

In search of a shared EU strategy

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Introduction

A few years ago White usefully identified three sub-systems of what in conventional terms often has been called European Foreign Policy. He distinguished between a *Community* Foreign Policy (external relations undertaken in the realm of EU's first pillar), a *Union* Foreign Policy (the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)) and a *National* Foreign Policy (the member states' foreign policy), all associated with the European Union (EU). According to the political logic of EU policy-making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is typically seen as a part of the CFSP, and White himself drew the conclusion that it also formed part of the second, 'Union Foreign Policy' (CFSP) sub-system of the overall European Foreign policy (White, 2001). This conclusion was drawn since the ESDP did not live up to the demands on a common defence that were defined by Roper in 1995.

Having analyzed the defence-related activities that actually took place in the EU since 1999 up until 2005, however, we are inclined to draw a different conclusion. We argue that the ESDP can be analysed as its own, fourth sub-system of European Foreign policy, albeit a sub-system with special characteristics. The reason for this is that many of the components and activities that Roper (1995) stated to be necessary if the EU is to have a common defence policy actually exist. According to Roper a common defence policy would "need to define on the one hand missions for its armed forces and on the other hand the relationship between the defence policy and other social, economic and industrial policies of the Union, as well as the share of defence expenditure in the budgets of the Union and its member states" (Roper, 1995: 9)" Roper separates between a strong version and a weak version of a common defence where a strong version of a Common Defence would imply organisation of armed forces of member states in common, and a weaker version would imply common organisation of activities. The stronger version would also "in its ultimate form [...] presumably imply common procurement, logistics, training, a common budget, common communications, intelligence and command structures" as well as restrictions on the scope for national defence policies (Roper, 1995,10).

Analysing the defence related activities in the EU since the end of the 1990s (Britz & Eriksson 2005), we found that the EU in 2005 had created military command structures, instruments for financing, training and exercises, military capability requirements, processes and institutions for capability development, and it had undertaken operations. In addition there had been joint efforts among the subsystems to create a European defence industry market through restructuring of the defence industry, and the creation of European rules for the defence industry. In 2003 the creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) brought the defence industry related concerns into the ESDP. One of the first tasks for the EDA was to create a common code of conduct for defence procurement. Thus, we found that a mixture of what Roper in 1995 defined as traits of a strong and of a weak defence policy already exist in the EU. This made us draw the conclusion that the ESDP in 2005 should be analysed as a sub-system of its own. However, given that these components of the common defence policy not are exclusive for the EU, we suggest that EU's defence policy be characterised as a *shared* defence policy rather than as a common defence policy.

We suggest that two distinctly theoretical benefits follow from studying the ESDP as its own sub-system of European Foreign Policy. The first benefit is that we achieve an increased understanding of the intrinsic dynamics of the ESDP sub-system itself, which facilitates comparative analysis with other sub-systems. The second is that treating the ESDP as a fourth policy sub-system enhances our possibility to identify the linkages between all the different

sub-systems. Where the traits between different sub-systems are similar we can suspect that there are linkages between them, and empirically investigate if that is the case.

When disentangling the ESDP from the other subsystems the differences in dynamics within these subsystems become clear. These differences regard for example the development of the sub-systems, what pushes integration forward in each system, and what kind of actors that participate in the subsystem (Britz & Eriksson, 2005).¹ We found that an especially fascinating aspect of the ESDP sub-system is the way in which other kinds of actors than diplomats and politicians, for example the military profession and the defence industry, are involved in the activities and development of the sub-system.

An important characteristic of the shared defence policy is that the components created in the sub-system are not exclusively conceptualized for EU purposes. EU components do by definition not exclude the existence of national components, and when it comes to both the physical and human components the assets most of the time is national resources which in certain circumstances can be made available for the EU. However, the process through which policy and components are merged and made available to the EU can obviously affect the national structures, especially when it comes to smaller member states. This embeddedness of the national and the European can also be analysed as a process Europeanization. For example, Eriksson (2006b) has conceptualised the Europeanized defence policy process as consisting of embedded participants, problems and solutions. (Britz & Eriksson 2005, Eriksson, 2006a, Eriksson, 2006b).

