke 1985). Where the former depicts the phase in the foreign policy process during which decisions are prepared and taken, the latter describes how this output of the foreign policy decision-making machinery is implemented when “actors confront their environment and their environment confronts them” (Brighi/Hill 2008: 118). Here, the deeply political core of the relationship between an actor and its environment comes to the fore. If “all politics is the exercise of influence” (Dahl/Stonebrickner 2003: 34), foreign policy as interaction between actors and their environment can be regarded as the “the exercise of influence in international relations” (Hudson/Vore 1995: 215). The foreign policy actor attempts to have an impact on its environment by employing instruments that it considers suitable for realizing its predefined objectives.

This process view of foreign policy can be helpful to visualize how the various core components of foreign policy analysis go - schematically - together. Table 1 distinguishes between the internal sphere, in which foreign policies are designed (“made”), and the external sphere. Foreign policy implementation, the concrete (bottom up) interaction between a foreign policy actor and its environment, is located at the intersection between the two. Further, from a top down perspective, it can be expected that the external sphere conditions to some extent the activities at the domestic level.
Table 1: A schematic view of the central units of analysis of traditional foreign policy analysis

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<tr>
<th>FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION</th>
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<td>- Influence attempts (concrete use of foreign policy instruments) and their objects</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERNAL SPHERE</th>
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<td>- Capacities</td>
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This simplified model of the foreign policy process allows us to identify the most important analytical units of foreign policy analysis. To further structure this account, and allow for a successive comparison of the assumptions IR theories, globalization and global governance make with regard to foreign policy, we derive one cluster of questions from each of the core dimensions of foreign policy:

1. **Internal sphere**: Who makes foreign policy (actors)? What type of interests/objectives are formulated and how? What are the capacities foreign policy can be built on and how can these be used (instruments)?
2. **External sphere**: Who are the actors in the external arena? What are the structures that determine how the actors typically interact?
3. **Foreign policy implementation**: How are instruments applied in order to influence the external environment? Which actors and/or which structures are the objects (or targets) of influence attempts?

In the following section, the paper considers the answers that IR theories have given to these questions, before examining how globalization and global governance studies would interpret them. One question will have to be addressed prior to the discussion of the latter two, namely: how they interpret the relevance of foreign policy.

III. **Conceptual foundations: foreign policy seen through the lenses of IR theories, globalization and global governance**

1. **Traditional approaches to foreign policy analysis and the challenge of globalization**
Taking the core units of foreign policy analysis as a starting point, we will now consider how these have been interpreted from the perspectives of the classical IR theories and constructivism, before looking at how globalization challenges these interpretations.

1.1. Traditional views on foreign policy: the classical IR theories and constructivism

Foreign policy analysis and International Relations are linked by a “special relationship” (Smith et al. 2008b: 4): the former has regularly been influenced by concepts - such as the primacy of nation-states - used in the classical IR theories. A very brief review of how these theories have influenced thinking about the various dimensions of foreign policy confirms this perception. Emphasis will be placed here on the two classical IR theories: neo-realism and neoliberalism/neoliberal institutionalism. Though not a theory per se, social constructivism will also be briefly discussed, as it has informed foreign policy analysis in more recent times.

In his “Theory of International Politics”, Waltz, the founding father of neo-realist thinking, refuted the idea that his reasoning could be used to build a suitable theory of foreign policy (1979: 127-128). This view has not only been contested by the younger generation of neo-realists (Elman 1996; Baumann et al. 2001; cf. Harnisch 2002), but the views foreign policy analysts hold of the external sphere have de facto been strongly influenced by neo-realist premises over the years (Wohlforth 2008). In a nutshell, from a neo-realist perspective, foreign policy is strongly determined by the external environment, an international system characterized by anarchy. In this system, states - understood as unitary, rational actors - interact to assure their security (Jervis 1978). A state’s foreign policy behaviour is determined by its relative power, which is a function of the distribution of power in the international system, and is seen to depend on material resources (military capacities, raw materials) (Mearsheimer 2007). Little attention is paid to the domestic context.

In a neoliberal (institutionalist) perspective, the international system is also primarily an arena for state interaction, but non-state actors and intergovernmental institutions can also play a role. Since states strive to maximize their interests in this arena, “cooperation under anarchy” (Oye 1986) or the creation of institutions through durable inter-state cooperation become feasible (Keohane 1989). This presupposes bargaining among states on the basis of predefined objectives (Keohane 1989), formulated in a domestic context via the pluralistic competition of interests. The opening up the black box of the domestic context and the explanation of the link between internally defined interests and their defence in the external arena - via foreign policy - can be perceived as the major contributions neoliberal theorists have made to foreign policy analysis (Doyle 2008), demonstrating in quite sophisticated ways how these arenas (might) interact (Putnam 1988; Moravcsik 1997). Central to the formulation and defence of interests is the emphasis on economic, in addition to military and natural resources, which makes the neoliberal concept of power slightly broader than the neo-realists’.

If both neo-realists and neoliberal theorists focus very much on the systemic features of the international system to explain foreign policy behaviour, more interpretive accounts that have emerged since the 1990s emphasize the relationship between agency and structure (cf. Harnisch 2002: 8; Checkel 1998). Moderate social constructivists oppose the “structural perspective” of the classical theories (Carlsnaes 2008: 91), introducing structurationist reasoning into the debate (Giddens 1984; Wendt 1992). If agents and structures co-determine each other, this leaves more space for foreign policy as (at least) the semi-autonomous exercise of agency. Moreover, constructivist thinking places generally more emphasis on the role of ideational factors (values, norms) in the international arena and, consequently, also in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy (Adler 2002). The external sphere is, from this perspective, no longer an exogenously given entity, but the product of the construction of intersubjectively shared meanings (“anarchy is what states make of it”, in Wendt’s famous dictum). This makes foreign policy ultimately appear
as an exercise of defining and constructing “systems of norms” (Finnemore/Sikkink 1998) through communicative interaction (arguing and persuasion) (Risse 2000; Checkel 2008: 76-77). Once structures have been created, a logic of appropriateness sets in, where actors behave according to the rules that have been intersubjectively defined, as opposed to according to the interest-driven logic of consequentialism that the classical rationalist theories hail (March/Olsen 1998). In sum, a lot of constructivist thought implicitly touches upon the level of analysis problem that neither neo-realism nor neoliberal accounts have solved: rather than perpetuating the divide between the internal and the international, constructivists advise us to transgress levels (Carlsnaes 2002: 342; Checkel 2008: 77-78).

In synthesis, both the classical IR theories and social constructivism have had a non-negligible impact on the way foreign policy has been and is understood and interpreted. The legacy of neo-realism is clearly visible in the emphasis of much foreign policy analysis on the centrality of states and on (an often limited notion of) power. Neoliberal thinking is observable in many accounts that focus on internal interest-formulation and bargaining as supreme foreign policy act. At the other end of the rationalist-reflectivist spectrum, while not so much applied to foreign policy analysis in practice, constructivism has generally made a contribution by emphasizing the role of ideational factors and a stronger focus on the relationship between actors and structures (Carlsnaes 2008) in foreign policy.

1.2. The challenge: globalization and the necessity to rethink foreign policy (analysis)

Globalization is frequently used as an analytical term, but “in fact poorly conceptualized” (Giddens 1996, quoted in Scholte 2005: 52; Rossi 2008). Parting from the assumption that globalization is a quantitatively and qualitatively new phenomenon, but not the end of history, we explore here its core features and the main observed causes and effects in order to then discuss how and to what extent it challenges traditional conceptualizations of foreign policy.

1.2.1. Defining globalization: causes and consequences

Many definitions of globalization co-exist, often emphasizing different aspects of the phenomenon (Beisheim/Walter 1997: 155). The most far-reaching attempt at comprehensively defining globalization arguably stems from Held et al. (1999: 16), which describe it as a “process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact - generating transcontinental or inter-regional flows and networks of activity”.

