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*Turkey's Accession to the EU: The  
Social Construction of Otherness in  
Reverse Images*

Presented by

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Please note that there may be more paper  
authors than paper presenters

**TURKEY'S ACCESSION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION:  
IDENTITY FORMATION AND ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY**

**By**

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### 1. Introduction: Self Invention and Collective Identity Formation

Who we are collectively, what we represent as a social order, what our group or national identity means, how 'presence' and 'essence' are configured, have become central questions in the contemporary period that some characterize as the era of postmodern politics. Transnational dynamics, captured metaphorically by such familiar political clichés, as globalization and regionalization, convey the sense that we are living through times that are nurturing unprecedented experiments in political formation and identity invention and reinvention. Spatial flows, innovative overlays of proximity and connectivity, new constellations of affiliation, novel representations of self and otherness, all sweep across the political landscape of contemporary international relations. During such an epoch, political relationships that occur below, within, across and above the nation-state become defined by the quests of collective cultural identification. The discourses of self-identity and collective self-invention infuse the politics of international relations. In postmodernism, we all speak to ourselves about ourselves; we seek to prove who we are to ourselves. Collective forms and cultural meanings no longer cling to foundational or canonical certitudes, let alone to geographic or linguistic molds. Rather, the question of who we are in a collective sense reasserts itself by virtue of historic opportunity for redesigned political association and alignment.

The effects help to define the essential conditions of postmodernism: a profound political anxiety; a sense of lost meanings combined with the possibilities of regained awareness; a fear of losing what one has been in favour of what one cannot predict; a sense that there exists, beyond our immediate political horizons, a cultural setting where we might create a new collective reality, if only we can grab it without losing ourselves. The concept of risk, a term that conveys the pervasive sense that one is sailing in uncharted waters, becomes the leitmotif and operative benchmark in the intellectual parlance of postmodern politics. For it denotes the political challenge many polities face in contemporary world society: *change or risk failure; risk failure but change*. Social constructionism, as an intellectual or analytical framework, reflects such an era. It points, first, to the importance of invented existential or open-ended cultural realities; secondly, it stresses the contextual features of all purposive or agential activity; and finally, it underscores the role and impact of recursive influences between structures and agents, between self and others, between collective meanings and individual goals. In so doing, it measures how risk and change commingle in international relations. Turkey's relationship to Europe, the very question of Turkish accession into the European Union, is, we suggest, prototypical of the conditions of postmodernism. Agency and otherness are subjected to the devices of self-invention and reinvention with all the risks that attach to such processes.

An editorial published in the German newspaper, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, in February, 2004, for example, encapsulated this sense of risk. 'Turkish membership is a

matter of life or death for the European Union,' it declared. The editorial next framed such risks according to two alternate scenarios. The EU, 'could perish in two ways,' it wrote. In the first scenario, the EU 'overstretches itself and, with the Turkish millstone around its neck, goes down in history as an enlarged free trade Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); in the second scenario, 'The EU fails to deal with the central conflict of the Western world with Islam. It could then one day rue the failure of accession negotiations with Turkey as a missed opportunity to build a bridge and transport its values toward an enlightened Islam.' The editorial concludes, 'both scenarios highlight the major risk involved in making the wrong decision.'<sup>1</sup>

EU enlargement and Turkish accession illustrate several definitive contemporary political phenomena suggestive of postmodernism. At first glance, however, negotiations between the EU and Turkey, as with other candidate states, occur within a multilateral framework structured around sets of intermestic linkages that define the standards, benchmarks and thresholds necessary for admission into the EU. Negotiated intermestic linkages promote domestic changes by linking social changes within domestic society, on the one hand, and regional institutional objectives, on the other. EU candidacy thus places before aspirant states a set or sets of reformist challenges. Indeed, the need to satisfy the criteria necessary for membership in the EU has prompted significant changes throughout Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Turkey itself. EU reformist agenda thus becomes a means for legitimizing the reformist agenda of leaders willing to risk opposition at home. EU candidacy and accession enables, in some cases, empowers, reformist leaders seeking to overcome domestic political resistance to progressive change, to pursue their objectives more effectively. Regional candidacy legitimates the goals that domestic reformist elites might not otherwise be able to establish for their countries. Membership in the EU thus creates new sets of political incentives, new ensembles of benchmarks and thresholds. For the most part these appear to strengthen the hands of political forces seeking change, change designed to reinforce the rule of law and due process within the candidate countries themselves. But this multilateral model, comprised of framework negotiations, benchmarks and explicit standards, requires further interpretation in the context of Turkish accession. The reasons for this point toward the postmodernist identity issues that permeate Turkish-EU relationships: can Europe remain European and embrace the Turkish nation within its inner cultural domain; can Turkey retain its Asian ties, its Eastern linkages, an Islamic identity, and yet become one with the European. Such questions issue out of the narratives of political postmodernism. They point to the risks each side senses as it sets about the task of negotiating self and otherness. The discourse is political, economic, social and cultural. But the story is about self-invention, collective identity formation and above all, about the collective ontological meanings that Europe and Turkey are inventing as they proceed down the serpentine road toward Turkish accession into the European Union (EU).

As we demonstrate below, the very language of EU 'acquis alignment' and 'Turkish pre-accession strategies' underscore the existence of self-aware identity projects that are unique in political history. The notion is simply unprecedented: Turkey, a sovereign state applies for membership in the regional European club. It does so on the basis of its willingness to conform to regional standards, thresholds and benchmarks. But

such issues become secondary to an overriding concern: how European can Turkey be. Turkish accession thus bespeaks both of political postmodernism and of its novelty. The politics of EU regional or collective interdependence no longer concerns community and cooperation; rather, it centres on union and solidarity, that is, on collective political identity. The consequent risks to both Turkey and the EU readily become greater. Once the politics of identity enter into the equations of EU negotiations, as in the case of Turkish accession, diplomatic relations cut to the core of collective self-understanding. What is sufficient for club membership, what is necessary for union, how much domestic transformation is enough, what becomes too much in terms of cultural or political identity, all such questions reveal new kinds of postmodern discourses. Here questions of collective identity rear up against the opportunities but also the risks that attend any process involving socially constructed forms of collective reinvention.

In Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's view, there appears to be little doubt that negotiations over accession provides a valuable instrumentality in encouraging Turkish society to make further adjustments toward stability, peace and justice. He has recently declared, for example, 'Turkey's membership in the EU is the most important modernization reform process in the Republican era. For us,' he continued, 'EU membership is the most effective political tool to renew the foundational ideals of our republic.' He underscored the significance of values in the process of alignment with European institutions. 'For us,' he declared, 'the EU is neither a religious nor a geographic community. It is a community of collective political values.'<sup>2</sup> Identity formation between Europe and Turkey, not crass interests alone, thus serves as the essential story being written in the course of negotiations over Turkish accession. Erdogan has stressed this in numerous statements to the effect that Turkish entry will prevent the so-called clash of civilizations. On November 25, 2002, he stated, for example, 'When we enter the EU we are not going to represent the clash of civilizations and cultures; instead, Turkey, by being the bridge, will help to achieve the merger of different cultures and civilizations.'<sup>3</sup>

To be sure, there are those who disagree with the pro-European stance pursued by Erdogan and many members of the governing Turkish elite, including the majority of members in the Turkish parliament. There are those who fret that Turkey, and for that matter the EU, will end up losing too much, that they will give away part of their cultural identities in the process of alignment. One author suggests, for example, that Turkish accession is a strategy that carries too high a cost to the Turkish nation. 'A country cannot be great without a strong sense of itself. Taking refuge in the bosom of the EU will not save Turkey unless it rediscovers its moral compass and refuses to surrender abjectly on matters of national interest. Turkey's road to the EU may well be its road to perdition.'<sup>4</sup> What this position ultimately stresses are the high risks to Turkish national sovereignty that attends full membership in the EU. But such fears revolve around the assumption that sovereignty confers autonomy rather than legal status and legitimacy. In a similar vein, no less a European personality than Giscard d'Estaing, recently articulated the fear apparently felt by many in France as elsewhere in Europe, that the EU would risk losing its political identity and Christian soul if it were to admit Turkey. Here the risks of

accession tend to be expressed in cultural terms that purportedly link EU membership to a cultural and political history, one seen to exclude Turkey.

Turkish accession into the EU thus reflects a historical relationship with both a venerable but tortuous past. The irony, of course, is that for Turkey and for Europe intersubjective quests to define each other relative to their collective cultural identities are hardly new. Since time immemorial, 'Europeans' have had to ask how and in what way they were European. The answers Europeans give to themselves point toward such overarching influences: of Greek philosophy; of Roman law, administration and geography; of Romanized Christianity; of the decentralized but circumscribed politics of the Holy Roman or Carolingian Empire; of the aesthetics of the Renaissance; of the Protestant Reformation and Counter-Reformation; of the Westphalian bargains and balances of power; of the rationalities of the Enlightenment; of market liberalism and the rise of cities within sovereign nation-states. The history of the West, of the Occident, has been told and retold many times all to express the meanings of Europe as an idea or concept. In the end, the idea of Europe remains somewhat elusive, like mercury or tinsel, clear to the eye, but evasive to the touch.