Given these empirical and theoretical insights, in this chapter we explore the possible analytical advantages of the conceptually significant qualification *shared* in relation to the EU as a strategic actor. A shared strategy can be seen as the link between a shared security policy and a shared defence policy as it translates goals to means and resources. Too often the discussion of the EU as a strategic actor ends up in divergent views concerning the existence or feasibility of a ‘common’ policy. The establishment of a security and defence sub-system within the EU was indeed characterised by a lack of a common strategy. The European Security Strategy that was adopted in 2003 has been questioned with respect to its strategic qualities. We therefore feel that an analysis of EU defence policy as well as EU strategy as ‘shared’ can achieve a better understanding of the current linkages between the foreign,- security,- and defence policy-making in the European polity. Security may be a common security policy goal in Europe, but there are several means to achieve it – some shared and others not. By introducing a new kind of dividing line between approaches pitting ‘common’ features versus independent-minded ones, we believe one may also achieve a more nuanced discussion on the strategic characteristics of the EU action. The concept of shared policy and strategy could also be a way to overcome the perception of the EU as a composite actor, mentioned by Engelbrekt in Chapter 1. For instance, Biscop (2002) has identified a comprehensive and cooperative approach to security in a variety of different EU policies and feels that they together might “constitute an innovative strategic framework for the ESDP” (2002: 489).

Analysing shared strategy

¹ Eriksson (2006b) suggests that defence policy within the EU may well be driven by an internal logic as well as an external, in comparison to the development of the CFSP that often is assumed to be driven by developments in the external environment. However, Jonson (2006) found that the political and economic explanation for the decision to launch the ESDP was not a strong one.

In order to analyse shared strategy in the EU and to bring the theoretical argument of the concept *shared* further, the empirical purpose of this chapter is to analyse expressions of shared strategy in two documents adopted at the EU level: the Headline Goal 2010 and the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. Heisbourg (2000) stated that the absence of a common European strategic vision was apparent in the implementation of the Petersberg tasks, but that the creation of the first Headline Goal (HHG 2003) meant that the ambiguity possible in the ESDP had reached its limit. The HHG 2003 itself meant that strategic purposes needed to be clarified though this was hinted in an indirect fashion. Strategic goals were not publicly debated to any large extent before the adoption of the HHG 2003. (Eriksson, 2006b) Later capability targets were developed by way of the Headline Goal 2010² and the Civilian Headline Goal 2008³, two documents which, it could be argued, represent an expression of a shared military strategy focusing on resources.⁴

The analysis in this chapter thus investigates the inner workings of the sub-system of defence (the ESDP) in White's terms, and particularly two issues. One is related to the hardware and structure for strategic reasoning and decision-making, and therefore addresses Machiavelli's fox metaphor. The second deals with the functionality of strategy and translation of theory into strategic action, and is closer to Machiavelli's lion metaphor (c.f. Chapter 1 by Engelbrekt and Chapter 7 by Wedin). The two Headline Goal documents can be said to constitute expressions of shared strategy, whether the term is conceptualised in terms of Machiavelli or those of Gray (c.f. Chapter 1), as both documents at a general level describe the means to an end. The civilian Headline Goal is analysed as an attempt at capturing some of the 'composite' character of EU actorness in the field of security and defence strategy. Also, it needs to be noted that it has become increasingly difficult to analyse the military parts of the ESDP without including civilian aspects, something that our analysis reflects (see also Britz and Eriksson, 2005).