This definition highlights what can be regarded as the core features of globalization. Firstly, globalization is given a temporal dimension - it is not a static, sudden event, but a long-term process towards greater “transplanetary connectivity” (Scholte 2005: 60). Secondly, and this is what is fundamentally new - it points to the fact that globalization entails the gradual transformation of social relations from territorially bound forms of organization (e.g. the state) into what Scholte calls “superterritoriality” (2005: 60) and what others have referred to as “de-territorialization” of social life, i.e. the emergence of new social and political spaces that are not attached to specific territories (Beisheim/Gregor 1997; Zürn 1998). In Held et al.’s account, these new spaces are called “flows” and “networks” (Castells 2004), the former defined as movements of physical artefacts, people, symbols, tools etc. across space and time, the latter as “regularized and patterned interactions between independent agents, nodes of activity, or sites of power” (1999: 16). Thirdly, four concepts are advanced which enable a concise conceptual capturing of globalization (Held et al. 4

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4 Our approach to globalization can be situated in the so-called “transformationalist strand” (Giddens 1990; Held et al. 1999) that occupies the middle ground between the deniers of globalization (Hirst/Thompson 1999; Hirst 1997) on the one and the “hyperglobalists” that either celebrate (Fukuyama 1992) or deplore (Altvater/Mahnkopf 1996; Albrow 1996) the end of (an epoch in) human history (Held et al. 1999: 3-10; Prakash/Hart 1999) on the other hand.
1999: 16-20): extensity, i.e. the stretching of economic, social and political activities across borders; intensity, i.e. the growing magnitude of interconnectedness in various domains; velocity, the degree to which global interactions and processes are speeding up; and impact, which is used to assess the effects of globalization.

Though often interpreted quite differently, four main catalysts of globalization have regularly been retained (Scholte 2005; McGrew 2005; Beck 2000; Held et al. 1999; Albrow 1996): 1. Political decisions: globalization is partially the product of the intended or unintended consequence of national and international policy choices - such as the de-regulation of markets - as well as of the growing tendency towards transferring sovereignty or delegating functions to inter- and supranational organisations, whose number and importance have grown exponentially over time (cf. Grande/Risse 2000: 236); 2. Technological developments: globalization has been enabled by the rapid evolution of communication, information and transport technology, which allow together for a decrease in importance of distances and, thus, the compression of space and time (Castells 2000); 3. Economic expansionism: “Globalization must be seen in part at least as the outcome of an idea, and specifically the idea of a free market; “free” in the sense of freed from political, social or “gemeinschaftlich” constraints” (Scott 1997: 9; Prakash/Hart 1999: 3); 4. Cultural exchanges: globalization is further, according to some authors a cultural transformation process: “material exchanges localize, political exchanges internationalize, symbolic exchanges globalize” (Waters 1995: 9).

As a “multifaceted and differentiated social phenomenon” (Held et al. 1999: 27), globalization has not only multifarious causes and abstract effects (deterritorialization, compression of space and time), but also numerous observable, concrete consequences for almost every aspect of social life: in the economic sphere (e.g., on markets, monetary flows, production and consumption patterns), in the technological sphere (on communication habits), in the sphere of mobility and transport (on migration flows, travelling habits), in the ecological sphere (on pollution) and in the cultural sphere (on tastes) (for overviews: Scholte 2005: 74-75; McGrew 2005: 27). As such, globalization processes create numerous opportunities for some, but pose threats to others. Arguably, the most significant effects concern politics (McGrew 2005). Not only are all levels of policy-making - from the local to the global - in one way or the other affected, but the predominantly territorial organization of politics itself is being put to the test. While most of the globalization literature has focused on its effects on the nation-state (Holton 1998; Zürn 1998), it is not only the Westphalian state as such, but the entire system of inter-state relations at a global plane that is undergoing a transformation (McGrew 2005: 35; Slaughter 2004).

From this overview, it becomes clear that the concept of foreign policy - traditionally formulated within the borders of the nation-state and implemented in the foreign policy arena of inter-state relations - is being severely challenged.

1.2.2. The challenge to foreign policy (analysis)

Explicit discussions of the challenges globalization poses to foreign policy are virtually absent from the relevant literatures. It is for this reason that we will now attempt to elicit what appear to be the most striking implications of globalization for the concept of foreign policy.

The relevance of foreign policy

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5 Quite a few theorists even reduce globalization to a growth in economic interdependence (for a critique of this myopic vision of the phenomenon: Beck 2000)
6 It is not always clear whether some transformations associated with globalization must be regarded as causes, effects or partially as both.
7 Without going further into detail on these aspects here, studies provide vast amounts of empirical data to substantiate the claim that frontiers are disappearing and relations intensifying in many of these domains (cf. Rossi 2008).
To begin with, globalization challenges the very essence of foreign policy: by rendering distances increasingly meaningless and altering the importance of frontiers, it blurs the distinction between inside and outside that is central to the determination of the foreign in foreign policy.\(^8\) Nothing leads us to suppose, however, that the notion of foreign is going to disappear. On the one hand, amid all claims about the slow erosion of the territorial organization of social life, the nation-state has so far largely resisted change and is not bound to vanish so soon (Sørensen 2004). On the other hand, even in an increasingly de-territorialized world order, the distinction between “we” and “the other(s)” will persist as long as there are cultural, linguistic and other differences. And nothing points to the disappearance of all differences, since little evidence supports the idea that globalization equals universalization or, as some have claimed, westernization (Petras/Veltmeyer 2001) (Scholte 2005: 56-59). Secondly, in an era of transformation that produces winners and losers, where political structures are changing, and where, hence, solutions have to be found to new types of social problems, the demand for foreign policy - an activity directed at influencing others (whoever they may be) to defend one’s aims and assure that one’s own vision of the world becomes part of existing and new structures - is bound to increase rather than decrease.

The internal sphere

Globalization also provides a major challenge to the common interpretation of how foreign policy is made, not only with regard to the locus, types of and formulation of interests and aims of foreign policy, but also concerning the capacities and instruments needed to conduct it in a globalizing world.

As to the actors who formulate foreign policy, the globalization literature suggests that these may not (exclusively) be territorially organised states any more, but - in parallel to, in addition to or instead of traditional actors - other entities, such as the European Union, whose foreign policy will be the subject of discussion below.

Against this background, globalization obviously also entails an opening of the internal sphere (Beck 2000). The interests of an entity will neither be exogenously given through the distribution of power in the international system, nor exclusively internally formulated via a pluralist internal competition of social forces. Rather, interests and aims can be expected to be increasingly the product of a variety of internal and external influences. With globalization raising the awareness that what happens in distant places may have impacts on the domestic (and vice-versa), the external may be much more present in the formulation of foreign policy goals. At the same time, demands for foreign policies that deal in one way or the other with the consequences of globalization, but also with its political, technological, socioeconomic, and cultural root causes are bound to arise.

The capacities and instruments needed to conduct the type of policy that is required to realize one’s aims largely transcend the traditional focus on material capabilities. Although it has been argued that “globalization is not divorced from the power structures associated with inter-state relations” (Clark 1999: 55), the transformations that it brings with it make it necessary to no longer reduce power as a resource to what states - or others - possess, whether they are “strong” or “weak” with regard to a certain number of indicators (military, economic etc.). Rather, as Castells has argued, in a context of globalization, power resides in networks, i.e. essentially in structures (1997: 424-425). In such a context, relational power “and (...) coercion become less prominent than notions of influence, access and communication” (Webber/Smith 2002: 22) and, ultimately, structural power (Strange 1988; Guzzini 1993). Important in terms of capacities to realize own aims is thus the continuous, long-term presence and (communicative) exchange with others in networks in order to wield influence, but also the capacity to impact on these structures them-

\(^8\) It is partially this alleged blurring between inside and outside that has led some commentators to ask whether globalization has rendered foreign policy as such “redundant” (Hill 2003: 13).
selves. This, in turn, demands not only material capabilities, but also non-material resources such as knowledge and the strategic capacity to effectively use one's resources.

