



ESDP and Strategic Culture; A Study on the Feasibility of Common European Strategic culture

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Introduction

A general approach in the study of the emergence of a European strategic culture represents major dilemmas. First, the EU is not a clearly defined actor in terms of security policy-making; it is not a state in the Westphalian sense and so far has pursued military policies usually pursued by international organisations. In addition, the study on the feasibility of a homogenous European strategic culture should aim to address the fact that the EU and the institutional underpinnings of ESDP are based on a clash of intergovernmental and federal pursuits. As such, I will pursue my study based on the hypothesis that the EU is a single state and I will try to explore the different strands of strategic culture that could have been represented for such a state. Following the scenario that the pursuit and implementation of ESDP has been successful, and with the EU acting as a federal state I will try to explore the effect that specific parameters, such geography and history, have on the development of a common European strategic culture.

For the purposes of this paper we shall make a major assumption. We will assume that the EU is a single state and try to explore the different strands of strategic culture that could have been representative for such a state. We will try to take a leap forward and assume that the European project has been a complete success and a super state based on a federal system has evolved through the now divided/united continent. In doing so we will not focus on a conclusive analysis of future developments but rather we will aim to provide an insight on the processes and development of a European strategic culture. Similar projects have been done by Mearsheimer (Mearsheimer 1991) in his now famous article , “Back to the future”, and by Hyde- Price (Hyde-Price 1991) with the four scenarios for 2010 Europe.

The basic assumption for this exercise will be that the pursuit and implementation of ESDP has been successful and that the EU is a federal state. As such, it provides a large degree of internal independence for the various states that comprise it and a central government based most likely in Brussels concerned with foreign relations, defence, economics and cross boundaries issues. We shall also assume that the EU expansion has stopped with the inclusion of the rest of the Balkan countries. Turkey will continue to be outside the Union decision centres while it will have extended trade relations and privileges with the EU.

The EU is a hybrid between a group of different independent states and an institution that tries to speak in the name of everyone. Hence a delicate balance has to be preserved between the centre of the Union and the centrifugal forces of the different states. When one is examining the EU as a whole one has to take both of these elements into consideration. This duality that the EU is portraying while at some instances can be beneficial, particularly as a way of smoothing differences between states, at the same time it can be a great obstacle in the formulation of common policies when different national interests exist. Therefore, the examination of the existence of a common European Strategic Culture in the EU has to face this problem. At the same time national strategic culture in itself cannot be considered as a solid notion steaming from only one source. In every nation there are different actors that affect the final representation of strategic culture to the outside world. The difficulty in distinguishing the degree of influence of each different actor creates a fundamental problem in the study of strategic culture. Hence in our hypothesis we will not include different inputs of EU actors, such as the EU Military staff, or COPS, but rather we will try to explore as much as possible the objective determinants for the creation of a common EU strategic culture. European strategic culture cannot be but an amalgamation of European *communautaire* strategic culture and different countries values and interests. Consequently, an examination of European Strategic culture should involve both the Brussels-based strategic culture and the pattern of behaviours that can be observed at the national level. On account of the increasing institutionalisation of the ESDP in the past 5 years, Brussels has moved towards a convergence of views at the level of civil servants and military staff. This has unmistakably led to the creation of a distinct Brussels strategic culture. The fact that the EU is in many respects a different political entity than any of its component parts can make us expect that some of the features of its strategic culture could be different. A successful European strategic culture would need to capture and draw upon similar norms, ideas and practices regarding security and defence policy and the legitimate use of force as its constituent parts have. In other words, a European strategic culture is not taking the place of national strategic cultures, but it should primarily be conceived of as the increasing institutionalisation of those ideas, norms and values that are sufficiently shared at the national level (Meyer 2004:6).