European relations with Turkey have been shaped by this history. What irony of ironies today is the fact that the Ottoman Empire was derisively referred to as the 'the Sick Man of Europe' during the latter part of the nineteenth century. It became so once it was admitted to the Concert of Europe in 1856, in the aftermath of the Crimean War, as its reward for aligning with France and Britain against Russia. For the first time, the Ottoman Empire was admitted to the European society of states. But an Eastern empire is not a Western state. And a sick empire is hardly a viable member of the fraternity of sovereign states bent of pursuing the Westphalian dynamics that would later be described as balance of power. For the Ottoman authorities, *belonging* on these terms meant the opposite, it meant *non-belonging*. In a way, the political and cultural narratives of Europe flowing into the twentieth century depended upon the Ottoman Empire as a way for Europeans to depict the reality of what Europe and Europeans *were not*. As the West looked East, it saw Byzantium and the eastern rites of Christianity. But beyond that when the West regarded the *House of Osman*, the Caliphate, the Sultanate, the Milliyet, and the *Dar* of Islam, it was inspired to invent its cultural notions of us and them, that is, notions of 'difference.' This was reciprocated, as notions of difference often are. When Czarist and Orthodox Russia fought its wars with the Ottomans, it was the *Romanoff* Czars who declared that they were Western, not the Ottomans. For the latter, Westernization was no more, no less than a survival strategy doomed to failure.

## 2. *Strategic Games in Organized Hypocrisy*

Today the debate over the social construction of Europe partially continues to centre around the future of European identity relative to Turkish accession. The question divides European elites and political parties. The consequence is that EU officials tend to fall into patterns of conflicting actions and contradictory statements. These patterns, first, may be likened to a diplomatic or political game, a game comprised of EU strategies designed, in Herbert Simon's terms, to '*satisfice*.' What this 'satisficing' game consists of

are EU diplomatic and political strategies designed to permit the EU and its representatives to pursue what Simon called 'incommensurable' objectives, in this case, relative to Turkish accession. These incommensurable objectives include the need *to recognize* the legitimate claims of Turkey for EU membership *without*, on the other hand, encumbering EU institutions at a time of delicate negotiations over EU constitutional provisions and political enlargement. The result is a diplomatic strategy to *delay but without rejection*. To articulate such a strategy publicly would be to incur considerable political cost, cost measured in terms of legitimacy and appropriateness. Actions and words or talk must thus become divided into separate realms. Actions do one thing; words say another. This phenomenon is well-known to students of politics and public administration. EU rhetoric and actions concerning when, how and under what conditions Turkey will be admitted manifest the contradictions perhaps best described by Nils Brunsson, as '*organized hypocrisy*.'<sup>5</sup>

The concept of 'organized hypocrisy' permits us to assess how purposive duplicity becomes a tool for public administrators, politicians and diplomats in circumstances where goals, ends and objectives cannot be equally or universally satisfied, or can be satisfied but at serious cost. Organized hypocrisy arises as a means, a method, a kind of convenience for those public officials who, for example, cannot satisfy contradictory constituent goals, or who wish to pursue their own aims or objectives despite conflicting institutional priorities, or for use by those caught in administrative settings where policy objectives goals appear mutually exclusive but for political reasons nonetheless must be pursued concurrently. Brunsson describes the problem in the following way:

Talk, decisions and products are mutually independent instruments used by the political organization in winning legitimacy and support from the environment. ...In the political organization the talk, decisions and actions do not have to be connected....On the contrary we can expect to find inconsistencies between them: in order to reflect inconsistencies in the environment the political organization can employ inconsistencies, not only within the separate areas of talk or decisions or products but also between them. In other words hypocrisy is a fundamental type of behaviour in the political organization: to talk in a way that satisfies one demand, to decide in a way that satisfies another....<sup>6</sup>

Organized hypocrisy becomes salient whenever the political or institutional goals that are internal to an organization appear to risk offending the external constituencies that support it, as in the instance of Turkish accession. As perceived by segments of EU elites, European popular opinion has tended on the whole, with some exceptions, to be negative with respect to this issue. This holds true especially at a time when the domestic political agenda throughout many countries in Europe turns on the risks of minority socialization at home and the difficulties of their economic incorporation. EU negotiations over Turkish accession thus represents a strategic diplomatic game characterized by patterns of organized hypocrisy in which European political officials and EU representatives seek

'to *satisfice*' when confronted with the untenable options, first, to reject, next, to accept Turkey.

This interpretation was recently lent additional credence when Romano Prodi, President of the EU Commission, on April 30<sup>th</sup>, 2004, in effect criticized the duplicity of EU heads of states. He stated, 'They are giving different messages to Turkey. When they are together with Turkish officials they say Turkey will become a member of the EU; but they say to me in Brussels, please do not hurry about Turkey's membership.'<sup>7</sup> Such forms of organized hypocrisy serve a functional role. It allows European political and EU institutional leaders to pursue contradictory aims relative to Turkish accession while avoiding the friction that might otherwise be caused if their intentions were enunciated publicly. But there are risks and costs to this strategy as well. Contradictory speech and action on the part of the EU has sometimes provoked angry reactions on the part of Turkish officials. On November 22, 2002, for example, President Sezer complained that, 'the officials of the EU are not being sincere. Each of them says that Turkey's accession is not a problem for them, but it is a problem for the other states.'<sup>8</sup> Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan has also attempted to call the EU bluff. On December 5, 2002, he declared, 'We are waiting at the door of the EU for 40 years. Even though, Turkey is more than ready, you [the EU] provided discussion dates to states that had applied only within the last 10 years; but you kept postponing ours. We do not see any sincerity in these actions.'<sup>9</sup>

Organized hypocrisy is not meant to suggest that disagreements over Turkish accession have not emerged publicly. On the contrary, open political differences among political parties and leaders especially in Germany and France help to set the stage for the EU diplomatic strategies featuring it. In Germany, for example, the Social Democrats and the Greens clearly enlist support for Turkish accession, whereas the Christian Democrats and other opposition parties are openly opposed. German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder, has recently stated, 'it will be very beneficial to have Turkey as a member because it represents a gain to Western security to initiate a process of accommodation between Western Enlightenment and non-radical Islam.'<sup>10</sup> Joschka Fischer, the German Foreign Minister, and leader of *Die Grunen*, also has called for the 'reconstruction of the West' to include Turkey. If Europe wishes to represent itself as a Christian club, it should 'say so and accept the consequences.'<sup>11</sup>

This view clearly contrasts with the official position of the opposition leader of the German Christian Democrats, Angela Merkel, who has stated, 'I belong to those who are very sceptical.' She urged her fellow European politicians to be forthright by not hesitating to inform Turkey that, it 'has little chance of joining.'<sup>12</sup> Merkel has repeated this theme by calling on EU officials to be unequivocal in opposition to Turkish accession. On April 30<sup>th</sup>, 2004, she stated, for example, 'I am tired of giving promises to Turkey that will not be fulfilled.' Merkel emphasized that Turkish accession was a matter not only for the Turks but for Europeans. She warned, 'Those who wish to persuade Europe should not seek to force Europeans.'<sup>13</sup> Further on the scale of those in opposition is Hans-Gert Pottering, the President of the German Christian Democrats. In a series of comments, Pottering has left no doubt regarding the obstacles. For him the issue remains

cultural and ultimately about identity. 'Religion is not the biggest factor,' he stated. 'The most important factors are cultural differences.' His anxiety seems clear. If Turkish accession were to succeed, he argued, European consciousness would be lost. 'Does the farmer in Anatolia see himself equal to the person living in Paris or London?' Pottering has asked rhetorically. 'If European consciousness is lost, there will be a different axis formed in Europe.'<sup>14</sup> Pottering's comments, so disdainful of Turkish rural workers, avoids duplicity but at the risk of blatant racism. Political correctness may be a form of organized hypocrisy, but surely Pottering helps us to understand its virtues as well as its costs.

Pottering's sentiments are not universally echoed in France, although strong resistance to Turkish accession guides French policy today. Leaders of the French ruling center-right political party, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), for example, have insisted in recent years that, 'there's no question of Turkey's entry in the middle or short term.' Francois Baroin, UMP Secretary-General, has consistently stated, 'We very clearly say no to Turkey's integration into the European Union.'<sup>15</sup> In France, as elsewhere, domestic politics play an important role in generating the circumstances that prompts political leaders to pursue strategic forms of organized hypocrisy. One observer of French politics recently commented that if the French government were to endorse Turkish accession, it would 'mobilize the anti-European voters and demobilize the more moderate ones whose votes they desperately need.'<sup>16</sup> The consequence is that both President Chirac and French Foreign Minister, Michel Barnier, openly favour delay, but *not* outright rejection. French President Jacques Chirac stated, for example, during a press conference on April 30, 2004, 'Turkey's entry into the Union is certainly not desirable in the short term. My conviction is that it is in the long term.' Chirac left no doubt what the long term meant: 10 to 15 years.<sup>17</sup> As keen a political analyst as Francis Fukuyama was brought to the conclusion, 'To believe that Turkey will someday become a member of EU, will be like believing that the border between the U.S. and Mexico will someday disappear.'<sup>18</sup> But this is hardly the case, since Chirac and the French government are manifestly engaged in a strategy designed to 'satisfice' according to the terms of organized hypocrisy to permit time to deal with identity conflicts with respect to Islam, Turkey and the West.