The external sphere

Turning to what globalization means for the external sphere, a number of considerable changes can be detected in the international system as it has been described and interpreted in classical accounts of foreign policy analysis (and IR theories).

First and foremost, the world is becoming more and more interconnected and multipolar in more than one way: not only has the balance between the still important state actors altered due, in part, to processes of (economic) globalization that have led to rapid growth in major emerging countries like China and India, but a plethora of new (types of) actors is populating the external arena (Humphrey/Messner 2005). Among them are the traditional intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations (IGOs, (I)NGOs), religious movements, multi-national companies (MNCs), but also various other new entities such as networks of scientists (epistemic communities) or of the media. This proliferation and diversification of actors has rendered the global arena much more complex than older conceptual approaches would have it. Moreover, the growing insignificance of borders has induced the slow emergence of a transnational civil society, bringing together citizens and private interests across frontiers to define and defend their common objectives (McGrew: 2005: 25).

As a result, the structures that have long been taken for granted - in a liberal view, a multilateral world order characterized by international regimes and organisations (cf. Ruggie 1993) - are eroding. In its current shape, the globalizing world is characterized by an emergent global governance mosaic, a co-existence of spheres of (relative) order - spaces that are regulated through inter-state cooperation in the traditional sense or informal networks of actors - and quasi-anarchic niches that are so far devoid of effective political organisation. If a political regulation of these spaces is desired, many of the traditional structures are in need of modernization and completely new structures will have to be created to deal with some unseen challenges, notably the regulation of various types of novel flows, e.g. in the communication and information domains, and to provide “global public goods” (Kaul et al. 1999). The latter have become more and more important in the wake of increasingly visible negative effects of globalization, namely the spread of risks (such as public health risks, e.g. HIV/Aids, or pollution, e.g. climate change) that markets cannot effectively deal with. If globalization restructures the world as we know it, dealing with these transformative processes - through (foreign) policy - amounts in essence to “globalizing structures” (Mittelman 1996: 233-237), i.e. adapting the political frameworks in which actors interact to the realities of a de-territorializing world.

Foreign policy implementation

When it comes to the question of how foreign policy is concretely implemented vis-à-vis other(s), globalization highlights that both the focus and the objects are changing.

Per definition, foreign policy is aimed at everything that lies outside of the entity that conducts it. The changing external environment demonstrates that a concentration solely on interstate relations is no more sufficient. Other actors such as NGOs, MNCs and the societal dimension of global politics, but increasingly also flows and networks, hybrids between actors and structures, demand more attention. A greater focus on these new actors, notably (organised) civil society can be assumed to further transform traditional diplomacy. Further, globalization challenges the focus on actors, be they old or new, only. As seen from the discussion of the external sphere, the activity of “globalizing structures” demands specific attention to the conduct of foreign policy. Implicitly, the globalization literature suggests that structures are bound to increasingly become the targets of influence attempts.

To play a role in the newly emerging foreign policy arena, instruments and coherent strategies are needed that heighten the chances of an actor to impact on all types of actors and structures.
Scholars of globalization do, however, not grant many insights into the foreign policy techniques that would assure the continuous access to and presence in global structures as well as the creation and sustaining of structures themselves.

Summing up, globalization poses numerous challenges to the traditional view of foreign policy conveyed by classical IR theories. At the same time, the literature on globalization does not provide many answers on how to rethink foreign policy in an era of growing global interconnectedness. Further conceptual thinking and research on the entities that make and conduct foreign policy, the types of goals that they pursue and the ways these goals are formulated and defended in a context of globalization is therefore much needed. Further, analyses of foreign policy in a globalization context will need to incorporate the new actors in the international arena and better understand and conceptualize the type of structures that exist or will need to be created. In order to get to some new inspiration on what shape this new foreign policy may take, the insights of global governance - as the political and conceptual response to many of the challenges posed by globalization - will now be examined in some detail.

2. **In quest of alternative concepts: exploring possible synergies between global governance and foreign policy (analysis)**

Globalization poses a major challenge to foreign policy, but it does not provide (all) the answers - neither with regard to foreign policy, nor with regard to world politics in general and the way we analyse both. To take up this challenge from the perspective of world politics, global governance - understood as a political programme and an analytical concept (Dingwerth/Pattberg 2006b) - has been promoted (Biermann 2006: 237). Where globalization decomposes and transforms, global governance helps to restructure or at least think about how to restructure. Its insights may thus also help us in updating the concept of foreign policy.

2.1. **Defining global governance: political programme, normative and analytical concept**

The origins of global governance can be traced back to a two-fold desire: in the face of observed changes in the international system - resulting in large part from the transformation processes associated with globalization - , policy-makers and IR analysts felt that the dominant ways of both making and thinking about international politics had to be reconsidered (Weiss 2000: 796; Barnett/Sikkink 2008: 78).

To make sense of the term, a useful distinction can be made between global governance as a political programme used by policy-makers, an analytical concept used by scholars, and a normative concept in the hands of both scholars and policy-makers to either criticize or praise the emerging new structures of a global polity (Dingwerth/Pattberg 2006b; Smouts 1998). In this paper, we restrict our discussion to the empirical-analytical use of the term - global governance becomes thus a “narrative” of (Barnett/Sikkink 2008: 78) or “a perspective on world politics”, i.e. the non-normative attempt to grasp the changes we can observe in global policy-making (Dingwerth/Pattberg 2006a; Biermann 2006).

Understood as such, global governance can be defined as “the complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are me-
diated” (Weiss/Thakur 2006). Although difficult to operationalize, this definition has its value as a comprehensive description of the various dimensions that political reactions to globalization incorporate. It can thus be used to analytically dissect global governance into its main components, starting out with the two elements of the term itself: global and governance.

In essence, governance - from Greek “kubernan”, to steer - depicts a new type of political regulation. Where classical policy-making by governments involves top-down exercise of authority, governance can be considered as - a formal and institutionalized/centralized or informal and decentralized - collective process of political steering (Rosenau/Czempiel 1992). It is politics, i.e. “the authoritative allocation of values” (Easton 1953) or “the articulation of interests” and “establishing of rights and obligations” in above definition, without a single centre or a single organizing principle (Rosenau 1995: 16). Adding the attribute global to governance emphasizes the fact that this policy-making implicates above all the highest level, what used to be called international. Even more so, global refers, however, to the fact that governance is also all-encompassing in its reach: it stretches vertically across levels (from the inter-national to the local) and has a horizontal, transnational component to it (Dingwerth/Pattberg 2006; Rosenau 1995).

Taken together, the two terms depict thus a form of policy-making that is (i) multi-actor (public and private: states, markets, citizens, governmental and non-governmental organisations) without having a clearly definable locus of authority, (ii) multi-level, but not hierarchical, (iii) process-oriented, and that can be (iv) formal or informal, thus varying in shape according to issue areas (Held/McGrew 2002; Biermann 2006; Mürle 1998). In practice, global governance can thus take many different forms, ranging from classical top-down governance via international governmental organisations over networks, i.e. “horizontal rather than hierarchical channels of authority” to private, market forms of governance (Rosenau 2002: 77; 81).

In synthesis, global governance can be regarded as “a broad analytical approach to addressing the central questions of political life under conditions of globalization” (Held/McGrew 2002: 8). Though by no means a coherent theory, a global governance approach does offer a conceptual lens that helps to understand world politics in the 21st century. Defined and delimited as such, the question that needs to be addressed now is what global governance as analytical concept implies for the conduct and conceptual thinking about foreign policy.