Besides the fact that it has been adopted by all member states, what elements of these policies which we see as expressions of strategy can help us conceptualise what is shared? How can a shared EU strategy be characterised and how does it relate to the traditional conceptualisations of strategy highlighted by Engelbrekt in Chapter 1? Can we say anything about the qualities of an evolving EU strategy, especially with regard to the capability for strategic reasoning and capacity for strategic action? As proposed in Chapter 7 by Wedin, strategy can be found at different levels, the political-strategic level, the military strategic level and the tactical/operational level. Since its adoption the official EU security strategy has been interpreted and elaborated in several ways, depending on the context. Instead of starting out from the EU security strategy formulated at a political-strategic level, we have chosen a focal point at a lower level, where security goals can be said to become transformed into defence policy through strategy. Our focus is on the level of defining and creating strategic resources, which roughly corresponds to the military strategic level. In each foreign policy situation requiring an EU response, however, more specific strategy is always developed (see Wedin in Chapter 7).

² Approved by the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004, endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004

³ Agreed by the PSC on 7 December 2004 and endorsed by the European Council on 17 December 2004.

⁴ The format of this chapter only allow us to analyse one aspect of EU strategy, we are well aware that we, with our focus here, in no way cover all of the strategic features of the ESDP. It could also have been useful to analyse the strategic qualities of EU action in terms of operations. For a short analysis of in particular, operation Artemis see Hyde-Price (2006), Ulriksen, Gourlay & Mace (2004)

Finally, we need to be more precise as to what shared strategy implies at this lower level of policy-making. Shared strategy can concern a number of ‘components’ physical as well as economic or other, pertaining to capacities, information, structure, activities, resources or policy formation. It concerns the identification of requirements, development and deployment of these components. Identifying such components in the Headline Goal 2010 and in the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 makes it possible to discuss aspects of shared strategy.

When analysing the two Headline Goal documents, we have sought to identify the aims, the requirements, the methods, and the means that appear in each document. These can be said to constitute the main components of any strategy, and with respect to this area, they constitute the link between politics and the use of military force – in the words of Gray: people and politics, preparation for war and war proper (c.f. Chapter 1). These findings are summarised below.

The Headline Goal 2010

Aims

The overall aim of the military Headline Goal 2010 from 2004 is for the EU to increase its actor capability through *rapid* action with a *global* reach covering the whole range of EU crisis management *tasks*. In the document it is emphasised that a purpose of actor capability is to strengthen the role of other international organisations, mainly the UN but also the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The possibility to increase co-operation with NATO is mentioned separately. It is stated that the Member States’ requirements and calendars should be harmonised. More importantly, a number of more specific tasks for the EU are listed; the Petersberg tasks, security sector reform, support for disarmament, and support to a third country for combating terrorism.

Requirements

Interoperability, deployability and sustainability are said to be requirements if the EU is to create the actor capability that is the aim of the Headline Goal. Interoperability is defined as “the ability of our armed forces to work together and to interact with other civilian tools”. Deployability “involves the ability to move personnel and materiel to the theatre of operation”, and sustainability “involves mutual logistic support between the deployed forces” (all three quotes in HG 2010:2 footnote 1).

Methods

The methods proposed in order to reach the aims and requirements, the plan for implementation, are the following: pooling of resources, shared assets, joint packages (the Battlegroup concept (see further below), shared standards, work within a Capability Development Mechanism (CDM), evaluation processes, exercises and the development of scenarios. It is here emphasised that a systematic approach is needed and that a transformation of the Member States forces, including the development of a common security culture is sought for.

The Battlegroup concept was introduced in late 2003 and became an important part of HG 2010. It consists of detailed capability requirements for the development of force packages to be made available to the EU. As has been argued by Eriksson (2006a,b) the introduction of the Battlegroup concept imply a change of governance with respect to military capability requirements and development. Compared to the Helsinki Headline Goal, to which the

member states were allowed to register almost what they wanted, the Headline Goal 2010 sets up specific requirements in several areas which can be seen as a “European model”.

Means

The means are the development of specific structures such as the European Defence Agency and other Council bodies, but also specific capacities such as a strategic airlift and the Battlegroups.

