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*Diverse but Converging Paths to EU
Membership: Poland and Turkey in
Comparative Perspective.*

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DIVERSE BUT CONVERGING PATHS TO EU MEMBERSHIP: POLAND AND TURKEY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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From 1989 onwards, communism came to an end with a domino effect in Central and Eastern Europe. The countries of the region were immediately exposed to a process of change and reform which would help to transform them into Western European style liberal democracies. Poland along with Hungary proved to be one the major cases of success in this transformation process. Indeed, in the words of Attila Agh, "...Poland has been the trendsetter in political developments for the entire region since the early 1980s or even earlier".¹ The Polish case is interesting in terms of highlighting the way in which relatively favorable domestic and external circumstances can interact and help to produce a virtuous cycle of democratization and reform over a short period of time. Similarly, the Turkish case is also interesting in terms of illustrating how relatively unfavorable domestic political conditions may interact with weak external signals to produce a considerably more gradual and protracted process of democratization and economic reform.

Hence, my aim in this paper is to provide a kind explanation of diversity in the context of EU enlargement based on different constellation of major actors involved depending on the specific political and economic contexts and resulting in vicious or virtuous circles. By highlighting the contingent nature of these paths, my explanation differs from the kind of perspective that highlights cultural and geopolitical reasons as being primarily responsible for two countries contrasting paths to the EU.

There are a number of striking commonalities as well as obvious differences between the Polish and the Turkish cases that render a comparative analysis a valuable undertaking. First of all, “Europeanization“ has been a major goal for the respective elites of both societies. In addition to their underlying Western orientation, which is shared by other countries in the region, both countries are large in terms of population size. Indeed, Poland is the only country among the ten new members of the EU that comes close to Turkey in terms of population size, although arguably Turkey’s size and per capita income is a considerably bigger constraint than that of Poland. Both countries have experienced prolonged periods of state domination in their respective economic and political spheres, in spite of obvious differences terms of regime type. Indeed, both countries suffer from the presence of a large and inefficient agricultural sector that poses serious threats to basic community institutions like the Common Agricultural Policy. They are also likely to pose a serious burden on the community’s structural or regional funds. There has been a noticeable divergence in the economic fortunes of the two countries, however, following the superior economic performance of Poland notably from the mid-1990s onwards.²

In spite of the more rapid progress registered by Poland in recent years, neither of the two countries may be considered as fully successful in terms of consolidating the reform process and achieving “substantive” as opposed to “procedural” democracy.³ Polish democracy still falls short of Western standards in such key areas as establishing a stable party system and the ability to deal effectively with corruption. Hence, it is meaningful to classify both societies as “transitional societies”, though at different points along the continuum of this transition process.

The relative success of Poland constitutes a paradox in the sense that Polish transition to a democracy is a rather recent phenomenon compared to the Turkish experience. In explaining this apparent anomaly, differences both in the domestic political environments and the external conditions, notably the relations with the EU, have to be taken into account. In spite of Poland's delayed re-encounter with Europe, the country has enjoyed a number of advantages in the domestic political sphere which has been absent in the Turkish context. My central hypothesis in this context concerns the unity and commitment of the reforming elite in Poland. Poland has experienced turmoil in its domestic politics in the course of the 1990s and a sizeable anti-EU coalition has been present right up to the recent referendum concerning the ratification of the accession decision.⁴ Nevertheless, the reforming elite with the help of a highly vocal civil society and mobilization from below, was able to display considerable unity and commitment in terms of its ability to satisfy the basic EU norms on the road to full membership. In contrast, the "power elite" or the "ruling bloc" in Turkish society displayed neither the unity nor the commitment necessary to accomplish rapid progress in terms of satisfying the EU norms. Indeed, the prospect of accession has caused a serious rupture within the power elite in the Turkish society with big business emerging as a leading member of the pro-EU coalition whilst the military and security establishment constituted a serious force of resistance for EU-related reforms. Consequently, from the EU perspective, considerable doubts were raised about the credibility of the reform process in Turkey, whilst similar doubts were largely absent in the Polish setting. What is also striking is that popular sector mobilization was critical in the Polish context whereas similar popular mobilization was largely lacking in Turkey.