2.2. Global governance as an analytical concept applied to foreign policy (analysis)

To systematically bring global governance insights and foreign policy together, we will once again make use of the catalogue of core analytical units of foreign policy analysis identified earlier.

The relevance of foreign policy

While globalization scholars may be less articulate about the future relevance of foreign policy, global governance analysts obviously do see a place for the political in this new global context. The mediation of interests between different entities through foreign policy becomes ever more crucial - and difficult - in an increasingly complex political arena. As long as these different entities belong to distinct communities, a line between inside and outside can be drawn and we can accordingly also assume that foreign policy continues to play a role.

The internal sphere

Turning to the actors, interests and aims of foreign policy in a globalizing world, states remain foreign policy actors, but in a global governance perspective EU foreign policy, MNC foreign relations or “NGO diplomacy” (Betsill/Correll 2007), among others, can equally be imagined. It becomes more difficult to pinpoint how and what type of foreign policy objectives are formulated by these actors. To start with, open frontiers and the increased transnationalization of societies lead to a growing impact of outside interests on the decision-making within an entity.
Further, as the emerging global governance architecture is characterized by variable geometry, the formulation of clear-cut overarching interests is rendered difficult. Interests and objectives rather need to be geared to the specific structures and actors that form the arena or network which deals with a particular issue. Where they used to be territorially and community defined, they are thus becoming more and more functionally defined. In that sense, the outside might determine to a larger extent what is considered an interest and a desirable goal by a foreign policy actor, without, however, dictating the precise option that this actor has to choose. This interpenetration of levels and of outside/inside also calls the very notion of an internal or domestic sphere into question. The variety of organizational forms that co-exist in the global governance arena also raise the question whether one core interest of any foreign policy actors is not to reduce the uncertainty and complexity of this new context by defining the goal of rendering the external environment less “messy”. With the idea of greater effectiveness in mind, structure-focused objectives may thus loom large in foreign policy for global governance.

Regarding the capacity that foreign policy actors need to dispose of in a context of global governance, a first necessity is to reconsider the concept of power: while “central to global governance” (Barnett/Duvall 2005: 57), it now comes in many different ways. Where the bargaining about institutions was mostly a thing of relational power in the hard, material sense in the classical IR accounts, a systematic conversion of one’s material power into impact on all actors and at all moments must be considered less and less realizable in a globalized world. “Globalizing structures” (Mittelmann 1996) therefore requires also structural power, i.e “the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and professional staff operate” (Strange 1988: 24-25). As seen, what becomes a particularly important precondition to convert one’s power into influence in global governance is access (cf. 1.2.2., Webber/Smith 2002: 202). Ideally, a foreign policy actor would strive for entry points to all global governance arrangements (institutions, networks) in various issue areas at all times. This requires, in turn, specific instruments that allow for being a part of such structures. The most obvious way to assure participation in governance is to be involved in and impact on the creation of new structures. To this end, foreign policy demands more long-term structural thinking and the creation of sustainable links with various other actors. This demands, in essence, continuous communication. Under global governance, new forms of diplomacy are thus emerging, where the traditional way of defining and defending interests may be replaced by a more open, more communicative way of determining what needs to be done and how.

The external sphere

The multi-actor and multi-level nature of the emerging global governance architecture implies that foreign policy has to deal with many - and many different types of - actors at the same time. Further, these actors not only operate by themselves, but can be part of larger structures that stretch across levels. Sub-state actors can play a role in global politics, NGOs can together form a global network operating at several levels at the same time. Furthermore, actors can come in different forms in different issue areas: where a state used to be a state whether the subject of negotiation was trade or arms control in the past, actors can now be lone riders in one arena and part of a powerful network in the next.

With the emergence of networks and under conditions of variable geometry, the structural features of the global governance architecture differ a lot: partially, new structures supersede old structures or co-exist with them, but in some areas that were rendered important by globalization (such as public health, transnational terrorism or migration) entirely new structures may have to be created or are emerging. Such structures can be highly institutionalized, organized according to multilateral principles (Novosseloff 2002), or extremely informal, such as loose governmental or private-public networks (Koenig-Archibugi 2002). The structures of global governance become,
in this perspective, more or less precise, more or less compulsive “systems of rules” (Rosenau 2002).

All in all, global governance as an analytical concept suggests that everything is still very much in a state of flow in this new global political arena - new actors are emerging and finding their place in the system, new issue areas are explored, defined and regulated, old structures reformed and new ones created. In short, as analytical perspective, global governance emphasizes that the external sphere is much more complex than the classical view of foreign policy would admit - and this has yet to be adequately reflected in foreign policy analyses.

**Foreign policy implementation**

Where globalization challenges the classical interpretation of the objects of influence attempts, employing a global governance lens can provide us with some (preliminary) answers to what may be needed to conduct effective foreign policy in the contemporary world.

In a context of global governance, the objectives of foreign policy require directing one’s actions not only at states, but at the entire range of actors and networks operant at various levels in the global governance arena. Not in the least, the focus of global governance studies on transnational relations (Brühl/Rittberger 2001: 2) demonstrates the necessity for foreign policy to target the societal level to a larger extent.

Further, global governance studies highlight that structures cannot be taken for granted. Foreign policy is in this perspective not just about the (pragmatic) solution of problems in ad-hoc coalitions or established institutions, but also about the (re-)definition of problems with a global reach and about the definition of where and how to treat these problems. As a matter of fact, the co-existence of many forms of governance arrangements may make it necessary - in terms of greater effectiveness - to interpret and shape these structures to suit one’s own objectives.

In synthesis, global governance offers a perspective on world politics that has important implications for the understanding and study of foreign policy. It suggests, above all, that the external sphere has - politically - changed so much that foreign policy actors may consider formulating different (less actor-focussed and more structure-focussed) objectives and designing new (communication-based) foreign policy instruments and strategies to realize these objectives.

The new type of foreign policy that global governance projects may not exist yet, or may exist only to some extent, but it seems necessary to adapt our analytical categories to the obvious changes in the way actors interact in global politics. Further exploiting the synergies between global governance and foreign policy may help to design a more appropriate way of analysing foreign policy in a 21st century context.

3. **Summary: contrasting traditional and alternative approaches to foreign policy analysis - neglected areas, new insights**

This part of the paper has served the purpose of clarifying how the core concepts of foreign policy analysis have been interpreted by the classical IR theories and constructivism, and how these interpretations have been challenged by globalization. Applying a global governance lens to foreign policy analysis then demonstrated that these challenges can partially be met if the concept of foreign policy is updated in line with a more differentiated thinking about today's world. Table 2 summarizes the main findings by comparing the traditional way of perceiving foreign policy to the perspective proposed by the globalization and global governance literatures, thus demonstrating that certain crucial features of changing world politics have so far been neglected. Constructivism, as a meta-theoretical approach, does not fit with either of the two perspectives. In Table 2, it has been placed on the side of the new perspectives, as it does highlight some fairly new aspects with regard to foreign policy analysis.
We have argued that globalization and global governance do not make foreign policy obso-
lete, but that they put pressure on it, demand for change and set the context for this change. Our
discussion of the classical interpretations of foreign policy and the fact that they continue to be
used in major current textbooks (Smith et al. 2008) demonstrate, however, that these still – and
despite all necessary and justified challenge - do have contributions to make to contemporary
foreign policy analysis.

Everything point thus to the conclusions that foreign policy as a complicated activity in a yet
more intricate context is much too complex to be looked at through a single lens. For the re-
mainder of the paper, we will thus advocate conceptual and theoretical pluralism, bringing to-
gether the various theoretical and conceptual offers discussed to develop our own conceptual
approach to the analysis of foreign policy in the 21st century.