Efforts made to codify research on strategic culture (Booth and Trood 1999) are suited to individual states rather than international actors like the EU. The European Union cannot be considered one state as long as individual sovereignty is maintained and as long as

each member state has the power to veto or even not to opt in to any decision dealing with foreign matters and national security issues. As long as member states are not ready to fully submit their national security to the centralized power of single European security agency the study of common strategic culture is very difficult. Furthermore, even this minimal consensus on security issues that emerged after the Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam and the St-Malo summit cannot be critically assessed in terms of producing a common strategic culture. Too little time has passed since these agreements took place for them to be in a position to affect considerably the individual strategic cultures of member states, let alone to foster a common strategic culture consistent and identifiable throughout the Union's actual actions and policies. A further obstacle in the study of the European Union's strategic culture is the fact that the Union has not been involved in actual fighting nor has it been as yet faced with decisions having to do with the declaration of war or the actual use of force in large scale. The European Union has purposefully confined itself to the Petersberg tasks, which do not include any references to actual territorial defence, leaving the whole matter of territorial defence to the hands of NATO. This fact denies us the possibility of actually testing Europe's responses in issues involving the use of force in a foreseeable time horizon. The assumption that the EU is a single state allows us to avoid problems related with the current status of the Union.

1 Sources of Strategic Culture

1.1 Geography and resources

The EU's natural borders will be the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, the Northern Sea and the plains of Ukraine and Belarus in the East. Having defined like that the physical borders of the future EU it is clear that any danger of invasion would come from the East, the traditional path of all extra-European invaders throughout the centuries. In addition, these borders would mean that the EU is very close to areas of increased instability. A condition that will be aggravated in time as the quantities of available hydrocarbons will keep diminishing. It can be safely assumed that an invasion by a third state is not possible in the foreseeable future. Of course the possibility of a strong EU state at the Western borders of the Russian Federation might awake its defensive reflexes. However at least for the foreseeable future we can assume that Russia will be neutralised through increased interdependence in the fields of energy and economics. Threats stemming from the geography of the Union have already been safely dismissed under the new European Union's Security Strategy (Solana 2003). Future threats would have nothing to do with actual territorial invasion or anything of this sort. They would be rather threats that come from terrorism and instability in the EU's periphery. The inner abroad would be far more important and unstable in the future that it is today and will be a major threat to EU's stability and prosperity itself (Solana 2003).

The development of the EU armed forces will also be naturally affected by geographical factors. The fact that there would be no immediate threat for EU's borders and that most of EU's interests would be found at the closest in its inner-abroad and at the farthest deep inside Africa would suggest that its armies should have a strong expeditionary character rather than territorial defence. In addition, its navy and air force should be organised in such a way as to increase the efficiency of such operations. Instead of air and sea battles the focus of their training should be rather ground support operations.

Strategic resources have always been a major problem for European states. Dependence on foreign resources has bore an imprint on individual strategic cultures accordingly. Consequently, EU's strategic culture should reflect the need for a guarantee of constant supply of desired materials. However, owing to technology innovations we are becoming better at finding, producing and recycling materials. Diversifying sources of supply and the development of synthetic substitutes and alternative production technologies will

continue to weaken the concept of strategic resource dependencies for developed countries. In case of crisis in a source country any choke-point can be now by-passed. The fundamental interests of EU countries are under little risk from any attack against their trade routes or resources. The only exception to that would be the oil market. Although other sources of supply will eventually become more important, this is likely to continue to be largely dominated by the Gulf oil producing countries. Disruptions to Gulf oil supplies could be by-passed in a short term crisis, provided that good relations with alternative suppliers are maintained. In a crisis of longer duration, alternatives would be difficult and prohibitively expensive. Only towards later in the century are alternative energy sources likely to begin to challenge the dominance of hydro-carbons. World reserves of fossil fuels are not expected to run out by 2030, or for some time thereafter, but will become increasingly concentrated geographically. The main sources of supply will include Russia and Central Asia, Iran and Libya. Offshore resources are likely to become a growing source of international dispute and potential conflict, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. In the developing world, there is potential for aggressive competition for resources as nations seek to industrialise, to cope with population growth and to meet expectations of an improved standard of living. Increasing industrialisation, often without effective health and safety or environmental controls, will pose significant hazards both to people and to the environment through accidental or indirect damage. Deliberate damage to the environment may also be used as a strategic tool by adversaries.