The Civilian Headline Goal 2008

Aims

The aim is said to be to increase the EU’s capability to act with coherent response to crisis from both pillar 1 and 2. Various types of civilian crisis management missions may be pursued. Except the four elements of civilian crisis management in the ESDP (police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection), monitoring missions, security sector reform, support for disarmament and demobilisation processes, and support for the Union’s Special Representatives are mentioned. The EU should be able to conduct several missions at the same time, and the missions should be deployable within 30 days of a decision. “When necessary, civilian crisis management missions must be able to draw on military enabling capabilities.” (Brussels, 7 December 2004, 15863/04, cit p 3)

Requirements

In order to fulfil the objective to prevent crisis there is a need for rapid action, for engagement at different levels and for a possibility to keep up several concurrent operations. Sustainability and quality is also important. (Brussels, 7 December 2004, 15863/04)

Methods

Internally, the capabilities should be achieved through the creation of integrated (multifunctional) packages and reviews of capabilities with respect to resources and availability. There is a need for coordination internally between the first and second pillars, and between civilian and military means. This may be realised through the civil-military cell of the Council secretariat.

Externally, the aims are supposed to be achieved through the deployment of integrated packages which provide advice, training, monitoring and substitution missions (where the EU performs executive functions) at the local level. The need for preventive activities is emphasised, as is coherence with the EU activities planned to take place after the operation. (Brussels, 7 December 2004, 15863/04)

Means

The means to reach the goals are the establishment of operational planning and mission support capabilities within the Council Secretariat, a Civilian Headline Goal Project Team to elaborate, evaluate and review the Civilian Headline Goal. Existing Council bodies and working groups (the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the Council Committee on Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM)) are to oversee the process. (Brussels, 7 December 2004, 15863/04) The capabilities themselves are also means.

Characteristics of EU shared strategy

Components of shared strategy

We can thus affirm that the two Headline Goals, in their essence, imply shared goals or policy with respect to the means and procedures by which civil and military crisis management should be developed and conducted. This is an observation one could already deduce from the decision in Helsinki in 1999 and from the EU Security Strategy itself. It should be noted that the policy goals of the Headline Goals, however, are formulated at a more detailed level, not least regarding the military dimension of the ESDP, which has come farthest in its development (see Eriksson, 2006a and b). As such, the documents are expressions of shared defence policy, but they are also more condensed expressions of shared strategy as they indicate the means and methods for reaching security policy goals set out in documents such as the EU Security Strategy.

In the two Headline Goals studied here, we find the first elements of a shared structure or model for the requirements, development and organisation of civil and military capabilities. In the civilian Headline Goal there is a heavy emphasis on coherence and cooperation between the Council and the Commission, both with respect to structures established, and with respect to the particular situation/operation. This illustrates that within this dimension, the interaction between the ESDP and the Community and the Union foreign policy-subsystems respectively is important. In the military case, we see elements of a shared strategy with respect to pooled means and resources (capabilities), which can also be seen as a component of both policy and structure. Shared strategy with respect to the *development* of capabilities is not as clear in the civilian Headline Goal. Pooling is, perhaps naturally, not a straightforward option in the civilian area which is more dependent on human capabilities than military hardware, and where the national structures might be entangled with other policy areas.

From the above we can also assume that there are shared strategic views on the acceptable methods, activities, and operational choices available. These are developed in detail in the case of civilian crisis management. It seems as if the use of the (civilian) Headline Goal 2008 document in practice has become more operational than strategic. According to a civil servant working in the Council with civilian crisis management people now refer to this headline goal rather than to the list of capabilities as they did earlier (Interview 230206). This means that the documents already help structure a shared operational strategy, and therefore impinges on EU operations in this field. With respect to the military part reference is made to the Petersberg tasks, but agreement on the exact military ‘method’ is determined on a case by case basis. The latter can only be found in the crisis management concept of the operation adopted by the PSC (these are classified documents). This difference between the level of shared strategic reasoning with respect to civilian and military means respectively indicates that it may be easier to produce shared strategy concerning the use of civilian crisis management capabilities. The reluctance to pre-define the shared strategic *methods* and *activities* to be applied in the military area, which has been observed by several researchers, remains. Shared strategy concerning capability requirements and development is, however, well developed in the EU’s military dimension.