To listen to some European leaders, Turkey then, Turkey now, was never part of Europe. And yet for many Turks, the very concept, Turk, has always implied a certain component of Europeanness. The Kemalist revolution stands for nothing if not the dramatic transformation in how Turkish society viewed itself as a cultural entity, Anatolian, yes, but also European. When Ataturk stood at the blackboard and taught his people to use a Romanized alphabet and system of lettering, Europe stood not only for culture, but for civilization itself. Today, in light of the deconstruction of postcolonial discourses, such presumptions give way to broader truths concerning the need to define what is sufficient and what is necessary in the intercultural politics of Turkish-European relationships. These truths point toward inexorable conclusions: that Turkish political institutions are democratic and can become increasingly open; that Islamic principles can be culturally transmitted in ways that are liberal and non-authoritarian; that to say Islamic and European in a single breath does not entail a contradiction in terms; and that Turkish

society might well contribute to the social stability and economic productivity of Europe in the future rather than to the heavy burdens Europe now carries in terms of structural rigidities and social discrimination.

Such themes have been steadily sounded by Erdogan and others among the Turkish elite. 'If you do not accept us, our public will say that, 'We already knew they were a Christian Club. We are a Muslim country. Our population is large. They will not accept us.' We do not want to validate such thoughts.'<sup>19</sup> Kemal Dervis, the Turkish economist and member of Parliament, expressed a similar thought when, on December 7, 2002, he indicated that Turkey's status as a Muslim nation was irrelevant to its ability to function as a fellow member of the EU. Taking aim at both the French and German opposition, he stated, 'Giscard D'Estaing and the Christian Democrat's approach against Turkey do not have any reference to economic, political, or human rights issues. Their approach is totally based on Christian Europe. Religion is a private matter.' He added, 'Modern, secular, contemporary Turkey, and with a mostly Muslim population, will demonstrate to the world that religious wars and religious borders are no longer possible.'<sup>20</sup>

But the parameters of democracy, liberalism, stability and productivity all becomes measures of how Turkey and the EU invent each other for themselves through the dialogical process that is now occurring. As Erdogan commented on January 18, 2004, 'Our region should not only be seen as a permanent market, it should also be seen as a productive region...'<sup>21</sup>

The task below is thus to examine the specific character of accession negotiations to determine how European assessments judge Turkish progress and how Turkey responds to these evaluations. But the process of *acquis* assessment reflects the past as much as it reveals the future. What follows, therefore, is a brief outline of the historical relationship between Turkey and Europe since the end of the Second World War. Our aim is to establish the background to current negotiations over Turkish accession. We next examine recent European accession reports. These are ostensibly designed to establish the specific thresholds, benchmarks and standards that Turkey must satisfy for membership. In addition, we refer to Turkish official responses to the EU accession reports. This provides a basis for interpreting the current status of negotiations. Our intent throughout is to argue that the EU is currently pursuing a delaying strategy relative to Turkish accession. But, as we shall argue, there are risks to this strategy of organized hypocrisy as well.

### 3. *Pre-Accession Strategies of the European Council: Inclusion without Acceptance, Mimesis without Guarantee*

In political projects that conjure up the dimensions of identity construction, collective memory often serves as a guide to the future. But memory can be a compass of uncertain value when, in underscoring the losses and pains of the past, it condemns the future to repeat them. The quest for Turkish accession represents a culmination of postwar years of diplomacy and politics designed to reinvent the Turkish identity in ways

that would allow it to go beyond the demonic memories that some might use to assail it. The sixty-five years between 1948 and 2003 reveal a pattern of political incorporation that has brought Turkey closer and closer into the mainstream of European life and politics. But like a translucent film or membrane, invisible yet present, memory has served as an obstacle to full acceptance.

Historic milestones help to 'periodize' this process of *inclusion without acceptance*. The Turks are *within* Europe but never *of* Europe. They become part of the institutional structures of Europe, but never European. To an extent they take pride in being cast in the role of the great bridge builder between East and West. But in the absence of sure European moorings, the role seems empty and unsound. Turkish accession thus looms as a vindication, a validation of the countless decisions on the part of the Turks, to remain committed to Western values, institutions and objectives. How has inclusion without acceptance operated at the diplomatic level? In answering this question, we present an ambiguous picture, one suggestive of the organized hypocrisy that guides EU policy today.

What better guide to the present is the history of Turkish involvement in Western and European institutions during the Cold War. The liberal international economic order advanced by the Bretton-Woods system and the European Common Market and eventual European Community, the defence architecture comprised of NATO guided by its grand transatlantic strategic alliances, the rise of multilateralism and regionalism in the West, all witnessed the active participation of Turkey, in some cases as a full-fledged partner. The years, 1948, when Turkey was admitted into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 1949, when Turkey joined the Council of Europe, represent important starting points. But 1952, the year when the Turkish republic became a member of NATO and thus integral to what Gulner Aybet calls the 'defence identity' of the 'Western camp,' was the crucial early milepost along the route to inclusion without acceptance.<sup>22</sup>

Common fate breeds a sense of common destiny. Turkey was thus fated by its geopolitical and historic rivalry with Russia and the emergence of the Cold War to become one with Europe and the United States in firm opposition to the Soviet Union. These were hardly halcyon days. Turkey was on the border's edge of the Soviet satellite system. And yet, for all to see, the Turks had become part of the shield, indeed, an essential protector, that worked to preserve Western and European security. The 1963 Ankara Treaty that introduced Turkey into the frameworks of the European Community as an associate member seemed to recognize Turkish contributions in this regard as did the Additional Protocol of 1970 that anticipated the establishment of a Turkish-European Economic Community.

Perhaps led by these blandishments to believe that Turkey had achieved the status of full acceptance, it applied for EU membership in 1987. It was an unpropitious decision. Socio-economic conflicts and civil unrest were rife throughout Turkey at the time. Market reforms, marginalization of major segments of the working class, large-scale emigration from rural to urban areas, the rise of Kurdish insurgencies, and other

such factors, worked against Turkish interests. In an ironic way, so did the demise of the Soviet Union. The year 1989 saw two parallel events that tell the entire story: the downfall of the Berlin Wall and the recommended rejection by the European Commission of Turkey's application for admission. It was a cold slap in the face. Turkey was good enough to be part of Europe's defence community when Europe needed Turkish forces. But once the Soviet Union collapsed, Turkey no longer measured up in areas of economic, social and political policy. From the Turkish perspective, this represented a betrayal, one made worse by the eventual EU admission of transitional democracies, states that had been part of the Warsaw Pact system.

Turkey was thus left standing in the cold. As Aybet observed some years later, 'The Turkish elite is surprised and angry that, whilst Turkey's place in Europe was not questioned during the Cold War when it was of strategic importance *vis-à-vis* the Soviet threat, Turkey's European identity is being questioned in cultural terms.'<sup>23</sup> But the truth had been manifested all along. Even from the perspectives of European security, the status of Turkey has been treated in ambiguous, and in our sense, hypocritical ways. Although it was a full-fledged member of NATO Turkey enjoyed only associate member status in the Western European Union (WEU), a parallel security organization operating in the European regional theatre. This has generated concern in Turkey that it might be held tactically responsible for strategic decisions in which it did not share.<sup>24</sup>

In 1993, the Copenhagen EU summit led to promulgation of the Copenhagen *Criteria* pertaining to accession. As a response to the influx of Central and Eastern European states seeking accession to the EU, the 1993 Copenhagen Council articulated a succinct set of criteria designed for the evaluation of a given country according to political, economic, and social categories. This decision, taken on the part of the European Council, to construct such criteria served as a direct acknowledgement at the highest political levels of the inevitability of membership of the associated countries. This reduced the question of accession to one of timing. Thus it represented a shift in emphasis from 'if' to 'when.' Since 1993, the following one-paragraph excerpt from the Copenhagen European Council Documentation (*Bulletin EC 6-1993*) has become widely referred to as the *Copenhagen Criteria*.

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.<sup>25</sup>

The extensive legal interpretation of these two sentences lies at the heart of all recent policy dialogues between applicant states and institutions of the EU. Since 1993, the *Copenhagen Criteria* have been enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union (1999) and stressed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000). In spite of the authoritative nature of the criteria, the language continues to act as a mechanism for debate and a condition for decision-making. This distillation of governance principles into a concrete, discussible listing of categories aligns well with

the EU aim of envisioning the grand project of enlargement as a continuing political process rather than as a static decision.

For the Turks, the *Copenhagen Criteria*, brief in substance, laden with content, augmented and clarified the standards, benchmarks and thresholds necessary for full admission and acceptance. They linked the domestic reforms in Turkey to regional dynamics and, in so doing, provided an observable or evidentiary basis and for negotiating Turkish accession. Such policy issues as the quality of democratic life and institutions, macroeconomic stability, minority rights, freedom of association, worker and trade union rights, all became subject to the direct purview of the EU and its pre-accession surveillance procedures. As rarely before, a sovereign state had become accountable to a multilateral and regional organization. But accountability is appropriate when the roles of the parties involved are deemed mutually acceptable. Accountability becomes a foil when they are not. The follow-up to the Copenhagen criteria has had a chequered history, no so much in terms of the nature of their substantive standards, but rather in terms of the diplomatic approach pursued by the European Council relative to Turkish capacities to apply them.