It is said that the next world war will be over water. This statement might seem currently far fetched but the truth remains that water and other resource shortages may become a cause for tension and conflict. The Middle East and Africa provoke perhaps the greatest concern about water shortage: by 2025, 40 countries in the regions are expected to experience water stress or scarcity (UNESCO and WWAP 2003). Resource scarcities and flooding are likely to prompt population migrations which may place unmanageable burdens on recipient states, many of whose economies are already stressed, whilst inflaming existing ethnic, cultural or religious tensions. It is possible that global warming will become an increasing source of tension between industrialised countries, which are seen to be the primary source of the problem, and developing countries which bear the brunt of the effects. Population wise, Europe is getting older. Currently 21% of the population of the EU are over 65. This is expected to rise to 34% by the middle of the century. This means that around two-thirds of the population of European countries will not be "economically active" (United

Nations 2003). Accordingly, tax revenues will come under pressure, whilst there will be increased demands on health and welfare spending. In particular, most European governments are already faced with pension liabilities which are projected to rise substantially as a percentage of GDP, making them progressively more difficult to fund from available revenues. One of the possible solutions would be to bring in more resources from outside Europe, as increased trade revenue from finished goods/services and raw materials. An outward looking strategic culture for the EU is justified therefore when one takes into consideration its geography and its primary resources. Solana amply described the main characteristic of this strategic culture in his European Security Strategy: “the first line of defence will often be abroad” .

The few elements of a common strategic culture that can be traced currently in the EU are greatly affected by the existence, or better, the lack of specific resources relevant to the actual implementation of different agendas. The lack of capabilities from the European Union has been a well documented fact in the relevant literature (Andreani et al. 2001, Courlay 2001, Everts et al. 2004, Hill 1993, Schake 1999). The European Union lacks the basic capabilities in order to be able to formulate a credible foreign policy like an organization of its magnitude is supposed to have. The ability of strategic air lift until the introduction of the new A- 400 heavy air transporters is lacking. Until this is rectified it has to rely on the strategic lift that the US can offer at its discretion under the NATO-EU cooperation schemes (Berlin Plus Agreement), and on what can be leased from Russia and Ukraine. At sea things are equally restrained as the European Union lacks the appropriate vessels for a considerable projection of force beyond the horizon. The EU as a whole does not have any considerable airplane carrier ability to facilitate operations in hostile environments where the use of land airports would not be available. The issue of resources available for military operations, as a whole, does not present a novel consideration. It has tantalised American - European relations for decades through the renowned burden sharing issue. The very fact that Europe is lacking the significant military resources needed for a USA style foreign policy has given rise to the Venus-Mars debate (Kagan 2002, 2003). The question that arises so often from this debate forms a circular argument. Does Europe have a more soft power-oriented strategic culture and approach to international affairs because of its weakness in resources or, inversely, is the weakness in resources the result of Europe’s different approach to world affairs (Kagan 2002, 2003). The question has yet to be answered satisfactorily. History has plenty of examples that dictate the former to be true and as soon as a state becomes powerful its love for

multilateralism and peaceful solution dissolves through the aroma of true power. United States itself presents a prime example for such a change. Early in the last century the lack of significant military strength dictated a pacifist approach but as soon as military strength came in the equation things changed. There is the hope that such reactions will diminish in the 21st century. The belief in the power of institutions is something that has coloured the end of the last century for better or worse. Based on this dichotomy of views we will take the middle road and assume that the European Union, true to its character, will be a hybrid of old and new world powers.

Europe is in principle as technologically advanced as the USA and perhaps in certain fields even more. All the while, it does not have the increased American reflexes on the loss of human life and the almost dogmatic belief on the supremacy of the new technologies as war winning tools for the wars that ensue. These differences could be explained by both historical and factual arguments pertaining to resources. European Union members had until recently armies prepared strictly for territorial defence against the superior numbers of the Soviet block. Since the end of the Cold War Europeans have cashed hard on the peace dividend and have greatly reduced their defence spending (at times below the 3% threshold), with notable exceptions Greece and the UK for their own particular reasons. The demilitarization of EU nations inescapably renders unrealistic even the conceptualisation of a more aggressive foreign policy.