When it comes to the civilian parts of the ESDP (civilian administration, rule of law, police and civil protection) much of the ongoing work in the Council Committee on Civilian Crisis Management (CIVCOM) has to do with the development (and agreement) of action-related concepts. This is an entirely new business with no previous applicant in international governance, something which is illustrated by the many new structures being built for the

purpose of developing the strategic and operational aspects of management. A major difference between the development of civilian and military capabilities is that for the military capabilities, NATO activities and structures have served as a model. (c.f. Strömvik, 2006). Although it has not been possible to copy NATO entirely (EU specific concepts have also been developed) international use of the military instrument is traditionally familiar to many states. No such model or tradition has been available for the development of civilian capabilities, which conventionally have been used *within* the states.

Shared strategy as expressed in these two documents can be viewed as more than civilian and military strategy. It is about creating shared strategic actorness and shared strategic actor capacity, both in the form of political and administrative structures and in the form of physical capabilities. In this way it can be seen as an expression of grand strategy, the way in which a political project is expressed as a basis for future action. As part of grand strategy, one suspects that these two documents in turn will influence the strategy of the EU member states so that they become an important point of reference in the development of national strategy, and then feeding back into the Union's general strategy. (This would obviously need to be investigated empirically.) Thus, we may conclude that in order to draw conclusions with respect to the importance of the shared EU strategy, we need to investigate the overall sum of strategy that exist within the EU and its member states to see to what extent these overlap and diverge.

Strategic culture

One part of the possibility to act strategically is what has been referred to as 'strategic culture'. Cornish & Edwards (2001:602-603) state that "the concept of strategic culture should be seen not as the product or spin-off of the ESDP, but as the means to start the process that will generate the political momentum to acquire capabilities". "[T]he EU will develop a unique strategic culture which begins to serve its needs and aspirations [...] and which neither forecloses later evolution of the European capability [...] nor [...] rivals NATO in scope or style" (Cornish & Edwards 2001:603). From this point of view the strategic culture comes *before* certain activities are possible. Similarly, judging from the text in the military HG 2010, where it is explicitly stated that common strategic culture should be sought for, it seems as if acquiring a common strategic culture is something that, at least to some extent, needs to be consciously pushed for in the same way as the ability to acquire capabilities does.

However, it could also be argued against Cornish & Edwards that a common or shared strategic culture is something which develops *from* continuous cooperation, joint action and participation in EU operations which produces a kind of *strategic aquis*, an institutional memory. Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that the military Headline Goals were developed as "lessons learned" from the latest military operations, NATO in Bosnia in the mid 1990s (perceived as unsuccessful) and the EU's first military operation Artemis in Congo in 2003 (viewed as largely successful). This would mean that the development of the Headline Goal 2010 itself (and its predecessor Helsinki Headline Goal 2003) forms part of the development of strategic culture. According to this argument shared strategic culture should be seen as developing in a continuous process, not simply adopted by decision and subsequently implemented. Indeed, this is an important aspect to take into account if the characteristics of the EU as a strategic actor are to be mapped.

Civil-military interface

As we argued above, it is becoming increasingly difficult to study military aspects of the ESDP without including civilian aspects of that same policy area. The (military) Headline Goal 2010 explicitly makes interoperability between civilian and military structures a requirement. Shared standards and shared assets, which imply interoperability in logistical and practical terms, are also mentioned. The Civilian Headline Goal 2008 also stated the need for coordination between civilian and military means, as well as coordination between EU institutions in the first and the second pillar. Thus, we can see an expressed concern with civilian-military relations *within* the subsystem.

A major dilemma for the EU is who and what institution will be at the top of the chain of command when both civilian and military capabilities are used in an ESDP mission. In NATO this is not an issue since they define civil military cooperation as “the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commanders and civil actors” (Mockaitis, 2004 quoted in Wedin & Patoka, 2006). In the EU the same question is much more problematic. At its most concrete level, it can be portrayed as a question of whether a mixed civilian and military ESDP mission would be led by a general or by the Special Representative (Interview 20060314).