At the same time, a proper understanding of the differences that emerged in the two cases needs to pay serious attention to the external environment that the two countries faced. My basic argument in this context is that the positive signals provided by the EU have rendered the job of Polish reformers considerably easier. The EU has been far more receptive, in part for cultural and historical reasons, to the idea of Polish membership. With its Christian population as well as its geographical proximity and Western European core, Poland appeared to be a natural candidate for EU membership in sharp contrast to Turkey which appeared to be on the margins of Europe with considerable doubts concerning its true European identity. Consequently, the powerful, if not definitive signals provided by the EU, including the scale of material assistance provided on the road to membership, has performed an instrumental role in the acceleration of the reform process in Poland over the course of the 1990s.⁵ Furthermore, the degree of commitment displayed by Germany as a key player within the EU to Polish membership also proved to be an external force of profound significance. In contrast, the EU elites, for a number of reasons, failed to display the kind of unity and commitment in the case of Turkish membership that they displayed in the case of Polish membership. The weak and often ambiguous signals sent by the EU helped to strengthen the position of the Euro-skeptics whilst undermining the efforts of the reforming elements within the Turkish state and Turkish society.

Clearly, a comparison of the recent Polish and Turkish experiences embodies broader relevance for the literature on democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. Comparative analysis suggests that democratization reforms are able to take root provided that certain favorable conditions exist within the domestic sphere of the

country concerned. Otherwise, external pressure alone cannot result in a fully consolidated democracy. At the same time, favorable external conditions can create a domino effect if favorable domestic conditions are present in the first place.⁶ Both Polish and Turkish experiences fit into this broad schema. Because of its more favorable domestic political environment, both in comparison with Turkey and the vast majority of the post-communist “ transition” countries, Poland was able to accomplish a relatively rapid and smooth process of economic and political reforms. Yet, at the same time, the far more favorable signals that Poland received from external actors, notably from the EU, has no doubt helped to amplify the pace of the reform process and made the job of the reformist elites much easier.

DIVERSE PATHS ON THE ROAD TO EU MEMBERSHIP: THE CASE OF POLAND

Poland had displayed many of the regular features of a communist society during the Cold War era. Yet, the communist party in Poland never had the strong monopolistic power and totalitarian control as in other countries of the communist bloc. The Catholic religion challenged the supremacy of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and retained the allegiance of the large majority of the Polish society.⁷ The planned economy did not exclude small private farming which became the dominant element in Polish agriculture after 1956. The Polish economy was also characterized by the presence of small, independent family businesses and thriving black or grey markets.⁸ There was a high degree of resistance on the part of ordinary people to a regime which was widely regarded as having been artificially imposed by the Soviet Union.⁹ Following the collapse of communism, rapid and full integration into the economic,

political and security structures of the Western world such as NATO and the EU has become a priority for Poland's foreign policy. The process of transformation started in institutional and social spheres.¹⁰ Poland became a key component of the EU enlargement process during the course of the 1990s. The EU, through its Copenhagen criteria exercised a profound influence over the course of the reform process in Poland, emerging as the firm anchor of this process.

Poland was the first country that brought an end to communism and had the significant role in precipitating the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Actually, the destruction of the communist regime might be traced back to early 1980s. During the early 1980s, a mass opposition movement, Solidarity, emerged from a deep and prolonged crisis of state socialism.¹¹ As a consequence of economic and political crises, Solidarity, whose origin was a working class movement as a trade union, became a powerful umbrella organization that helped to mobilize millions of members and sympathizers against the communist rule. In the late 1980s, the disastrous economic situation triggered a new wave of political protest and strikes. The reformist policies of Gorbachev enabled the soft liners in the Polish communist party, PZPR (The Polish United Workers' Party) to start negotiations with Solidarity. The negotiations were opened in February 1989 and in April the Round Table Agreement was signed. According to the agreement, parliament would be bicameral, with a revived freely elected Senate. Elections to the lower house, the Sejm, would be free but only partly competitive to ensure the continuing dominance of the PZPR. Finally, a new office of the president was created which would be indirectly elected by parliament.¹² The semi-free elections of June 1989 generated an outcome which was surprising to both sides with Solidarity unexpectedly taking all but one of the

seats reserved for the opposition. The election meant the end of the communist monopoly and the elimination of the authoritarian regime. Poland became the role model for some of the other CEECs, by achieving a peaceful “negotiated transition” to democracy.¹³

Systematic reforms have been undertaken in two main spheres: at the level of representative institutions and the rule of law.¹⁴ They have also included the establishment of political pluralism, free elections, the creation of a democratically elected parliament, an independent judiciary, directly elected presidency, and the establishment of legitimate and effective centers of government along with a modern civil service.