1.2 History and experience

Europe is a place full of historical experience and there are lessons to be taught from it. The EU project itself at its very beginning was an effort to go over history and to respond to the then recent destruction caused by World War II. This very fact constitutes the core difficulty in order to study the historical course of the Union. Accumulated knowledge of the past plays an important role in the shaping of strategic culture for the constituent members of the EU. The formative years for the EU are the years of WWII and its aftermath. These years were traumatic for most EU members. The last time that Europe as a whole was engaged in a total war was in WWII. Since then no major military conflict has taken place on European soil, with the exception perhaps of the Yugoslav wars of succession which in any case were not of a pan-European scale. For one to say that EU states have common historical experiences would be simply an oversimplification. One must always keep in mind the distinct historical past of each member state. On the one hand, we have nations like the UK and France that came out victorious from the last Great War in Europe and both of which were once global empires. On the other, we have countries like Germany and Italy that came out defeated and devastated. In addition, the war experience of some of the member states involved their engagement in places away from the European continent, (UK in the Falklands in early '80s, France in Indochina in the '50s and Algiers in the '60s, Belgium in Congo). The experiences drawn by the different states from these wars varied depending on the nature of the particular conflict and, of course, on its result. For the UK it was proven that military power was effective and helped to boost the self confidence of an ex world empire whose prestige had suffered greatly with the loss of its colonies and with events such as the Suez crisis. Conversely, the experience of France's colonial wars did not do much in boosting its prestige. This had to be the case, as their result was France's humiliating withdrawal and the total loss of its intercontinental territories. Germany, on her part, had no military experience whatsoever after WWII. The reason was that it was self-restrained by its constitution and its foremost consideration was to defend itself from a possible attack from the USSR. At the same time, there are the countries of the former Eastern block that are only now starting to make their individual steps in the world arena after 50 years of political castration by the USSR. Further, Scandinavian states are characterized principally by a traditional adherence to political neutrality. This formed the basis of their current prosperity. Finally, we have to take into consideration countries with their own political micro-histories that can not be placed comfortably in broad categories. On the one hand, Spain and Portugal have created an

aversion for military intervention that is to be explained by the extensive involvement of their militaries in politics in the past. On the other hand, Greece even though of a similar political past to that of Spain and Portugal, has a completely different approach to military matters. Her unique approach to the possibility of armed conflict has been shaped by the constant frictions with Turkey. One can conclude from the above that approaches to issues of war and peace in a European context on a state level are heavily dependent on past experience and hence lack uniformity. For some states, war remains a useful, even if unpleasant tool, while for others not even the concept is acceptable.

Efforts to create a common foreign and security European policy can be traced back to the 1950s. During the Cold War such initiatives had little prospects of actually arriving at a concrete end because at that time NATO, and in effect the US, guaranteed European security. The collapse of the Iron Curtain altered that situation. Voices were raised in both sides of the Atlantic calling for an American withdrawal and a more autonomous European security policy. The Franco-German response to this climate was to propose a 'European pillar' inside NATO. The introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) when the treaty of the Union came into effect on 1 November 1993 was seen as a step towards this direction. Nevertheless the reinvigoration of the Western European Union (WEU) for this aim was not as fruitful as it was hoped, since member states failed to expand their defence expenditures or to allow the material development of national or pooled capabilities (Terriff et al. 2001). The development of the CFSP, and with it the Union's external profile, depended on the willingness of key European states and the Union itself, for varying reasons, to try to animate a more comprehensive framework for its external relations in the post-cold war world by beginning to look to the military end of the toolbox of competencies (Deighton 2002). Within the EU, the range of security policies – Civilian Power Europe Mark I (Stavridis 2001) – were being developed at the same time in the Balkans, supplemented by the wider economic and diplomatic tolls of the Union. It was this atmosphere and line of events that produced the Anglo-France St-Malo declaration in December 1998. The declaration said that: "The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role in international stage. To this end the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible, military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, acting in conformity with our respective obligations to NATO".

Perhaps the two most important formulating experiences for the Union in this respect were the Kosovo war and the Second Iraq war. Both of these underlined the Union's inability to control and agree on matters of war and peace.

Events in Yugoslavia during the first half of 1999 highlighted the necessity for greater European cooperation. The Kosovo conflict demonstrated to the EU countries that many – though far from all – of their fundamental foreign policy interests were similar. EU governments, supported by a good part of their respective public opinion, were appalled by the ethnic cleansing and turned a worrying eye to the floods of refugees. It was then determined that some form of action should be taken in regard to the policies of Milosevic. The governments understood that they would often have better chance of achieving their objectives if they combined their efforts. For example, if all the member-states pursued separate and independent policies on how to restore economic and political stability to former- Yugoslavia, they would be unlikely to achieve a great deal (Grant 2000). Furthermore, the Kosovo conflict demonstrated the serious shortcoming in Western Europe's ability to undertake a crisis-management-type operation as the US had to provide around 60% of the aircraft and resources. The lesson learned by the EU from Kosovo was that if it was more effective militarily it would have had more diplomatic clout (Grant 2000). The dramatic events of the 'wars of Yugoslav succession' had a major galvanizing effect in respect to common policies. Thus, the UK appears to have crossed a European Rubicon; France appears to have made peace with NATO and Germany appears to have relaxed its aversion to professional militarism and its preference for civil approaches to foreign and security policies (Howorth 2002).