This does not fit our traditional view of strategy as something that is only military, when it comes to the ‘composite’ crisis management complex that the EU consists of. But strategy needs to be formulated and expressed also with regard to civilian components, and perhaps especially in view of the interface between civilian and military components. This is related to the fact that the military capabilities according to a traditional idea of strategy should be used to defend a territory, which is not primarily the case for EU capabilities (neither civilian nor military). This means that both the sources from which these capabilities are taken, and their purpose, differ from the capabilities that form part of a more traditional view of strategy.

In addition, different member states have different traditions, which obviously affect the extent to which strategy can be shared when it comes to the civilian/military interface. One example is the different role of the military as opposed to the police in fighting terrorism. Another is the differences in traditions when it comes to organisation of the police force, where member states with a ‘gendarmerie tradition’ have supposedly broader possibilities to make police available for ESDP missions than other member states (even if only because of their numbers and deployability). Yet another thing worth noticing in both documents is that security sector reform and disarmament are stated to be activities that should be undertaken with the capacities developed through that Headline Goal. This means that we can see a joint focus when it comes to these two specific tasks. In these two tasks we can also find clear connections to the EU’s first pillar, as both security sector reform and disarmament often are supported and organised by the Commission. This means that the “strategic part” of the EU not only includes the activities in the second pillar but also stretches into the first pillar.

The use of force

The concept of strategy and in particular that of military strategy inevitably involves a comprehension of the use of force, either generally or in a particular situation. Crisis management is the main feature of the European security agenda and indeed, its grand strategy since the mid 1990s. (Hyde-Price, 2006: 89f) The strategic qualities and consequently the use of force in crisis management are distinct from most of the strategies that dominated the Cold War. At the same time the use of force or its corollary, coercive power backed by force, is arguably associated with any form of strategic thinking. In the words of Hyde-Price:

The Cold War emphasis on collective and territorial defence by mass conscript armies has given way to a growing concern with the calibrated use of military force as an instrument of statecraft. After four decades in which strategic thinking was primarily focused on nuclear deterrence and the prevention of war, Clausewitzian understandings of war as a continuation of politics by other means are back in vogue. Military coercion has become an integral aspect of milieu-shaping, in the form of peace support operations and humanitarian intervention.

(Hyde-Price, 2006:86-87)

According to Schelling (1966), we may identify two main types of uses of force; coercion and brute force. What distinguishes these two types, Ring (2006) argues, is not the amount of violence or the purpose of action, but the *relationship between the actors* in the process. Coercion is characterised by a relationship between actors where one (with or without the help of the threat to use of military force) wants the other to do something voluntarily, while brute force is characterised by a situation where the one who uses force is only interested in destroying the other's capability. This argument corresponds fairly well with the observation made by Hyde-Price that crisis management is part of a multi-actor environment. Hyde-Price, using a slightly different terminology than Ring, concludes that brute force is not a common feature of European strategy. Some kind of strategic coercion is the characteristic of crisis management. (Hyde-Price, 2006:90) We can agree with this conclusion.

The shared strategic elements of EU crisis management suggests an extension of the concept of strategy from being preoccupied with the actor's end goals to focusing on the *process within* the other actors. Thus, this is an extension of the EU's shared strategic efforts involving milieu shaping which was previously mainly normative.⁵ In other words, the EU has by way of comprehensive (membership) or partial (association agreement) methods aimed at transformation within other states. With the development of the ESDP sub system of European foreign policy the EU moves abroad in its efforts at transforming the processes within other states. This is usually undertaken in *cooperation with* the other party, not necessarily against it. Thus, it could be argued that the EU has developed, alongside strategic reasoning and strategic action, a characteristic policy of *strategic interaction* via a formal relationship with other relevant actors. This pattern fits rather well with many of the EU operations undertaken, both within the civilian and military part of the ESDP. In addition to the Petersberg tasks (which all except peace enforcement require some sort of recognition and cooperation from the recipient part) many of the EU's military tasks contain explicit support functions, such as security sector reform, support for disarmament, and support to a third country for combating terrorism. The same goes for the civilian tasks which focus on advice, training, monitoring and substitution missions.