IV. Structural foreign policy as a conceptual framework for studying foreign policy
in a context of globalization and global governance: The example of the Euro-
pean Union

On the backdrop of our discussion of the various lenses through which foreign policy can be
analysed, the objective of this part of the paper is to draw the lessons from new debates on global
politics in order to widen our understanding of foreign policy. Foreign policy may be transform-
ing before our faces, but we do not possess the conceptual tools to make sense of these changes
yet. The ultimate aim we pursue here is thus to bring forward some alternative analytical tools for
studying foreign policy, which are - in our view - appropriated for the context of globalization
and global governance.

To do so, we will firstly draw a sketch of the reconstituted foreign policy in the 21st century.
This essentially requires identifying which aspects of what we have labelled the “traditional per-
spective” may still be considered useful and necessary, and what has to be newly added. As seen,
globalization represents a series of gradual processes. In times of transformations, old and new
coeexist, and we will try to uncover what these different features are. In our discussion of the new
foreign policy concept, we will once again rely on the core analytical units of foreign policy analy-
sis. Even if the core topics and variables in foreign policy analysis may change over time, foreign policy as an activity remains, in essence, an actor’s use of capacities in order to influence others so as to promote its goals. The new concept of foreign policy we will bring forward - structural foreign policy - will then be used to analyse the European Union’s foreign policy.

1. (Re)conceptualizing foreign policy for the 21st century: towards a structural foreign policy

Globalization and global governance studies emphasize that contemporary global politics can, in essence, be regarded as a quest for structures - the creation or modification of frameworks within which actors can interact in the post-Cold War context and within which processes and flows can take place. In an attempt to take this observation into greater account, this section will introduce a novel concept to the analysis of foreign policy: structural foreign policy. It is two things at a time: a political reality and an analytical concept. As a political reality - a form of foreign policy - structural foreign policy has existed for a long time, but may be in the process of becoming a dominant feature of foreign policy in a context of globalization and global governance. As an analytical concept, it is fairly new (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008; Keukeleire 1998, 2002, 2003; Telo 2006). In our discussion, we will firstly explore its meaning as an analytical concept, before applying it in a second step to the European Union so as to show what it (can) mean(s) in practice.

Structural foreign policy as an analytical concept recomposes elements of older conceptualizations by injecting new ideas into them, without necessarily replacing them. As a matter of fact, a conventional reading of foreign policy continues to be of relevance, but to understand transformations in the making and conduct of foreign policy, a new, complementary conceptualization seems necessary. Structural foreign policy can be defined as

“a foreign policy which, conducted over the long-term, seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures. These structures characterize not only states and interstate relations, but also societies, the position of individuals, relations between states and societies, and the international system as a whole” (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 25-26).

While this definition shares with traditional definitions the focus on influence, it expands the range of objects of foreign policy, placing a special emphasis on structures and the long term (sustainability), and on the importance of a wider set of levels than just the state/inter-state level (comprehensiveness) (cf. Figure 1). Within the concept of structural foreign policy, structures consist of relatively permanent organizing principles and rules of the game that shape and order the political, legal, socio-economic and security fields. Structures are made operational through a complex organizational and/or institutional set-up that can vary from country to country, from society to society, and from region to region. For example, “democracy” is an organizing principle that shapes politics in many states, just as the principle of “free market” shapes the economies of many states. However, the way in which both are made operational differs considerably between countries. Furthermore, structures can be found at various levels: at the national (e.g., the Palestinian Territories), the regional (e.g., the Middle East) or the global level. In line with the assumptions made about multi-level interactions in the global governance literature, the various levels are also perceived as being interrelated here.

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As a first step in explaining the structural foreign policy concept, we situate it within the broader debate between the main theoretical paradigms in IR and within the debate on the structure-agency problem (Giddens 1984; Wendt 1987; Dessler 1989). This is particularly important as the qualification “structural” to label a specific type of foreign policy may lead to confusion about the exact meaning of the concept. A misunderstanding can result from the predominant use of “structure” or “structural” to qualify quite different theoretical approaches (e.g. structuralism, post-structuralism, structural realism, structural idealism) in the IR literature. Structural foreign is not affiliated with any of these structure-based accounts. Rather, the concept of structural foreign policy is based on perspectives and insights from various structure and agency-focussed approaches discussed in the first part of this paper. We agree thus with Zielonka (1998: 17) when he says that “one can be a liberal-constructivist-realist regardless of what the guardians of individual theoretical temples may think”, but even go beyond that view of theoretical pluralism by adding also concepts from the global governance literature to complete the picture. Our basic assumption is that the various major theoretical approaches are complementary to each other, as they all clarify different dimensions of the international realm. All have both strengths and limitations in their analytical and explanatory potential.

From the dominant neorealist and neoliberal assumptions, we accept that states are rational, interest-seeking and power-maximising egoists, with their behaviour being determined by the structure of the international system. However, the view on structures held in this paper differs quite a bit from the anarchy assumptions of neo-realists. Moreover, in our view, states are no more self-evidently the main and central actors in the international realm, and are - even when they seem to be successful in maximizing power - no more fully able to use their power resources effectively to pursue their interests. Further, this work shares the neoliberal institutionalist view that cooperation between states within international regimes and organizations is both possible and necessary in order to advance these states’ own and collective interests, and that multilateral institutions indeed matter. However, in our view, the pursuit of interests through multilateralism does not suffice. In the face of globalization leading to a growing interdependence and vulnerability of all actors in global politics, the realization of one’s interests no longer requires solely the pursuit of “self-regarding” collective interests, but also of “other-regarding” interests (where the interests of other actors are dominant, but where the state in question can derive indirect benefit from the improved situation of other actors), with this “other” not only referring to other states, but also to other types of actors (such as individuals and societies) (George/Keohane 1980: 221; Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 21-23).

The various constructivist approaches to IR provide another major foundation for our elaboration of the structural foreign policy concept. We share the view that reality is socially constructed, and that immaterial aspects such as values, cognition and identity are of crucial importance. Moreover, we adhere to a structurationist solution to the long-standing structure-agency debate in IR: in line with several other foreign policy analysts, such as Carlsnaes (1992) and Hill (2003: 295), we adopt the view that agency and structures are mutually constitutive (Giddens 1984). Structures enable as well as constrain action, they are at the same time the outcome and the medium of action (Waever 1994: 263). This mutually constitutive character of
agency and structure leads, on the one hand, to the recognition that structure can be the object of a foreign policy and that, consequently, influencing, changing and shaping structures can be a useful objective and tool of a purposeful foreign policy. On the other hand, the objective of shaping, changing and influencing structures precisely comes from the recognition that structures do constrain, enable and shape the behaviour and actions of agents (individuals, states or any other units). It is this latter insight that makes it interesting for a foreign policy actor to attempt to impact on structures. The latter ultimately become instruments in the hand of an actor for influencing the behaviour and actions of other agents profoundly and in an enduring way. In this context, we follow Wendt’s view that, while not easy, structural change is possible: just as structural reproduction, it is caused by a continuous process of interaction. Structures thus have a relatively permanent and enduring character, but this does not imply that change cannot occur. It is precisely this possibility of change that makes foreign policy appear in a new light: as structures are sustained by foreign policy practices, they can also be transformed by foreign policy practices (Wendt 1999: 185-186, 308-317). In this perspective, the long term becomes especially important. It is the sustainable change of structures that matters most. In view of their relatively permanent quality, influencing or changing the structures within which actors operate can be harder and take more time than influencing or changing the behaviour of actors in specific crises. However, if successful, the impact of these efforts can be both more profound and more enduring.

Having clarified the gist of the approach and the relevance of foreign policy as such from the perspective of the structural foreign policy concept, it can now be instructive to go a bit more into detail and see how this approach interprets the core analytical units of foreign policy analysis. To allow for a coherent presentation, the order of the three units will be inverted, starting with the external sphere.