The other formative experience for the European Union was the debate that preceded the Second Iraq war in 2003. Europe was divided in pro-war and anti-war nations with tensions rising and creating one of the worst crises inside the Union. The EU did not manage to raise a single voice on the issue apart from some statements of principle that had to offer little to actual events. A series of letter exchanges took place during the period preceding the invasion of Iraq. European Union newcomers, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland aligned with Spain, Portugal, Italy and the United Kingdom and issued the 'Letter of the Eight' (José María Aznar et al. 2003) in the European press three days after the European Council of the 27 January 2003. The letter called for support for the US cause in Iraq. The second Gulf war and the debate around it clearly demonstrated to the Europeans that they do not have common views on the very basic issue of the use of force, let alone on the

cultivation of a common strategic culture. In its official statements and documents the European Union had always evangelized a limited use of force and the use of economic rather than military weapons in dealing with world crises. Nevertheless when such times came everything collapsed and despite the efforts of the Greek Presidency at the time the EU as a whole did not produce a coherent single line of policy. The exception was some statements based on the least common denominator, which had no real practical use. What really mattered at that point were the interests of the different member states and these were deeply divided amongst themselves. The only advantage to be found in the aftermath of this debacle was the realisation by the European leaders that the absence of a shared threat assessment, and hence a shared strategic culture, was the key element that defined the dispute over Iraq and the EU approach to security as a whole.

1.3 Political structure and defence organization

Since the end of World War II and during the Cold War, Europe has been governed by various gradations of two major political systems, socialism and liberal democracy. Western Europe followed the liberal paradigm while Eastern Europe was under the influence of the Soviet Union and its political system. The end of this dichotomy came with the collapse of the Eastern Block and the end of the Cold War. Today, liberal democracy is the norm and in fact a prerequisite to all member states of the EU, old and new. In terms of collective defence structures NATO continues to be the organization of choice. Following its last enlargement NATO nowadays covers most of Europe including in its members many of the former Eastern Block states.

The EU's military project was formally launched in the 1999 Cologne Council, in the midst of NATO's Kosovo intervention. Javier Solana was confirmed as the new High Representative for the CFSP and set the Union's military role under the Petersberg Tasks. Such a breakthrough could not have taken place without the pressures of the Kosovo campaign and was made possible largely only due to the UK-France understanding in the Saint-Malo summit.

“The European Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises...”(Franco-British 1998).

1.3.1 CORE VALUES AND BELIEFS

The EU aspires to consider itself as a strategic factor with specific and unique values and interests which it has to protect and project. The European Union Institute for Strategic Studies according to its publication on European Defence: A proposal for a white paper (Gnesotto et al. 2004), tries to tabulate these values and interests:

“All EU members have vital interests, beginning with the defence of the Union's territorial integrity, economic survival and its social and political security. The ‘value interests’ of the Union lie in the promotion of a stable and peaceful environment in its neighbourhood and in the strengthening of the rule-based international order” (Gnesotto et al. 2004 p: 13).

The European Union is a community firmly based on values such as liberal democracy and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The European Union's international face is based on the projection and support of its values and interests. One of the documents that incorporate these values and principles is the Article 2 and 3.4 of the draft Treaty for The Constitution:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination . . . In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protection of human rights and in particular children's rights, as well as to strict observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter” (Inter Governmental Convention 2003: Article 2).