The manner or style adopted by EU officials has had times revealed a kind of prejudicial assumption that Turkish society was chronically or constitutionally incapable of implementing the Copenhagen criteria. To become convinced that the Turks could or would give concrete form to the Copenhagen standards has thus required successive steps. Evidence that the Turkish government was indeed making progress had to filter through the EU pre-accession monitoring or surveillance system. The cumulative effect has been that Turkish pre-accession negotiations have turned around nothing less than the collective identity of the Turkish nation. *Pre-accession strategy* has emerged as a term of choice in the negotiations over Turkish accession. The reasons are clear: it has enabled European political elites and EU officials to '*satisfice*,' that is, to hand the Turks, in tantalizing fashion, the grapes they desire, but as in Aesop's fable, always to move what is sought beyond reach. EU rhetoric or verbal strategy grounded in organized hypocrisy has thus played for time, perhaps to allow for EU enlargement and to permit the political circumstances for Turkish entry to ripen. For those European politicians who fear public reaction or who are adamantly opposed, talk of pre-accession strategies has served as an escape route away from open confrontation. Emphasis on pre-accession strategies has thus permitted the EU to temporize with respect to Turkish entry by separating talk from action.

The record written by the twelve European Council sessions, beginning with the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997 to the Brussels meeting in December 2003, typifies organized hypocrisy in that it verbally affirms Turkish pre-accession strategies, but, on the other, places the bar to Turkish acceptance just a little higher. This is not to suggest that the Copenhagen criteria are inappropriate. Nor is it to say that the Turkish government and the Turkish people are bereft of responsibility in this regard. The analytical issue here concerns negotiations and how we interpret the dynamics of international cultural relations grounded in the social constructions of collective identity and identity formation. What the history of the European Council relative to Turkish

accession demonstrates is how the conditions of being European or Turkish have been mediated through a series of diplomatic steps. These steps de-link talk from action but in ways that recognize Turkish progress this side of inclusion with acceptance.

The main issue is identity formation. Nowhere is '*Europeanness*' or '*Turkishness*' explicitly debated as such. But the implications are clear. The central question for the European Council and for Europeans in general is whether Turkish society can become sufficiently identical to European societies; can it engage in a process of *cultural* and, as we shall see, *public sector mimesis*, despite its Islamic traditions, so that it takes on the features of advanced industrial democracy; can it be a Muslim nation and a free and open one as well; can an Islamic state nurture an effective, efficient and accountable government. For the Turks, the history of negotiations with the EU is one that has imposed the demands of *mimesis but without guarantee*. Secondary to this, but related, is the issue of macroeconomic stability and economic growth and, specifically, the capacity of the Turkish economy to employ gainfully its young, expanding but generally poor labour force. Minorities, especially but not exclusively Muslims minorities in Europe, and the prospect of widespread Turkish emigration, have made this issue political sensitive throughout the period below.

The present era in the history of Turkish accession begins with the December, 1997 meeting of the European Council in Luxembourg. This period will draw to a close in December 2004, when the European Council announces its decisions as to whether or not to permit Turkey to pursue a specified timetable. The intervening period outlined below in terms of *steps* reflects modifications in the policies assumed by the European Council during its Luxembourg 1997 session.

### Step 1

This represents the nadir in EU-Turkish relations. Whereas the Luxembourg European Council enlarged the horizons of an integrated Europe and called for the end of traditional geographic and political divisions, the contours of Europe envisioned at this time by both the European Council and the EU Commission did not extend to Turkey. The climate of the Luxembourg meeting in December had been shaped by a EU Commission report published earlier in the year, entitled *Agenda 2000*. This excluded Turkey from the procedures that were to be followed during imminent enlargement negotiations. Thus, *Agenda 2000*, published ten years after Turkey had initially applied for admission, identified two tiers of candidate states: fast track and slow track: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia were in the first grouping; Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia were in the second. But Turkey was in neither category. When the European Council met in Luxembourg in December it attempted to assuage Turkish feelings. It did not succeed. To temper the effects of its estrangement with Turkey, the EU *European Strategy for Turkey* was released. This stressed the unique relationship between Turkey and the members of the EU and, on this basis, attempted to justify the exclusion of Turkey. The European Strategy, furthermore, established the principle that Turkey would be 'judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant states.' But the Turks would have none of it. When the European Council invited Turkey to a March 1998 conference aimed at negotiating accession procedures,

the Turkish government refused and boycotted the meeting. It declared that the European Council had acted in a discriminatory way by ostracizing Turkey. It rejected the European Strategy that floated vague suggestions on how Turkey should reform and lamented the fact that the Council had offered little or no European financial resources to support such efforts. As a final measure, the Turkish government also indicated that it would abstain from all further contacts with the European Union on a multilateral basis and would conduct its European affairs entirely through bilateral or government-to-government relations. Yet, again, the Turks were the outsiders of Europe.

### Step 2

If intimacy breeds contempt so do formal ruptures among allies. The estrangement between Turkey and its European partners could not be allowed to stand. As a result, the European Council in the ensuing seven years to the present has attempted to patch up relations with Turkey, but in ways that have created the illusion of inclusion in the absence of any promise of full acceptance. The unrelenting task assumed by the Council has been to confirm and then to reaffirm the possible eligibility of Turkey for membership, but all the while not conceding it. The illusion of hope in politics is often as important as its reality. The EU Council has thus repeatedly held out the prospect that Turkish eligibility would become real once the Copenhagen criteria were fulfilled, once Turkey pursued an appropriate pre-accession strategy, once it implemented the Accession Partnership, etc. Even the Luxembourg session called 'for a strategy to be drawn up' to bring Turkey 'closer to the European Union in every field'<sup>26</sup> and the follow-up European Council meeting in December 1998 declared that it attached great 'importance' to the 'European Strategy to prepare Turkey for membership.'<sup>27</sup> More precise policies were formulated by the European Council during its Helsinki meeting in December 1999. For the first time, the European Council referenced the term, '*pre-accession strategy*.' What this implied was that Turkey would be granted candidate status--but without a specific timetable for accession. The question of Turkish accession was now a genuine exercise in organized hypocrisy. The European Council for the first time did promise to 'stimulate and support' Turkish efforts to reform by means of an 'enhanced political dialogue' but offered little in the way of specific measures. This exercise continued through several subsequent European Council meetings that successively referred to the Helsinki principle, 'Turkey is a state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states.' The Feira European Council, for example, conducted in June 2000, noted Turkish progress, but pressed Turkey to make 'concrete progress, in particular on human rights, the rule of law and the judiciary.' By the time that the Nice European Council was held in December 2000, Turkey had become a full-fledged member candidate. The Nice meeting 'welcomed' Turkish 'progress' and called for an *Accession Partnership* with Turkey. But the terms of this partnership immediately became suspect. As one observer has written, 'Contrary to rhetorical statements made in the meeting regarding the importance of establishing closer relations between the EU and Turkey, all assessments concerning EU's future institutional framework...were designed for an EU...without Turkey.'<sup>28</sup>

### Step 3

Matters turned in Turkey's favour somewhat after the Nice meeting. In March 2001, the EU Commission publicly approved the Accession Partnership with Turkey; the Turkish government on March 19, 2001, immediately announced its national program for the Adoption of the EU acquis. When the Goteborg European Council met in June 2001, it indicated that Turkey had made 'good progress,' and thus was 'closer to the EU.' It also declared that decisions taken since the Helsinki meeting had 'opened up new prospects for her European aspirations.'<sup>29</sup> But the Goteborg meeting introduced a major new major twist or condition: Turkey was required to adopt the IMF economic program. The bar to admission and membership had been raised again. It no longer concerned political policies and legal standards, but included economic and, by implication, cultural issues as well.

#### *Step 4*

The Laeken European Council, December 2001, indicated that 'good progress' had been made, including appropriate amendments to the Turkish constitution. These reforms, the session concluded, 'should mark a new stage' toward 'the opening of accession negotiations' and in evaluating Turkish 'preparedness for alignment on the acquis.'<sup>30</sup> Similarly, the Seville European Council, June 2002, reaffirmed the language used by previous Councils. It referred to Turkish 'progress' in reforms, to the 'Accession Partnership,' and to the importance of treating Turkey in ways similar to other states. 'New decisions could be taken on the next stage of Turkey's candidature,' it concluded.<sup>31</sup> The Brussels European Council, October 2002, noted that 'important steps' had been taken by Turkey and opined that this brought 'forward' the possibility of accession talks.<sup>32</sup> The Copenhagen European Council, December 2002, finally announced that the next stage in accession talks would begin on December 2004. 'If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.'<sup>33</sup> The Copenhagen meeting also called for an extension and a deepening of the EC-Turkish Customs Union. Further, the European Council promised significant increases in its pre-accession budgetary and financial assistance to Turkey to assist in the process of implementing the revised Accession Partnership and its implementation in Turkey. The Thessaloniki European Council, June 2003, cautioned that the December 2004 decision was hardly predetermined. 'Taking into account progress achieved,' it stated that 'significant further efforts to this end are still required.'<sup>34</sup> The Brussels European Council, December 2003, retained the approach previously repeated: compliment the Turks on the progress made; hold out for more. Despite the 'considerable and determined efforts by the Turkish government to accelerate the pace of reforms, many of which are significant in political and legal terms,' the Council declared, 'further sustained efforts are needed.'<sup>35</sup> The precise areas mentioned included, the independence and functioning of the judiciary, the need to strengthen the overall framework for the exercise of fundamental freedoms, particularly with respect to association, expression and religion, the further alignment of civil military relations in accordance with European practice, extension of cultural rights and further progress in establishing the foundations of civil society in the Southeastern region of Turkey. Progress in resolving the Cyprus issue was also mentioned.