**External sphere**

The structural foreign policy approach parts from assumptions that come very close to those made in the globalization and global governance literatures. In parallel to processes of globalization, which have transformed the external sphere into a multi-actor, multi-level arena, it accentuates the challenges currently posed to the Westphalian system and the breakdown of the East-West division. Both were ordering principles of the global plane, which have become undermined. This de-structuring process can have two consequences for foreign policy: from a neorealistic perspective, it can encourage states to strengthen their own (military) capabilities in order to try to survive in this increasingly dangerous and unpredictable world. The result is a renewed emphasis on foreign policy as it is conventionally understood, and particularly on the need for military instruments. However, the breakdown of the old structures can also be interpreted from a structural foreign policy perspective as an incentive for employing foreign policy techniques in order to re-structure the external arena with the aim of making the profound transformation processes resulting from globalization politically manageable.

This latter perspective implies that a structural foreign policy approach considers this external sphere not only as an ever more complex arena of multiple actors, but focuses particularly on the necessities and opportunities for (re-)creating and sustaining structures, defined above as relatively permanent organizing principles and rules of the game that shape and order the political, legal, socio-economic and security fields.

**Foreign policy implementation**

Globalization and global governance point to the necessity of rethinking the foci of foreign policy with regards to the types of objects (actors, structures), the levels, and the temporal dimension of foreign policy activity.
Where other states used to be the prime objects of influence attempts by foreign policy actors in the past, globalization has made it necessary to consider a broader range of objects. The structural foreign policy approach emphasizes that in the changed 21st century context, an effective foreign policy requires not only a continued attention to various forms of actors, events and conflicts, but, even more so, to processes, structures and the overall context all actors are embedded into. Structures (such as the Western-dominated international financial system) and processes (such as climate change, democratization, the transition to an open market economy, or the rise of anti-Western sentiments) have an impact on the behaviour of actors and provide the framework in which they operate. As such, they are at the roots of conflicts and can also be parts of their solution.

From a structural foreign policy perspective, these structures are interpreted widely (cf. Figure 1): material structures that assure military security or economic well-being can no longer be the only foci of foreign policy activity in a context of globalization. Other, immaterial dimensions such as culture, beliefs and identity become equally important targets (cf. Goldstein/Keohane 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Hudson 1997). Culture, beliefs and identity shape the perception and behaviour of actors, how they define their interests and what kind of role they want to play in the international system.

As seen above, structures exist at various, interrelated levels. From a structural foreign policy perspective, it would be insufficient to attempt influencing structures at one (e.g. the global or regional) level without tackling also the other levels (such as the societal and individual levels).

Finally, the structural foreign policy approach introduces a clear temporal dimension into the analysis of foreign policy (implementation). Foreign policy is, in this perspective, no longer only about short-term activities, but about durably altering structures. Foreign policy instruments are employed in a way that assures enduring changes to structures. The sustainability of structures depends, partially, on the extent to which they are seen as legitimate and are (or are becoming) part of the mindset, belief systems or mental structure of the people concerned (population and elites). Changes to structures will be more enduring when they are seen as desirable and legitimate, and not just as the result of external pressure or of a purely rational cost-benefit calculation (acquiescing in order to gain economic support, for example) (cf. Wendt 1999: 266-78). From a structural foreign policy perspective, a foreign policy is more likely to be successful if the promoted structures take into account, or are embedded into, traditions or processes that are endogenous to the target country, society or region. Where the elite and population share the same values, and view the structures being promoted as desirable, the latter will be more readily internalized. To target structures in this sense, a long-term foreign policy strategy is required.

All in all, the foreign policy implementation becomes, as a result of changes in the external sphere induced by processes of globalization, more multi-faceted. If the objects of foreign policy acts vary to such an extent, the preparation of foreign activities in the internal sphere demands also further adaptations.

**Internal sphere**

In calling the state centrisim of much foreign policy analysis into question, globalization and global governance (implicitly) open the debate about whether other entities than just states can also dispose of a foreign policy. A structural foreign policy perspective answers this positively.

The structural foreign policy approach can be applied to the analysis of the foreign policies of all sorts of actors, even if it emphasises that not all actors may have the same chances of successfully exerting a foreign policy that would fall under this approach. States’ external activities can be analysed with this approach as well as the external activities of entities such as regional integration projects and international organisations (e.g., the EU and the UN, but potentially also the Africa Union, ASEAN or the Arab League), which often dispose of a wide range of instruments and
methods to influence the political, legal, socio-economic, security and other structures beyond their own borders. Further, this approach can be employed to analyse the external - world-wide or regional - activities of other new or “non-conventional” entities. Examples are religious movements or groups such as Islamic movements or major international foundations, but also international financial or economic enterprises as far as they try to impact upon more than the financial and economic structures (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 298-327).

Turning to the policy making process, a structural foreign policy approach highlights above all the importance of the strategic decision of a foreign policy actor to adopt a more comprehensive and long-term oriented foreign policy strategy. This decision and the follow-up on it regularly require the implication of the highest (political) authorities. Within the context of a state, this means that the Minister (and Ministry) of Foreign Affairs plays an important role in preparing this policy, but that other government services and the Head of State or Government in particular can be expected to also play crucial parts in adopting the fundamental strategic decision. The wide range of instruments needed to implement a comprehensive, long-term foreign policy strategy indicates that other sectoral governmental (Ministries of Interior Affairs, Justice, Economics, Finance, specialized agencies) and non-governmental actors have to be taken on board in both preparing and - particularly - continuously carrying out this policy. In view of the wide range of policy instruments that have to be used and of the considerable budgets that have to be made available over a longer term, it is also clear that Parliaments are likely to play a larger role in this type of foreign policy. This increased complexity of the decision-making process also applies to other entities, such as international organizations, where even more actors can be expected to be implicated in the design of a foreign policy.

Turning to the objectives that are pursued by foreign policy actors in a context of globalization, we have argued that, from a structural foreign policy perspective, these are no longer deduced from “self-regarding”, egoistic interests, but from “other-regarding” interests, taking the preferences of actors in other parts of the world into account (George/Keohane 1980: 221; Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 21-23). Regularly, these objectives relate to the (re-)creation of structures. If they are to contribute to an effective long-term foreign policy, objectives will have to be elaborated with regard to the organising principles of political, economic or societal life at various levels. Structures at one level cannot be tackled in a sustainable and effective way if other levels are neglected. Further, from a structural foreign policy perspective, objectives are defined to a larger extent than in traditional accounts of foreign policy with regard to geographical entities (the globe, a region or a neighbourhood), but also with the prospect of influencing or shaping structures in a specific policy domain (such as governance structures with regard to environmental issues).

Finally, the realization of these aims requires capacities and instruments. The challenges posed by the 21st century context imply that military and diplomatic power and instruments continue to be essential, but are also insufficient for achieving all foreign policy goals. Military, hard power and military instruments must be complemented by economic and financial (soft) power and instruments. Hard power is essentially based on coercion. It rests on both inducements and threats (“carrots” and “sticks”) and can involve the use of military, economic or other instruments. Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others and to get others to want the outcomes that you want. It arises from the attractiveness of an entity’s culture, values, political ideals and policies, or from the perception that these are legitimate (Nye 2004).

While the larger focus on soft power as a capacity may be in order, the structural foreign policy perspective stresses, however, even more the importance of “structural power”, as opposed to traditional, relational power, i.e. the power of one actor to get another actor to do something it would not otherwise do (Dahl 1963). Structural power refers to the authority and capacity to set or shape the organizing principles and rules of the game and to determine how others will play that game (Holsti 1995: 69; Strange 1988). The possessor of structural power can “change the
range of choices open to others, without apparently putting pressure directly on them to take one decision or to make one choice rather than others” (Strange 1994: 31). The range of options available for an entity could be extended through the development of new opportunities, or restricted through the imposition of costs or risks, rendering some choices more attractive, and others more difficult. In altering the context in which other actors operate, the use of structural power can lead to fundamental and enduring changes in the actions, behaviour and identity of actors (cf. Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 23-24).