As a result of its turbulent past European Union relies, as guiding principle, on peaceful means to negotiate and settle disputes (Gnesotto et al. 2004 p:27). As a consequence of that the EU has created a preference to first use it's so called 'soft' rather than it's 'hard' power. On the other hand it is argued by many that this preference to 'soft' power rather than to 'hard' is not a result of that turbulent past but rather of its inability to master the appropriate capabilities for such action. Furthermore the Union has over the past decades tried to cultivate and implement a moral diplomacy. In this, European governments have been at the forefront of the international community in recognising and promoting a *droit d'ingérence humanitaire*. This practice has been institutionally incorporated in the 'Petersberg tasks' and lead to the Union's involvement in various humanitarian crises both in Europe and beyond. Finally, the Union has considered the UN Charter as the cornerstone for international security and stability. For the Union the UN Charter should be the essential guide for any peace enforcement and peacekeeping operation throughout the world. Overall, international agreements in the context of international institutions are considered to be the best way of attaining security. Finally there is a clear preference on behalf of the Union in multilateral uses of force. A preference that is clearly stated in the European Security Strategy document of 2004:

“In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective

multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective” (Solana 2003 p: 9).

Intervention therefore cannot be possible unless it has at least the efficacy of a clear ethical or humanitarian goal. Adding to that any European government would only be able to sustain political support for intervention if its purposes are seen as just and legitimate (Hyde-Price 2004).

The EU has a holistic approach to security. It does not concentrate only on what is denoted by the traditional definition of the term. It includes global warming, energy security and various regional crises, but at the same time it manages to put more emphasis on three main threats to European security: terrorism, WMD proliferation and failed states/organized crime (Solana 2003). Similarly, the way to tackle these threats is all inclusive and not limited to military tools. The ESS stresses that *‘today’s threats are more dynamic and more complex [...] none of the threats is purely military; each requires a mixture of instruments’* (Solana 2003).

1.3.2 SECONDARY BELIEFS AND BEHAVIOUR

Europeans have a long lasting belief in the value and use of alliances. Europe has seen in the course of years many great alliances rise and fall within its geographical confines. The United States of America is a traditional ally of Europe and for almost half a century it has underwritten Europe’s security through NATO. This alliance is not going to change in the foreseeable future. Under our scenario NATO will have an inversely related importance as the power of EU increases NATO will decrease. However, we cannot speak like the USA for a common enemy since the European Union consists itself of former traditional enemies. As such, they are not as yet aligned in outlook and interests so as to have *common* enemies.

Countries with strong military establishments have had traditionally more influence in decisions concerning matters of defence and security. The whole project of the ESDP has been initiated by such states, namely France and the UK. EU states have very different approaches to the use of military force stemming from their different capabilities and attitudes. Because of these differences it can be inferred that any attempt to identify a singular doctrine for EU military operations would be flawed. Nevertheless, this problem can be bypassed if Britain and France, objectively the two more militarily powerful states, take the

lead (Everts et al. 2004 p: 13). These states because of their military capabilities have cultivated a different strategic culture from the rest of the European States. Their doctrines have been developed and tested in real scenarios under dangerous conditions and can provide the seed for a more comprehensive Pan-European Doctrine. At the same time, the tradition of international intervention by several member states is slowly becoming transfused to the European level. "...The first line of defence is often abroad..."(Solana 2003 p: 6) Following from this statement in the European security strategy document it is evident that power projection has stopped being the monopoly of traditional power projecting countries such as France and the UK and has passed on being an official prerequisite for EU's policies.

Traditional concepts of large standing armies have long given way to the modern warfare doctrines that stress quality and professionalism against quantity and conscripts. Military preparedness has been a problem for many years for the EU. Under the Headline Goal there has been an effort for "...member states to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military force of up to 60,000 persons..." (European Council 1999). At the same time there has been a slow but steady shift towards new technologies that can act as multipliers of force. The only restraint is the enormous cost that is entailed in such purchases. Many European citizens do not consider high levels of defence spending necessary for security. Put differently, they are not prepared to sacrifice the social state for increased military spending. The debate between guns and butter is still largely shifting towards butter. A huge effort for the consolidation of the European Defence industries, resting precisely on these premises, is currently under way. European defence industries consolidation is the only way towards independence in procurement and the best way to take advantage of economies of scale both in production and in the all important Research and Development.

Crises have been considered as dangers to be managed. Traditionally, they have exposed the Union's vulnerabilities and have pushed it forward in amending them and preparing for the next. Alas, no crisis is the same as the previous one. The style of EU crisis-management is distinct from the American style, in the respect that political solutions are vastly favoured against those that entail the use of force. The Union proves itself committed to exhaust all possibilities for a peaceful and political solution before it decides on the deployment of ground forces. The fact that an increase in military options on the behalf of the Union has been noted will hardly change that. The only certain result will be an increase in

the Union's options at any given time and possibly, as a consequence, an increase in its credibility.