The problem is, of course, that the Turks, especially under the present Erdogan government, have followed what successive European Councils have mandated. Strategies can backfire when they succeed, especially when they succeed only too well. This is the problem with organized hypocrisy; it sometimes fails to prevent clarity, in this case, the clarity focuses on public sector reform, mimesis and isomorphism.

4. *The National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis:  
Administrative Mimesis and Public Sector Isomorphism*

The year 2004 promises to be a fateful one in the history of EU-Turkish relations. The decisions to be adopted by the European Council in December 2004 will set the stage for negotiations over accession for many years to come. External opinions range across the spectrum concerning the eventual outcome: some aver that Christian Europe will continue to demonise Turkish entry and that Turkey will never be invited to become a member; others suggest that Turkey will be admitted to the EU, but only after a decade or two of further administrative reform and identity reinvention; others argue that the EU will accede to the obvious by providing a timetable for Turkish accession that will enable Turkey to enter the EU as a full-fledged member no later than 2010. But crystal balls do not allow for the examination of historical records with sufficient acuity to be able to assess the future in light of the present. What remains unique about the negotiations over Turkish accession is the very public nature of the documentary record produced in the course of EU-Turkish diplomatic deliberations. The EU Commission's *Regular 2003 Report* on progress made towards Turkish accession outlines, chapter and verse, what steps and measures the Turkish government must take. For its part, the Turkish government has responded to the EU Commission's report, with verse and chapter, point by point, in its *National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis*.

Certain features emerge in the course of a systematic rendering of these documents. For the EU there exists many pluses in what the Turks have achieved, but many minuses linger and must be overcome. Clarity and precision become central in evaluating the degree to which the balance between the pluses and the minuses continues to represent an exercise in organized hypocrisy. The more precise, the greater the clarity, with which the EU establishes what the Turkish government must do in order to receive a positive evaluation, the more difficult it becomes for it to separate talk from action. Time may be running out on the game of organised hypocrisy. We may be entering a new phase, after December 2004, one consisting of *administrative mimesis and public sector isomorphism*.

One theme that unifies the overall EU approach is the requirement that the Turkish government strengthen its administrative capacities. In policy domain after domain, the *EU 2003 Report*, when specifying the negatives or the minuses that continue to exist, identifies administrative capacity and institution-building as the solution. What the EU Commission's *2003 Report* seeks, therefore, is a kind of administrative mimesis between Turkish public sector organisations and European public institutions. The very words that appear and reappear such as '*alignment*' and '*harmonisation*' demonstrate this emphasis on the need for Turkish public sector organisations to imitate European ones.

Thus the current state of the EU-Turkish Accession Partnership depends essentially on the degree to which Turkish civil and bureaucratic structures effectively imitate the European. *The exercise in organized hypocrisy thus is giving way to an exercise in administrative mimesis and public sector isomorphism.* The desired aim of the EU Council and of the EU Commission that emerges through a reading of the documents encapsulated below is to promote organisational and institutional kinds of isomorphism across the Turkish public sector and between European and Turkish public agencies as well. Organizational and institutional isomorphism, that is, the extent to which Turkish public agencies and government bureaucracies resemble European ones, now rises to the fore. It represents a new stage in the identity formation necessary for success in the Turkish pursuit of accession. Administrative mimesis and public sector isomorphism together constitutes the new *sine qua non*. This, we predict, will be the thrust of the decision taken in December, 2004 whatever the timetable that is announced.

For its part, the *National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis* recognises the need to achieve greater degrees of harmonisation or public sector isomorphism. In the crucial area of ‘political criteria,’ for example, the document specifies concrete measures taken along with future action items. Accomplishments include abolition of the death penalty, the lifting of states of emergency and legislative revisions in numerous areas relevant to rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Within the area of cultural and social rights, there is emphasis on minority rights.

The tables below outline in the left-hand columns the EU Commission’s 2003 *Report* in terms of the pluses and minuses it attests that now exist in terms of Turkish progress; the right hand columns, extracted from the *Turkish National Programme*, lists Turkish responses. These are the parameters of administrative mimesis and public sector isomorphism that are currently open to mediation.<sup>36</sup>

<b>POLITICAL-LEGAL ISSUES</b>		
<b>Issue Area</b>	<b>General Status according to the EU Commission report</b>	<b>Official Turkish response and relevant action items</b>
<b>Corruption</b>	<p><b>(+)</b> Turkey has ratified the Civil Law Convention on Corruption</p> <p><b>(-)</b> In spite of several initiatives, corruption remains at a persistently high level and affects many spheres of life.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The fight against organized crime, drugs, trafficking in human beings, fraud, corruption, and money-laundering, particularly through legislative alignment, improved administrative capacity and enhanced co-operation between different law-enforcement bodies will continue to be strengthened in line with EU standards. In this framework, bearing in mind that legal persons may also be involved in corruption and organized crime, necessary amendments will be made to the Turkish Penal Code concerning economic crimes committed by legal persons, and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption will be ratified by the Parliament.</li> <li>Amendments will be made to the Turkish Penal</li> </ul>

		Code, the Law on Combating Organizations Pursuit Illicit Gain, and the Law on Criminal Procedure.
<b>Free movement of persons</b>	<p>(+) Some progress in the reporting period, mainly in the area of free movement of workers. A law on work permits was adopted in February 2003.</p> <p>(-) Turkey's alignment remains limited. As regards administrative capacity, no developments can be reported.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Depending on the progress of the ongoing negotiations between Turkey and the EU on liberalisation of services, the provisions regulated by specific laws and which include 'Turkish citizenship' as a precondition for the execution of a profession will be abolished for EU citizens, for some professions gradually before accession within the framework of reciprocity principle, and for some professions upon accession, again maintaining the reciprocity principle.</li> <li>Studies concerning alignment with the EU <i>acquis communautaire</i> of the legislation in the fields of coordination of social security, right of residence, and free movement of workers will continue and will be finalised before accession in the framework of the reciprocity principle, by taking into consideration the ongoing negotiations with the EU on the liberalisation of services.</li> <li>However, Decisions Nos. 1/80 and 3/80 of the Turkey-EU Council laying down the procedures related to the entry of Turkish workers and their families to the EU employment market and their wages and working conditions, need to be updated by taking into consideration the interpretations of the European Court of Justice. There is a need for new Association Council Decisions that will permit our citizens working legally and residing in member states to exercise the right to free movement without having to wait for Turkey's full membership.</li> <li>On the other hand, it is proposed to amend related articles of Law No. 5682 on Passports, and to establish a structure ensuring conformity with the decisions of the Community <i>acquis</i> in order to prevent illicit immigration, as required by the EU. The relevant draft law should be enacted as soon as possible.</li> </ul>
<b>Customs issues and Visas</b>	<p>(+) Administrative capacity has been improved.</p> <p>(-) The following outstanding issues should be given priority: legislation on the customs aspects of control; counterfeit and pirated goods; cultural goods and non-customs legislation relevant to</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In order to transpose the new EU Customs Code into Turkish customs legislation, Turkey will become a party to the Revised Kyoto Convention.</li> <li>The administrative and operational capacity of the customs administration to fight against smuggling will be strengthened.</li> <li>In order to achieve interconnectivity between electronic systems in Turkey and the EU, efforts for the alignment of computer systems will be</li> </ul>

	<p>the application of customs provisions on free zones and customs procedures with economic impact. Turkey should continue to strengthen inter-institutional co-operation and post clearance audits and border control, in order to achieve satisfactory implementation and enforcement of the aligned legislation.</p>	<p>completed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Turkey will be a party to the Convention on Transit and Single Administrative Document upon the approval of the countries that are party to the Convention.</li> <li>• In the field of free zones, the discrepancies between the practices of Turkey and the EU will be removed by paying special attention to the role of free zones in Turkish economic development and the vested rights of the existing firms.</li> <li>• Turkey will harmonise its legislation with the EU acquis regarding the Mutual Administrative Cooperation Agreements signed by the EU with third countries.</li> <li>• In order to continue the process of alignment of visa legislation and practice with the acquis, the issues cited below will be given priority: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Important steps have been taken to align with the EU Visa Negative List. By May 2003, 75% alignment with the said list was achieved. For full alignment, the situation of six countries needs to be reviewed. As a first step, Turkey introduced visa requirements for six Gulf countries (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates) which the EU subjects to visa requirements, as of September 1st 2002.</li> <li>2. As a second step, thirteen countries (Indonesia, Republic of South Africa, Kenya, Bahamas, Maldives, Barbados, Seychelles, Jamaica, Belize, Fiji, Mauritius, Grenada and Santa Lucia) have been listed for visa requirements, and these entered into force between May- July 2003.</li> </ol> </li> <li>• Alignment with EU norms in the field of intellectual and industrial property rights, in which considerable progress has been achieved by Turkey during the Customs Union process, will be completed.</li> <li>• Turkey will be a party to important agreements and treaties in the field of intellectual and industrial property rights.</li> <li>• Particular importance will be devoted to the fight against counterfeit and pirated goods.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Public Administration</b></p>	<p>(+) There has been progress in some sectors.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In order to realise financial transparency necessary legal and administrative arrangements will be made for the approval of the budgets of budgetary (the</li> </ul>