Strategic interaction as a characteristic associated with the EU indicates that EU's shared strategy takes place in a *context* that is different from the traditional. Indeed, as Hyde-Price concludes,

Given the values and norms embodied in the political culture of mature democracies, the strategic culture of Western democracies emphasizes the use of coercion and discriminate force rather than brute force. Unless national survival is at stake (as in the Second World War), military power is used selectively and

⁵ For this debate, see Manners, 2002, Smith, 2005

subject to strict political guidelines. Force is limited and targeted, and aimed not at the physical destruction of the enemy's society or even its armed forces, but rather at the leadership or regime. The aim is usually to influence the adversary's decision-making, not to eliminate his ability to resist. Coercive diplomacy is thus a continuation of politics by other – more limited – means, and embodies an aspiration to a more 'humane' form of warfare.

(Hyde-Price, 2006:91)

This description is at least partly synonymous to the shared strategy pursued by the EU and analysed above. However, *the target* in the case of the EU crisis management is often (a reform of) the whole or part of *the society*, not only the regime. If the distinction concerning the use of force is related to the strategic characteristics of fox and lion we have two options; either we can view coercion as a characteristic of the fox – since it seems to involve a larger amount of strategic reasoning, and brute force to the lion. This, however, would imply that the actual use of force would not be likely to materialise. Or we may link both coercion and brute force to the lion – as both are expressions of strategic action. Neither of these options seems, however, to fit the EU which features both strategic reasoning and strategic action. Thus, the EU needs another characteristic. The argument pursued above implies that it is not only the strategic characteristics that are different, but also the kind of terrain or setting in which it is supposed to work, affecting the qualities necessary.

Another question with regard to characteristics is what kind of qualities that are encouraged? A military strategy makes it possible to use force as the *continuation of politics*. Since the EU cannot always agree on what policy should be pursued in future, and thus what kind of (civilian and military) capabilities should be developed, but has experience from earlier cases when agreements have been made, these previous instances become important for the capabilities that are developed. This means that the characteristics developed cannot necessarily enforce policy when the political options have run out in the particular instance, but rather according to what would have been necessary in an earlier experience. This is not unique for the EU it is also a fact for the EU member states (the difficulty to plan for the unknown), but it becomes even more explicit for the EU. In addition, this situation might bring somewhat different consequences for the EU since the capabilities developed there belong to the member states and make the strategy shared. In this way the development of the member states' own capabilities and strategic culture are affected not only by their own last crisis but also by the EU's last crisis. These capabilities can, but do not have to, overlap. The main challenge is to create enough flexibility when building these capabilities, flexibility that makes it possible to change strategy both at the EU level and at the member state level.

Conclusions

This chapter suggests several features that could be said to characterise the EU as an actor with a shared strategy. In our search for shared strategic components in the documents Headline Goal 2010 and Civilian Headline Goal 2008 we found several such expressions. The EU documents contain what could be termed shared strategic policies and ideas about what needs to be done, shared identification of strategic resources/capabilities necessary, shared strategic methods for development of the capabilities and shared strategic options with respect to the use of these capabilities. The latter was explicit particularly with respect to the civilian dimension.

The components of the shared EU strategy analysed above reaffirm the notion of the EU as a multi-level actor. Its shared strategic components are found at the European level and at the national level. Within these levels there are also diversity and multiple actors are involved in the process of creating and implementing the EU's shared strategy. The creation of components can be seen as expressions of strategic reasoning. The EU strategy investigated here implies shared policy, organisation and action – which constitute the 'glue' between the EU and its member states in their joint endeavour.⁶ The multi-level character also means that developments on one level affect the development on another level. This also means that another conclusion is that in order to fully comprehend, and to give a fair picture of the shared aspects of EU strategy we should not only investigate the EU level but also the member state level. It becomes increasingly important not only to study the development on the EU level when the shared policy and strategy is to be studied, but also to study what happens in the member states and the interplay between the development on the EU level and the member state level. The EU's possibilities to pursue a shared strategy is built on member state capabilities, these 'parts' of the shared strategy 'sum' need to be investigated if a fair picture of the EU shared strategy is to be given. This area needs further research.