On top of coercive instruments, which continue to play a role, tools are needed that allow an actor to wield soft and structural power. These are, on the one hand, programmes and tools based on economic resources. Further, however, and in line with structurationist reasoning about structural change as the result of continuous processes of interaction (Wendt 1999), a structural foreign policy perspective points to the importance of tools that allow for access to and constant interaction with other actors. As a result, communication-based foreign policy instruments such as public diplomacy tools and foreign policy acts based on arguing (Risse 2000) - in combination with more traditional diplomatic tools - are considered to have a greater potential for the creation of structures simultaneously at all levels than in the past.

Altogether, a structural foreign policy lens demonstrates that the analysis of foreign policy can benefit from a greater focus on aspects that have been neglected so far - structures, soft forms of power, the long term -, but that become increasingly important in the context of globalization.

2. The European Union as a global actor: structural foreign policy in practice

Structural foreign policy is not only an approach to the study of foreign policy, but can also be a form of foreign policy when exerted by an actor. A suitable example of an actor that displays strong features of structural foreign policy in its external activities is the European Union. It will be used here to illustrate how the conceptual framework briefly outlined above can be applied to analyse political reality. Emphasis will again be placed on the three core analytical units of foreign policy analysis: the EU’s internal set-up, its interpretation of the external sphere, and its foreign policy implementation. To conclude, examples of EU structural foreign policy will be discussed.

Internal sphere

Concerning foreign policy decision-making, a structural foreign policy lens firstly instructs us to look beyond the traditional actors and procedures of foreign policy. While the number of actors is rather limited in the CFSP, other domains of EU foreign policy that emanate from the first or more than one pillar are characterized by the involvement of multiple, highly diverse actors. Decision-making in many EU foreign policy domains involves - inter alia - diplomats from ministries and the Council, the European Commission, specialized EU agencies, and specialized governmental actors as well as non-governmental actors (NGOs, professional organizations, research institutes etc.). The involvement of so many actors makes the process appear as rather complex. Quite regularly, it has been up to the Commission to assure the continuity and try to adopt a strategic long-term approach to certain foreign policy issues. It has steered and concretized the development of partnerships and taken the lead in framing the predominantly economic relations with third countries and other regions into a more global EU policy based on an outspoken strategic view on the developments in the various regions. As a by-product of the complex decision-making and of the input of the Commission, the resulting objectives that the Union defended in its external activities incorporated many different interests, and inserted itself more and more in a long-term strategic perspective (cf. Keukeleire 2003: 49-51).

The structural foreign policy approach further informs us that a consideration of an actor’s capacities and instruments should not stop with the traditional interpretations. In the
EU’s case, from a traditional perspective, it may be hardly contested that it is an economic, diplomatic, and, largely, also military heavyweight (Wouters et al. 2008; Biscop 2004). As for the immaterial capacities that form the basis of softer forms of power, the EU has profound experiences with continuous, institutionalized internal communication and the creation of structures among 27 entities that were originally independent. This also points to considerable resources of the EU in terms of structural power.

Concerning the instruments that EU structural foreign policy can rely on, a heavy dependence on the economic and financial instruments of the first pillar has been noted (Keukeleire 2003: 48-49). These European Community (EC) instruments are incorporated in the various support programmes and funds (such as PHARE, TACIS, MEDA, EDF) and in the different kinds of association agreements and trade and co-operation agreements that the EC concludes with third countries and other regions. Further, a number of diplomatic and political instruments play a role in the Union’s structural foreign policy. Central here is the political dialogue which has been developed with third countries and other regions. This type of dialogue extends across themes of foreign policy, going beyond political and security matters to also include many other economic and social policy areas (justice, migration, demographic developments etc.).

In sum, the EU’s foreign policy decision-making can, at least in part, be interpreted with a structural foreign policy lens as more than just the traditional formulation of self-centred interests involving a limited number of actors.

**External sphere**

The EU’s perception of the external sphere can be summarized fairly quickly: notwithstanding the continuous importance of a traditional reading of the external environment, the concepts of globalization and global governance are ubiquitous in EU discourse. Not only the Commission, but also other EU foreign policy actors increasingly interpret the external sphere as an arena of emergent global governance. This can best be observed in the seminal 2003 Commission communication “The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism” and the European Security Strategy (Commission 2003; Council 2003), both of which refer to global governance as a global political context. Also, other opinion pieces and statements made by high EU representatives (Solana 2007; Barroso 2008). Accordingly, the EU appears to have a very broad concept of the actors that populate this arena and has acknowledged - in documents (Commission 2003), but also in actions (see below) - the necessity to create, sustain or reform structures in this sphere.

**Foreign policy implementation and its effects**

Since the late 1980s, the EC/EU has conducted a clear structural foreign policy vis-à-vis the CEECs and, from the mid-1990s onwards, the structural foreign policy model has gradually become the mainstay of the EU’s relations across the Eurasian and African continents. In contrast to its conventional foreign policy, the EU’s structural foreign policy has been perceived by the member states as complementary to their own foreign policy and to that of other international actors (including the US, NATO and the UN). It has also been relatively easy for the EU to develop a structural foreign policy because it could often draw on well-developed first pillar procedures, budgetary resources and the institutional set-up. Characteristic features of such a policy are long-term, often very comprehensive economic and financial instruments that link incentives to duties on the side of the influence object, and allow thus for the creation of structures. These instruments may have a direct impact through the support of economic reforms and economic development, or through making financial means available for political or organizational change, e.g. for free elections or for structural reforms of the judicial system. The instruments may also
have an indirect impact: the promise of economic-financial support or of co-operation may be
used by the EU as a leverage to promote or enforce political and social reforms (such as the
organization of free elections, respect for the rights of ethnic minorities, etc.).

On paper at least, many of the EU’s policies towards other regions look rather far-reaching.
However, when assessing the EU’s structural foreign policy, it is important to differentiate be-
tween (a) a structural foreign policy discourse and set of objectives; (b) a structural foreign policy
which translates these words and goals into operational measures with budgetary resources; and
(c) a structural foreign policy that is also actually having a structural foreign policy effect (the fol-
lowing analysis is taken from: Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 255-297).

The EU has structural foreign policy discourse and objectives vis-a-vis most regions of the
world (including regions such as ASEAN and Latin-America). It has an operational structural
foreign policy (to varying degrees) towards the CEECs, the Balkans, the Mediterranean area,
some countries in the CIS and to a lesser degree sub-Saharan Africa. However, for the time being
the EU has only had a successful structural foreign policy effect with the CEECs and potentially
also the Balkans. In contrast, the impact of policies towards the Mediterranean have been disap-
pointing, and towards Africa have so far failed to effect real positive change, while it is too soon
to judge the long-term effects of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Some short comments on
the EU’s policy towards the CEECs, the Balkans and the Mediterranean can be illuminating to
understanding the EU’s structural foreign policy.

In contrast to what is often asserted, the EU’s policy towards the East did not start with the
1993 Copenhagen criteria that initiated the enlargement process. Prior to the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the Iron Curtain in late 1989, the EC was already supporting and promoting structural
reforms in Central and Eastern Europe, despite US doubts about whether these reforms should
be taken seriously. In a strong expression of both positive and negative conditionality avant la
lettre, the EC developed an active policy from the moment some of the CEECs began to ques-
tion their decaying communist structures and adopt reform measures. Following the Copenhagen
Criteria of 1993, the candidate countries were confronted with a highly detailed list of conditions
in nearly every policy domain that had to be fulfilled. The EU was exporting its structures and
values beyond its territory and embedding the CEECs within its own structures, policies and be-
liefs. This resulted in a gradual socialization and Europeanization of the CEECs, leading in 2004
and 2007 to their accession to the EU. The successful transformation, democratization, stabiliza-
tion and incorporation of ten neighbouring countries concluded one of the most geostrategically
significant foreign policy achievements of the EU, and indeed of the ‘West’ more globally.