	<p>(-) There has been only limited progress in establishing conformity assessment and market surveillance mechanisms and institutions, and the system of legal metrology needs to be reinforced.</p>	<p>Support and Price Stability Fund), and extra-budgetary funds which are not closed out of necessity (the Support and Price Stability Fund, the Social Aid and Solidarity Fund, the Defence Support Fund, and Promotion and Publicity Fund) by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, to make the accounts of these funds subject to external auditing, and to report accounts of these funds together with consolidated budget accounts, on a monthly basis.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A comprehensive public administration reform programme will be implemented to develop the necessary legal and institutional environment for the provision of public services in a more effective, transparent, and participatory way.</li> <li>• The independence of the regulatory authorities will be preserved in accordance with international norms, and their transparency and accountability will be increased.</li> <li>• Acceleration of investment procedure through the elimination of administrative barriers and the reduction of red tape will continue in the framework of the Reform Programme for the Improvement of the Investment Environment, which has been prepared to facilitate and encourage foreign direct investment and for the purpose of increasing domestic and foreign investment.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Role of National Security Council</b></p>	<p>(+) The reform package adopted in July introduced important changes to the duties, structure and functioning of the National Security Council.</p> <p>(-) The powers and functioning of State Security Courts is still not in line with European standards and practice.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The functions of the National Security Council and the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council shall be harmonized with the consultative status as redefined through constitutional and legislative amendments.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Efficiency of judiciary</b></p>	<p>(+) Initiatives have been taken to strengthen the judiciary.</p> <p>(-) More efforts are still needed to enhance the efficiency and the independence of the judiciary. The functioning of the courts still needs to be brought into</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The necessary legal and administrative measures will be taken to strengthen the functioning of the judiciary, increasing judicial and administrative capacity to achieve international standards for prisons and detention houses, and judicial automation.</li> </ul>

	line with European standards in particular with the rights to legal defence and the principle of fair trial.	
<b>SOCIAL POLICY AND CULTURAL RIGHTS</b>		
<b>Issue Area</b>	<b>General Status according to the EU Commission report</b>	<b>Official Turkish response and relevant action items</b>
<b>Human Rights</b>	<p>(+) Four new reform packages have been adopted since August 2002, addressing a range of issues related to human rights and the protection of minorities.</p> <p>(-) It is of great concern that Turkey has not executed many judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Government is convinced that ensuring the full and equal enjoyment of all fundamental rights and freedoms and cultural rights by all individuals without discrimination is its fundamental duty. In this context, the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion and belief will be strictly safeguarded in accordance with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Ensuring gender equality in practice will be prioritised.</li> <li>• The Turkish Government will closely monitor progress in the country in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law, regularly evaluate the work underway for harmonization with the EU acquis, and will take all necessary measures to speed up the ongoing work.</li> <li>• The goal is to strengthen, on the basis of Turkey's international commitments and EU standards, the provisions of the Constitution and other legislation to promote freedom; provide for a more participatory democracy with additional safeguards; reinforce the balance of powers and competences between State organs; and enhance the rule of law. In the context of the reform process regarding democracy and human rights, the review of the Constitution will have priority. The constitutional amendments will also establish the framework for the review of other legislation.</li> <li>• Torture and maltreatment will be prevented and zero tolerance will be shown in this matter. The legislative and administrative measures adopted for this purpose will be implemented strictly.</li> <li>• The effective implementation of the measures concerning the conditions in prisons and detention houses will be achieved.</li> <li>• Human rights training for public officials will be expanded and intensified. Legal reforms will be emphasised as the basis of the democratisation process.</li> </ul>

<p><b>Basic Freedoms</b></p>	<p>(+) The adoption of reform packages has led to the lifting of several legal restrictions on the exercise of freedom of expression. As regards freedom of association, some restrictions have been eased. In the area of freedom of religion, some changes have been introduced by reform packages.</p> <p>(-) Cases against persons expressing non-violent opinion continue to occur. Associations still experience cumbersome procedures. Cases of prosecution against associations and particularly human rights defenders continue to occur. Executive bodies continue to adopt a very restrictive interpretation of the relevant provisions, so that religious freedom is subject to serious limitations as compared with European standards.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Government attaches importance and priority to both the continuation and the expansion of freedom of expression. Support for the development of civil society and its participation in democratic life will be continued. In this vein, the relevant legislation will continue to be reviewed in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights.</li> <li>• The legislation concerning freedom of worship will be simplified in implementation in light of the ECHR and its Additional Protocol No. 1, with a view to addressing the needs of different religions and faiths.</li> <li>• Legislation concerning associations as well as meetings and demonstrations will be reviewed. Provisions in various legislation will be collected into as few laws as possible to provide consistency.</li> <li>• The legislative and administrative reforms concerning associations, foundations, meetings, and demonstration marches will be implemented effectively.</li> <li>• In addition, legal and administrative measures will be introduced in the short or medium term regarding individual rights and freedoms, the freedom of thought and expression, the freedom of association and peaceful assembly, civil society, the Judiciary, pre-trial detention and detention conditions in prisons, the fight against torture, human rights violations, training of law-enforcement personnel and other civil servants on human rights issues, regional disparities.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Broadcasting rights</b></p>	<p>(+) Measures have been taken to lift the ban on radio and TV broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish.</p> <p>(-) So far, the reforms adopted have had little practical effect.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The implementation of the provisions on the learning of and the broadcasting in different languages and dialects used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives will be ensured.</li> <li>• Although some provisions of EC Directive 97/36/EC concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities ('TV without frontiers'), such as advertising, tele-shopping, protection of minors, definitions, and major events were fully transposed into the relevant Turkish laws, in order to achieve full alignment with the said Directive, Law No. 3984 on the Establishment of the Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts will be amended.</li> </ul>

<p><b>Workers and Employment</b></p>	<p>(+) Labour market policies have been brought closer to international standards.</p> <p>(-) The attention paid to labour market issues is far from sufficient.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The draft law on the establishment of the Turkish Employment Agency, which aims to strengthen the capacity of the Turkish Employment Agency in developing active labour market policies, and to develop a national employment policy compatible with the European Employment Strategy, will be enacted.</li> <li>• The Active Employment Measures Project will be implemented for combating unemployment.</li> <li>• A National Employment Plan consistent with the European Employment Strategy will be developed.</li> <li>• It has been envisaged that many issues related to the free movement of persons, considered to be a very sensitive issue by EU member states, will be dealt with at the full member stage, and possibly through transitional arrangements.</li> <li>• Decisions Nos. 1/80 and 3/80 of the Turkey-EU Council laying down the procedures related to the entry of Turkish workers and their families to the EU employment market and their wages and working conditions, need to be updated by taking into consideration the interpretations of the European Court of Justice.</li> <li>• There is a need for new Association Council Decisions that will permit our citizens working legally and residing in member states to exercise the right to free movement without having to wait for Turkey's full membership.</li> <li>• On the other hand, it is proposed to amend related articles of Law No. 5682 on Passports, and to establish a structure ensuring conformity with the decisions of the Community acquis in order to prevent illicit immigration, as required by the EU. The relevant draft law should be enacted as soon as possible.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Refugees and Asylum</b></p>	<p>(+) The adoption of the Migration and Asylum Strategies for alignment with the EU acquis is a significant step.</p> <p>(-) Improving co-ordination and co-operation among institutions of justice and home affairs, the reform of the judiciary, intensified active co-operation with the</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• While being a party to the UN Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its Additional Protocol, Turkey declared at the time of its accession a geographical limitation on the definition of the term 'refugee'. Despite the limitation on the definition, as a result of humanitarian concerns both for foreigners granted refugee status and for foreigners arriving from regions outside of Europe granted temporary asylum rights, Turkey strictly observes the 'nonrefoulement' principle of the Article 33 of the Convention.</li> </ul>

	<p>European Union on illegal migration and the lifting of the geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees, and the co-operation with the EU in fighting trafficking are issues that need to be addressed more concretely.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The issue of geographic limitation will be addressed during the progression of EU accession negotiations of Turkey. The geographic limitation will be lifted in the accession process, on the condition that it should not encourage large scale refugee inflows to Turkey from the East, upon the completion of the necessary legislative and infra-structural measures and in line with the sensitivity of the EU Member States on the issue of burden-sharing.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Social Security</b></p>	<p>(+) The process of aligning with the acquis has started mainly in areas related to labour law.</p> <p>(-) The most urgent problems for the social security system are the lack of financial stability due to general macroeconomic imbalances, the presence of an informal sector and administrative and management problems.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The new Framework Law that aims to bring all social security institutions under the same roof will come into force and thus social security deficits will be reduced.</li> <li>• EU legislation on individual and collective labour law, health and safety at work, equality of treatment between men and women, and combating discrimination will be transposed into Turkish Labour Law. Training activities will be held to improve the administrative capacity. Also implementing regulations will be prepared in the areas of health and safety at work.</li> <li>• The administrative capacity of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security for EU alignment and participation in the European Social Fund and Dublin Foundation will be strengthened.</li> <li>• In order to fully align with EU acquis in the field of public health, an implementing regulation will be issued for ensuring the surveillance and control of communicable diseases, and necessary institutional arrangements will be made.</li> <li>• The institutional capacity of the social security system and the social funds required to implement the EU acquis on social protection and social inclusion will be strengthened.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Education</b></p>	<p>(+) Some progress has been achieved in the area of education and training.</p> <p>(-) Turkey should increase levels of investment in science and research. It should continue preparations for participation in the Three Community programmes, re-examine the role of the High Education Council, and</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The National Agency for the coordination of participation in EU Education and Youth Programmes--such as Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci, and Youth--was set up under the aegis of the State Planning Organisation. A law will be passed securing its autonomy in administrative and financial terms. Furthermore, information meetings will be organised to publicize the Programmes.</li> <li>• With the aim of mutual recognition of vocational training documents and ensuring a certain standard in vocational training, the 'Draft Law on National</li> </ul>

	improve special education options.	<p>Professional Standards', contemplating the establishment of a Professional Standards Institute which regulates vocational standards and is open to the participation of employees, employers and state agencies has been prepared by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security and the Turkish Employment Agency and submitted to the Prime Ministry. The enactment of this draft will be very significant.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Necessary studies will be carried out to increase the period of compulsory basic education to 9-12 years as in EU member states.</li> <li>• Turkey endeavours to participate in the Fifth Framework Program (1998 – 2002) of the EU in the field of Research and Technological Development covering the years 2000-2002 with a maximum number of projects until 31 December 2001. In order to participate in the next framework program as an 'associate member', an association agreement will be negotiated and necessary studies will be conducted to allow for Turkey's first full participation in the 6th Framework Program (2002 – 2006).</li> </ul>
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## ECONOMIC POLICY