With respect to capacity for strategic action this area needs further research and we cannot claim to have empirical evidence to draw conclusions. However, based on the strategic traits of the Headline Goals studied, we suggest that the EU's evolving shared strategy contains an understanding of the use of force which can only be characterised as coercion. The use of brute force is not an option for the EU. Furthermore, the relational aspect in itself seems important for the EU, both with respect to civilian and military strategies. The EU's civil and military crisis management capabilities can be seen as an extension of the EU's traditional normative milieu-shaping towards the use of practical means on the ground.

The civil-military interface as an integral part of EU strategy is a characteristic that is embedded in most aspects and expressions of the EU's shared strategy, both with respect to strategic reasoning and action. In the Headline Goals we find the wish to develop both fox-like and lion-like capabilities and it becomes evident how closely related civilian and military means are. The use of force can be characterised as strategic coercion as opposed to brute force. It takes place in a milieu that differs from that traditionally associated with strategic action and the use of force. It is not related to territory and it almost presupposes *strategic interaction* and in most cases cooperation with the receiver. The receiver or target is also often the society at large, not only the regime. The aim is change within the society, not only of the regime.

Strategic culture within the EU it could be argued, is created from continuous cooperation, in a process that produces a strategic aquis which can function as a basis for future strategic reasoning and strategic action. This means that to a certain extent (even if it is limited) we can already expect the EU to have strategic culture. Whether this strategic culture is single and coherent is an empirical question, but it could be assumed, as argued by Jonson (2006:241), that the EU does not consist of *one* strategic culture, but several. These appear in an aggregated form at the multinational level. One way of investigating how national strategic norms converge has been proposed by Meyer (2005). How strategic culture(s) affects the further development of shared strategy in the EU is a task for further research.

⁶ Concrete action have, however, not been investigated here. Eriksson (2006a and 2006b) has analysed these issues from the perspective of Europeanization as embeddedness.

There are two aspects in the analysis that (in different ways) are connected to the civilian-military character of the ESDP, and that can give further insight into how the concept shared might help us to understand important characteristics of contemporary European security policy. The first regards the de-territorialized aspect of shared strategy that is the result of strategy being developed not only for military purposes but also for civilian. The second aspect is that the analysis of strategy as shared, shows that the shared defence policy sub-system is more clearly linked to other sub-systems of European Foreign Policy than a common defence would be. A common defence policy would have its own (exclusive) resources, something that the shared defence policy does not have. The aspects of shared strategy analysed here highlights this even further because of the need shown in the analysis above to channel economic resources to develop the means necessary to reach an agreed end both from the Commission and from the member states.

As stated in the introduction the concept of shared helps us to analyse strategy in a more nuanced way than would be possible by using the concept common, which would imply an either/or attitude to the existence of strategy. One interesting example from the analysis here is the fact that the strategy in the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 was clearer regarding methods to be used, compared to what was found in the (military) Headline Goal 2010, a result that might be a bit counter-intuitive.

This chapter has given a nuanced picture of several aspects related to the conceptualisation of strategy in the context of the EU. Our findings concerning the dynamics of the ESDP as a separate sub-system of European Foreign Policy, and the concept of shared strategy, suggest that strategic reasoning is a feature of the development of shared EU strategy, but we suggest that is developed in a process that is taking place at multiple levels involving multiple actors. This process sometimes appear ambiguous, and it probably is (compare Krahmman, 2003, Eriksson, 2006b), but clarity is required as so many actors and components are involved in its implementation. This means, however, that the intentionality, or rationality, inherent in the traditional uses of the concept of strategy is problematic when applied upon the EU. Related to this point is an aspect, which we may call coherence. The understanding of strategy as being something *common* with a coherent core, is challenged by the usage of the concept shared, and the empirical illustrations made in this chapter support the use of this concept. In order to analyse coherence between European strategies we need to make further comparisons between member states and the EU.

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