The aforementioned beliefs are quiet widely shared, at least within the European elites and even more within those that are based in Brussels. Admittedly, there is a level of discrepancy between shared beliefs in Brussels and in the individual capitals. One could say that consolidation is one step ahead in Brussels than in the rest of Europe. This is the result of a process of bureaucratic socialization (Glarbo 1999 p: 646) which helps to mould a diplomatic and strategic identity for those based in Brussels. European Union civil servants considered the Union largely as a civilian power with no place reserved for military people. This notion had as a result the creation of frictions between the two branches especially after the creation of the European military staff. The appearance for the first time inside EU's corridors of military uniforms did not leave many heads unturned. Rivalry and suspicion was evident almost at all levels of administration. Military operations require a level of security and a certain protocol which was unknown and strange to the civilian personnel at that time. It was some time before both branches grew accustomed to each other. The introduction of military personnel inside the Union's headquarters added new instruments to its toolbox. For these instruments, neither the rules nor the way that they would be used were clear at the beginning – and are largely unclear still. It has taken the dominant personality of Javier Solana to partially even out the awkwardness and tensions.

2 Military Strategic culture

2.1 Nuclear strategy

The European Union through the arsenals of France and the UK is a nuclear power. Both countries under the assumption of one EU state would have placed their arsenals under EU control for Europe's uses as a deterrent. The process has started already with Jacques Chirac President of the France Republic reiterated in his speech to the Institute of National Defence High Studies (IHEDN) on 8 June 2001, nuclear deterrence *"must also – this is France's wish – contribute to European security. [...] In any event, it is for the President of the Republic to assess, in a given situation, the damage that would be inflicted on our vital interests. This assessment would of course take account of the growing solidarity among the countries of the European Union."* France and the UK and as a result the EU do not consider nuclear weapons to be the universal answer for all questions and threats. The Union through its members is a signatory of the Nonproliferation treaty of nuclear Weapons. The EU council on the 12th December 2003 reaffirmed its stance against the proliferation of nuclear weapons (European Council 2003). In addition to that on 30 April 2004, the Vice-president of the European Commission, Loyola De Palacio, officially informed Mohamed El-Baradei, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the United Nations (IAEA) that the Member states of the Union were ready to apply the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty. The additional protocol will broaden greatly the ability for inspection beyond the traditional suspicious installations directly related to the production of fusion materials. The EU on its behalf alongside the mechanisms of the IAEA has its own corps of inspectors, counting 200 members, and also maintains a database containing details of all civilian nuclear materials in its territory. Additionally the EU Council is a signatory member to the Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty (CTBT).

2.2 Conventional strategy

The conventional strategy for EU forces should revolve around 3 main pillars: prevention, protection and projection. The goal of prevention is to prevent the emergence of potentially dangerous situations and of direct or indirect threats, to prevent the use of force, and to contain crises and conflicts at the lowest possible level. The protection of populations, institutions, territory, essential cultural values, major economic activities (supply and information flows) and deployed forces is a constant necessity in a context where distinctions between internal and external security are disappearing, especially in the fight against

terrorism. The effectiveness of the permanent security posture is closely linked to projection capabilities outside the EU territory. These capabilities require a high aptitude for anticipation and reactivity, and the constant capability to adapt to changes in the international environment.

Conclusion

Following our initial assumption that the experiment of ESDP has succeed and with the EU acting as a single federal state we can sketch a possible future strategic culture for a united Europe. Under these assumptions therefore the strategic culture of Europe will be based on the rule of law, protection of human rights and liberal democracy. No foreign intervention will be possible if these prerequisites do not provide at least part for its justification. Following the importance of human life and human rights, minimization of collateral damage will be a prerequisite for any operation. European strategic culture will be outward oriented since that follows from its geographical and geopolitical situation. This means that European armed forces need to restructure away from their cold war emphasis on collective territorial defense towards expeditionary operations of power projection. It will be firmly based on the idea of multilateralism and forming consensus for any future intervention. Use of force will be permissible only as a measure of last resort and only under the authorization of the UN. Somebody could describe the EU of the future as a gentle giant able of inflicting great damage but thinking twice beforehand. It is plain enough that we can not currently discuss for a common European strategic culture. Nevertheless it also evident that the bases for it do exist in today's Europe.

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