Issue Area	General Status according to the EU Commission report	Official Turkish response and relevant action items
<b>Macro-economic policy</b>	<p>(+) Turkey has made progress in improving the functioning of markets and in strengthening the institutional framework for a fully functioning market economy.</p> <p>(-) Macroeconomic stability and predictability have not yet been achieved to a sufficient degree.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the determination and implementation of macroeconomic policies, special importance will be given to strengthening the dialogue with the EU.</li> <li>• In this context, studies with regard to Fiscal Notifications and the Pre-Accession Economic Programme, which are being carried out within the framework of the Pre-accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure, will continue.</li> </ul>
<b>Fiscal policy</b>	<p>(+) Economic stability and predictability have increased with a continued decline in inflationary pressures.</p> <p>(-) The disinflation process has to be maintained; inflationary pressures remain</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of the disinflation and structural reform programme, agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank will continue.</li> <li>• In order to support the disinflation policy, incomes policy will be determined by respecting inflation targets in the short-term.</li> </ul>

	high.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of financial sector reform will continue, and the law concerning harmonisation of the public internal financial auditing system with European Union and international standards will be enacted.</li> <li>• Studies will continue to ensure a sustainable growth environment, to decrease the inflation rate permanently, and align the public debt stock and budget deficit to GDP ratios to EU averages.</li> </ul>
<b>Ability to cope with EU market pressures</b>	<p>(+) Trade integration with the EU has remained stable and the commodity structure of the exports has continued to improve. Medium, small and very small enterprises have proved to be the stabilizing core of the Turkish economy.</p> <p>(-) Further decisive steps towards macroeconomic stability and structural reforms will enhance the Turkish capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Turkish Competition Law is to a great extent parallel to the Competition Law of the EU. The Competition Authority is following amendments to EU rules of competition, and activities have already been initiated to prepare parallel arrangements.</li> <li>• Following the entry into force of the Turkish Code of Commerce, alignment with EU legislation in the field of company and accounting law will be completed gradually.</li> <li>• The working group on the ‘Special and Exclusive Rights’ of public institutions established to ensure compliance with EU norms and prevent distortion of competition will compare Turkish legislation in this field with the related EU legislation and specify the necessary measures required for harmonisation.</li> <li>• Harmonisation studies will continue in the field of state monopolies of a commercial character in order to eliminate any discrimination between the Member States and Turkey in the procurement and marketing of goods.</li> <li>• With the Law on Monitoring and Supervising State Aid, a functionally autonomous authority responsible for monitoring and supervising state aids will be established and the said authority will provide harmonisation with the EU acquis in this field.</li> </ul>
<b>Free Movement of goods</b>	<p>(+) Turkey has made progress, particularly on sector-specific legislation.</p> <p>(-) Substantial efforts are needed in terms of both alignment and implementation of legislation on product safety and product specifications. Limited progress has been made in the field of professional services,</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Turkey will complete harmonisation with EU technical legislation, and the market surveillance system and conformity assessment system will be established and implemented.</li> <li>• Alignment with EU criteria in food safety will be realised by the adoption of the relevant EU legislation and implementation thereof. To this end, the physical infrastructure of control laboratories will be improved. Moreover, a ‘Rapid Alarm System’ will be established to ensure nationwide food safety.</li> </ul>

	<p>information-society services, and the insurance sector in regards to aligning with the <i>acquis</i>.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The required infrastructure will be completed for full enforcement of the harmonised legislation and of the market surveillance system and conformity assessment systems.</li> <li>• The fulfilment of these obligations, will provide for a supply of quality goods conforming to international norms to our domestic market, and with its positive impact on our exports, will also increase our competitiveness.</li> <li>• Studies for the establishment of a new market supervision system, initiated following the Customs Union, still continue. This system covers the technical <i>acquis</i> of the EU and its stages of implementation including standardization, measurement (metrology) and accreditation.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Free Movement of services</b></p>	<p>(+) Turkey has made progress in this area, in particular as regards the banking sector and the area of investment services and securities markets.</p> <p>(-) Alignment is low in the area of professional services, and further legislation is needed in the areas of information-society services and data protection. Insurance supervisory bodies need additional administrative capacity.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Studies on the detailed scrutiny of Turkish legislation will be carried out in order to identify potential obstacles to the EC Treaty provisions related to the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services.</li> <li>• The Law on Insurance Regulation and Supervision, which has been prepared for strengthening regulation and supervision of insurance companies and for harmonisation with EU legislation, will be enacted.</li> <li>• EU legislation on personal data protection will be harmonised and the Personal Data Protection Authority will be established.</li> <li>• EU legislation on provision of services in the information society will be harmonised.</li> <li>• Depending on the progress of the ongoing negotiations between Turkey and the EU on liberalisation of services, the provisions regulated by specific laws and which include ‘Turkish citizenship’ as a precondition for the execution of a profession will be abolished for EU citizens, for some professions gradually before accession within the framework of reciprocity principle, and for some professions upon accession, again maintaining the reciprocity principle.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Free Movement of Capital</b></p>	<p>(+) The alignment with the <i>acquis</i> is progressing, notably as regards the liberalization of capital movements.</p> <p>(-) Further efforts are</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The issue of removing all restrictions affecting foreign investments (originating from the EU) in all sectors in Turkey (the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts, the Law on Turkish Civil Aviation, the Law on Cabotage, the Turkish Code of Commerce,</li> </ul>

	<p>necessary. In particular, Turkey should lift remaining limitations on foreign investors, and continue its efforts to modernize liberalise and streamline the legal, regulatory, and administrative framework on investment.</p>	<p>the Law on Telegraph and Telephone, and the Tourism Incentive Law impose various restrictions) will be placed on the agenda during the negotiation process.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• With the new Law Foreign natural persons and commercial companies will be able to acquire real estate in the territory of the Republic of Turkey, on a reciprocal basis and in compliance with the security principle. The issue of removing all restrictions will be placed on the agenda during the negotiation process.</li> </ul>
<b>Privatisation and Banking</b>	<p><b>(+)</b> The banking sector is channelling financial capital towards the private sector only to a limited degree, and the sector's consolidation process is not yet completed. Political interference has been reduced and the number of branches has decreased.</p> <p><b>(-)</b> No privatization has taken place. The privatization of state-owned banks and enterprises as well as market deregulation has to be accelerated, and structural distortions should be addressed.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Harmonisation studies in the field of banking and securities are ongoing.</li> <li>• The Banking Regulation and Supervision Board, established as a consequence of the reform of the fiscal sector, provides a central authority for the regulation, observation and supervision of the banking sector. However the crisis faced in February 2001 has made it necessary to take more fundamental measures in the context of the reforms of the fiscal sector.</li> <li>• It is essential that priority be given to the Banking Act and the Law of the Central Bank of Turkey. The regulations regarding state owned banks will also be given first priority in the context of fiscal sector reform.</li> <li>• Privatisation will be accelerated and completed.</li> <li>• Privatisation is an important component of the reform program. For the growth of the Turkish economy in a competitive environment, economic activities of the state, especially those having a monopolistic character, have to be privatised immediately. Meanwhile, maximum care must be taken to ensure that private monopolies do not develop and replace the state monopoly.</li> <li>• The amendments introduced in 1999 mean that privatisation is included in the Constitution for the first time. In addition, problems concerning public procurement in the energy sector have been dealt with through the establishment of an international arbitration mechanism.</li> </ul>
<b>Regional disparity</b>	<p><b>(+)</b> Some progress has been achieved since the last regular report for the implementation of regional policy in line with EC structural policies, in particular as regards territorial</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The National Development Plan and Regional Development Strategy, the objectives of which are to achieve economic and social cohesion within the country, will be finalised by the State Planning Organisation.</li> </ul>