It has been with the CEECs and the countries of the Balkans that the EU could play its
trump card – the prospect of accession. However, these regions also had other characteristics: the
EU was able to take a long-term approach; could tackle all structures in a comprehensive and
consistent manner; the structures it was promoting were embedded in endogenous processes; and
the conventional foreign policy problems were tackled by other actors and gradually diminished.
The extent to which the EU was able to tackle the mental structures of the target region’s elites
and populations was especially high in this case. In Central and Eastern Europe, a large majority
of the population and the elite wanted change. While they might not have been palatable, the
costs associated with these changes were accepted because the end goal was firmly rooted in the
popular consciousness. These factors meant that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
and the Balkans more or less met the conditions for a successful structural foreign policy in a way
that has not been mirrored in the other regions of the world discussed here.

The foreign policy efforts of the international community in the Balkans intertwine conven-
tional and structural foreign policy, relational and structural power, hard and soft power. After
the peace agreements at the end of the Bosnian and Kosovo wars it was clear that the continued
presence of extensive military forces alone would not achieve sustainable peace. To achieve sustainable peace would require a fundamental transformation of the region in order to gradually desecuritize interstate and intersocietal relations. It is in this transformation process that the EU’s role has been key. From a position of impotence in the 1990s, it has evolved into a key actor in the region, employing the full range of instruments at its disposal. The EU is undertaking its most comprehensive and challenging structural foreign policy, which works on the majority of structures (political, legal, socio-economic, security) and levels (individual, societal, intrastate, interstate, intersociety, regional). The EU’s structural foreign policy towards the Balkans is, however, only successful because its actions have been complemented by NATO’s strong conventional foreign policy in the region.

The cornerstone of the EU’s policy is the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). Launched in 1999, the SAP is based on a progressive partnership with each country, in which the EU offers a mixture of trade concessions, economic and financial assistance (through the Instrument for Pre-Accession, which in 2007 replaced the CARDS Programme) and contractual relationships (through Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA), which govern the political, trade and economic relations of the EU with the Balkans countries. In this policy, the EU has gone beyond the common elements of conditionality that governed its relations with the CEECs pre-accession (democracy, rule of law, human rights and market economy reforms). The EU has added further conditions related to the Balkans’ specific post-war situation and the need to overcome regional antagonism. The EU is increasingly effective in fostering structural change in the Balkans. However, a range of factors within both the EU and the region indicates this transformation will continue to be a difficult process. Levels of interstate and intrastate animosity remain high, and, while restoring war damaged infrastructure is relatively straightforward, rebuilding economic structures and particularly repairing the societal and psychological damage of war is far from it. In conjunction with 45 years of communist rule which only ended in 1991, it is clear that the adaptation of mental structures and interiorization of the new rules of the game, essential elements of an effective structural foreign policy, are a very real challenge in this region.

In the mid-1990s, the EU wanted to apply to its relations with the Mediterranean the objectives and methodology that had proved so successful with its Eastern neighbours. The EU envisaged fundamental changes in the political, legal, economic and societal structures within the individual Mediterranean countries, in their mutual relations and in their relations with the EU. However, in this case the EU could not play its trump card – the prospect of accession. The groundbreaking Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 1995 in Barcelona for the first time brought together Foreign Ministers of the EU member states with their colleagues from the Maghreb, the Middle East and Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. The Barcelona Conference established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and laid the foundations of a process designed to build a comprehensive multilateral framework for dialogue and cooperation in the three dimensions of the partnership: the political and security partnership; the economic and financial partnership; and the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. Despite its limitations and ambiguities, the EMP looked promising: it focused on genuine structural reforms, was comprehensive in nature and could rely on a wide set of policy instruments. However, despite the intrinsic value of this unique institutionalized framework for Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and cooperation, a decade later disappointment overshadowed the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process. Although the structural foreign policy dimension was strong in both intent and the set-up of the EMP, it was weak in terms of output and effects, as it has not acted as a motor for far-reaching structural change. This failure was a hard lesson for the EU: that pursuing a long-term and comprehensive structural foreign policy, without being able to provide an answer to the conventional foreign policy challenge of the Middle East peace process, was impossible. Furthermore, the EU’s structural foreign policy was never going to be effective because its objectives were not sufficiently supported by endogenous forces and actors.
These explanations for the failure of the Barcelona Process are relevant to evaluating the EU’s attempts to upgrade and ‘rescue’ the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership through the European Neighbourhood Policy. Even if endogenous support for structural change exists among the political and economic elites of some Mediterranean countries, this support is not the case for all ENP partners. Also, in the handful of countries with a (moderately) reformist leadership, endogenous public support for modernization, liberalization and ‘Western’ reforms appears to be fading among some sections of society, with support for the competing Islamic structures increasing. A problem for the sustainability and legitimacy of the EU’s ENP strategy is that the EU has once again failed to pay sufficient attention to the immaterial dimension of foreign policy, to the societal and human security dimension, and to the interests of its partners.

3. The promises and pitfalls of using the concept of structural foreign policy for the analysis of EU foreign policy

Structural foreign policy as an analytical framework displays a number of advantages when it comes to reconceptualising foreign policy under conditions of globalization. It highlights numerous features - above all the importance of structures and the long term - that have been largely absent from the analysis of foreign policy in the past. In doing so, it erases some of the blind spots that have hindered a full understanding of foreign policy as agency in a world in transformation. The conceptual framework is particularly strong when applied systematically and in detail to a specific case of foreign policy, such as the EU’s policy vis-à-vis the Mediterranean. It requires a precise tracing of all actions on the part of the EU and of the reactions to it. If this is carefully done, the approach leads to insights into the Union’s strategic approach and its bases, but also to the effects of this foreign policy, allowing thus for a comprehensive foreign policy analysis.

The necessity to trace actions and reactions over a longer period of time in order to understand long-term changes, and particularly the need to isolate variables and establish causal relations entails that the approach is difficult to operationalize. This major shortcoming of structural foreign policy should, however, in our view, not serve as an excuse for producing exclusively analyses which are feasible, but ultimately less relevant when they neglect important features of contemporary foreign policy practice (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 336-338).

Overcoming this shortcoming requires further conceptual thinking. If analyses manage to prove the worth of this framework, structural foreign policy can be a valuable complementary approach for accounting for the EU’s foreign policy activities. In the face of important challenges posed by such problems as energy security, climate change or global terrorism, traditional foreign policy forms may increasingly be complemented by policies that operate with a long-term perspective, strategically targeting actors and structures.

V. Conclusion

This paper parted from the observation that the concept of foreign policy as it has been understood traditionally by foreign policy analysis and interpreted by IR theories (neo-realism, neoliberalism) has come under considerable challenge in an era of globalization. In an effort of reinvigorating this concept, insights from the global governance literature were systematically applied to the core analytical units of foreign policy. This exercise allowed for the identification of a number of neglected areas of contemporary foreign policy analysis.

On this backdrop, the paper advanced an alternative approach - structural foreign policy - to incorporate some of these neglected dimensions into the study of foreign policy in a 21st century
context. The structural foreign policy approach can be applied to states and other foreign policy actors and proves to be a particularly useful way of thinking about the relationship between these actors and structures at various levels in a context of globalization and global governance. It can be especially helpful when assessing comprehensive and long-term foreign policy strategies. It proves, however, for the time being, difficult to operationalize - and further conceptual thinking is necessary on how these difficulties can be overcome.

VI. Bibliography