	<p>organization and the preparation of a National Development plan.</p> <p>(-) Considerable efforts are still necessary to ensure implementation of regional policy at central and regional level. Appropriate institutions need to be created and endowed with adequate human and financial resources.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preparations regarding the law on local administration reform will be completed.</li> <li>• Under the coordination of the Secretariat General for EU Affairs, a working group including all relevant institutions will be set up to adopt EU legislation on the coordination and implementation of the regional and structural funds, and to design the necessary structures for the implementation of the related EU legislation.</li> <li>• The draft Law for establishing Regional Development Agencies in NUTS 2 regions will be prepared in order to ensure the on-site and effective use of resources, implement EU programmes, develop the relationship between the private sector, non-governmental organisations, and public administration, and provide inter-provincial coordination.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Agricultural policy</b></p>	<p>(+) Some progress has been made in the veterinary and phytosanitary fields particularly as regards animal disease control, identification and registration.</p> <p>(-) Further substantial efforts aimed at increasing the administrative capacity and upgrading control and inspection systems, and the upgrading of food processing establishments, will be required if full compliance is to be achieved.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Harmonisation with EU legislation on the establishment of the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), which Turkey will use efficiently in agriculture policies, will be completed and studies will be initiated to establish the necessary institutional capacity.</li> <li>• The EU legislation regarding common market organisations developed for all product groups, and the legislation related to those products which are not subject to common market organisation but are governed by a certain production model and for which an aid mechanism has been set up, will be examined.</li> <li>• Turkish legislation will be harmonised with EU legislation laying down the implementation conditions and principles for Turkey regarding determination of the border inspection posts in the phytosanitary field and removal of technical barriers to trade.</li> </ul>

## 5. Conclusion

Emphasis on public sector isomorphism suggests that the road to Turkish accession is now bending away from the spectres of inadequate economic growth or overwhelming levels of Turkish emigration to the labour markets and social safety nets of Europe. As one study observes, ‘Turkey equals 2-3 times Romania; it has a very similar GDP per capita, a comparable track record in terms of growth over the last years, a similar share of agriculture, and also problems with macroeconomic stabilisation.’<sup>37</sup> The Turkish economy is growth oriented and functions at a par or even above those of newly

admitted states. In addition, it is becoming increasingly recognised that extension of the *acquis communautaire* to Turkey will not result in a flood of Turkish workers to European labour markets or to unrestricted access to the benefits of European welfare systems for them and their families. This was given special emphasis by the Turkish government in its 2003 National programme, when it stated (see above), 'It has been envisaged that many issues related to the free movement of persons, considered to be a very sensitive issue by EU member states, will be dealt with at the full member stage, and possibly through transitional arrangements.' Nothing in the process of enlargement prevents EU states from limiting access to their labour markets and social security or welfare systems during negotiated periods of transition like those that now serve to limit migration flows from the recently admitted states.

What has always made the question of Turkish accession different, however, as we have tried to show, is the issue of Turkish and Islamic cultural identity and its perceived impacts on democratic institutions and public sector accountability. What has concerned the EU is the ability of Turkey to accommodate political, civil, social, cultural and economic rights in ways that reaffirm the legitimacy of Western forms of democracy. Here too the Turkish government has acted responsively to these legitimate concerns. On or around June 9, 2004, the Turkish government announced release of jailed Kurdish lawmakers, including Nobel Peace Prize nominee, Leyla Zana, who was freed after serving ten years of a fifteen year sentence. Zana had become a major symbol to many Kurds and Europeans as a result of her advocacy of non-violent means to obtain rights for Turkish Kurds. Additionally, the Turkish state-run broadcasting network, aired its first ever television and radio broadcast in Kurdish, key requirements demanded by the EU.<sup>38</sup>

In the end, there is much to be gained on both sides of the accession question, as Zana's release from prison so nobly demonstrates. For the Turks, their legitimacy as a European nation becomes finally settled. Turkish civil society organizations gain stature; the Turkish military becomes leashed under the terms of European democratic traditions, but nonetheless a powerful element in European security. Turkish civil society, the effectiveness of its public and judicial administration, the competitiveness and efficiencies of its markets, its capacity to promote human and social capital, all is significantly enhanced. As we have shown, the issues that have developed over the past decade have devolved into matters of judicial administration, political structures and bureaucratic delivery systems. On the whole, this seems salutary. Administrative and public sector cultures do reflect capacities for maintaining an open society crucial to the success of a productive and democratic society. Accession thus represents a positive force for change in Turkey, one that reaffirms the continuity of Turkish democracy and its relationship to Europe.

For the Europeans, the gains range from the material to the sublime. Europe's access to energy sources is vastly enhanced. The strategic interests of Europe in the Middle East, Central Asia and South East Asia become more secure. The Cyprus issue works its way toward resolution with greater certainty. EU-Turkish capital, trade, and tourist flows all become facilitated. Europe's ageing population soon may look to relatively youthful Turkish workers as a boon rather than as a predicament. And Turkey

may soon become the welcoming site for European industrial agglomeration, given the scarcity of such sites throughout much of the European continent.<sup>39</sup>

But even more than just this, *Europe reinvents itself*. For the challenges of social construction, the dynamics of identity formation and the path toward historic reinvention cuts two ways, as they do in all relationships grounded in mutuality. It is every bit as incumbent upon the Europeans as it is on the Turks to reconstruct their cultural identities along non-exclusionary lines, whatever the difficulties and demands. Fundamental to the issue of Turkish accession is the question as to whether or not Europeans, both elites and general populations, can learn to embrace the Turkey of Turkish and Kurdish Muslims as one of their own. We spoke earlier of risks. Risks are invariably present whenever and wherever great experiments in postmodernist forms of social reinvention occur, especially when collective notions of 'otherness' are present. Today, minority issues assail European politics and anti-immigrant and anti-enlargement political parties and factions become important political forces. For such reasons, one hopes that Europeans have the capacity to take the risks necessary to convert cultural differences into political partnership and collective constructions of otherness into forms of regional solidarity.

Ultimately, the question of Turkish accession is not about the EU or Turkey alone; it is about civility in international relations, politics and law. If successful, Turkish accession into the European Union will confirm the validity of multilateral institution-building and of the capacities of advanced industrial democracies to promote an international civil society grounded in peace and justice through dialogue and due process of benefit not only to their populations alone but to the entire world.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> The editorial in *Suddeutsche Zeitung*, as translated and summarized in the International Herald Tribune, 19 February 2004, 2.
- <sup>2</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet*, 13 December 2002: authors' translation.  
HTTP: <<http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/arsiv/1,,,00.asp>> (accessed 1 June 2004).
- <sup>3</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet* *ibid.*, 25 November 2002.
- <sup>4</sup> S. Sami, 'Membership Could Cost Turkey Its Soul', *International Herald Tribune*, 7 May 2004, 8.
- <sup>5</sup> N. Brunsson, *The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organizations*, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1989.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- <sup>7</sup> *Hurriyet*, *op.cit.*, 30 April 2004.
- <sup>8</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet*, *ibid.*, 22 November 2002.
- <sup>9</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet*, *ibid.*, 5 December 2002.
- <sup>10</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet*, *ibid.*, 30 April 2004.
- <sup>11</sup> Cited in J. Vinocur, 'Fischer's Shifting Vision of Europe's Grand Future', *International Herald Tribune*, 13 April 2004, 2.
- <sup>12</sup> A. Cowell, 'In Debate Over Turkey, Europe Defines Itself: A Christian Club vs. Geopolitical Union', *International Herald Tribune*, 26 January 2004, 3.
- <sup>13</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet*, *op.cit.*, 30 April 2004.
- <sup>14</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet* *ibid.*, 15 September 2003.
- <sup>15</sup> 'Turkey Isn't Fit for EU, French Say', *International Herald Tribune*, 9 April 2004, 3.
- <sup>16</sup> Cited in K. Bennhold, 'Chirac Praises EU Expansion', *International Herald Tribune*, 30 April 2004, 2.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>18</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet*, *op.cit.*, 29 April 2004.
- <sup>19</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet*, *ibid.*, 5 December 2002.
- <sup>20</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet*, *ibid.*, 7 December 2002.

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<sup>21</sup> Anadolu Agency, cited in *Hurriyet*, *ibid.*, 18 January 2004.

<sup>22</sup> G. Aybet, 'Turkey and European Institutions', *The International Spectator*, 34:1, January-March 1999.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> European Union, The European Council, *The Bulletin of the European Communities*, No.6/1993, 'Conclusions of the Presidency', 13, 21-22 June 1993.

<sup>26</sup> European Union, The European Council, *Conclusions Of The European Council On Turkey Since Luxembourg*, December 1997, 1.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> E.Erdogdu, 'Turkey and Europe: Undivided but Not United', *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.6, No.2, June 2002, 46.

<sup>29</sup> European Union, The European Council, *Conclusions Of The European Council On Turkey Since Luxembourg*, December 1997, 1.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> European Union, The European Council, *Conclusions Of The European Council On Turkey Since Luxembourg*, December 1997, 2.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>35</sup> European Union, The European Council, *Conclusions Of The European Council On Turkey Since Luxembourg*, December 1997, 3.

<sup>36</sup> The paragraphs cited in this table are culled from *2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession* and *2003 Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis* according to our interpretation of significance.

<sup>37</sup> Gross, D., Crum, B., and Turmann, A., 'Enlargement: A Process Rather Than A Point In Time', CEPS Policy Brief No.51, April 2004.

<sup>38</sup> 'Turkey Frees Kurds, Airs Kurdish Broadcast', *Washington Post*, 10 June 2004.

<sup>39</sup> Akinci, U., 'EU and Turkey: A Win-Win Proposal', in *Turkishpress.com*, 23 May 2004.

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