The specific dynamics of the transition process, involving significant mobilization from below, helped to produce unified elite that was single-mindedly committed to the reform process. The nature of the transition process meant that members of the traditional elites or the military-security establishment that have acted as a counter force in the reform process were effectively sidelined right from the very beginning in Poland’s encounters with the EU. This constituted a major asset in the Polish context that played a decisive role in the relatively smooth implementation of economic and political reforms.

Diplomatic relations between Poland the European Community (EC) were established and an agreement on trade and economic co-operation was signed in September 1989. In addition to this decision, at the G7 Meeting in July 1989, a decision was taken to set up the G24 Western aid program to Poland and Hungary in order to support the

transformations taking place in these countries and the European Commission was empowered to coordinate this assistance. The Commission subsequently set up its PHARE program, which provided the basis for the financing and provision of technical assistance for the economic restructuring of these countries.¹⁵

In May 1990, Poland submitted an official application to Brussels to initiate an association agreement with the EC. In December 1991, Poland and the EU signed the European Agreement (EA). The Polish Parliament ratified it in July, 1992 and it came to force in February, 1994. It created a legal framework for multilateral co-operation in economic, political and cultural sectors, and promised to add impetus to Poland's program of internal reform. These series of steps constituted the first phase in Poland-EU relations. The second and critical phase, however, was initiated at the Copenhagen Summit of June 1993 Where the European Council set out the political and economic criteria with respect to the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU.¹⁶

In April 1994, Poland formally applied for full-membership. Poland's application was formally accepted at the Luxembourg Summit of October 1994 and it was agreed that negotiations on the Polish application would formally commence in the spring of 1998.¹⁷ Forming a kind of road map for the negotiating process was the "Strategy for Poland" devised in June 1994, which contained the blueprint for domestic economic, social and institutional reform. The details of the subsequent steps in Poland's accession process have been widely documented.¹⁸ What is important is that Poland has been provided with clear and unambiguous signals at an early stage in its relations

with the EU. This, in turn, has considerably eased the task of reformers both in the economic and the political spheres.

DIVERSE PATHS ON THE ROAD TO EU MEMBERSHIP: THE CASE OF TURKEY

In striking contrast to Poland, Turkey's encounters with a parliamentary democratic regime have a much longer history dating back to 1950. Turkey's democratic regime, however, has been subject to periodic breakdowns.¹⁹ This suggests that although procedural democracy has been the norm, Turkish democracy has been weak in terms of substantive democracy. In contrast to Poland, Turkey constitutes an example of a second wave democracy of an earlier vintage that still remains to be fully consolidated.²⁰

Similarly, formal relations between Turkey and the European Community span a much longer time period. An associate agreement between Turkey and the EEC was signed in 1963. The Ankara Agreement which became effective from December 1964 onwards envisaged a stage by stage integration process culminating eventually in full membership of the Customs Union of the preparatory and the transitional stages. The agreement also envisaged a movement towards free mobility of labor between Turkey and the Community at some future date, an issue which has created considerable resentment and tension within the Community in the following years and particularly from Germany which historically has been the principal recipient of migrant labor from Turkey.²¹

The year 1974, however, proved to be a crucial turning point in a negative direction. Turkey's intervention in Cyprus during the summer of 1974 and the subsequent partition of the island has adversely affected Turkey's prospects of full-membership. By the time, Turkey re-established representative democracy and applied for full-membership in 1987, it encountered a different kind of Europe that was far more stringent in terms of its admission requirements. Turkey's membership application was rejected by the Community. The decision was justified with the reference to the weaknesses of the Turkish economy as well as Turkey's continuing democratic deficits and weak human rights record.²² Rather reluctantly, the focus of the Turkish policy makers shifted towards the reactivation of the Customs Union which came into effect at the end of 1995. The Customs Union clearly constituted an important development that helped to expose Turkish industry to greater competition.²³ At the same time, however, the Customs Union *per se* hardly provided the mix of conditions and incentives needed for radical economic and political reforms. Consequently, the reform process has remained partial and incomplete.²⁴

The 1990s, on the whole, have not been a happy period for Turkey. The Turkish economy, in the 1990s has been characterized by a high degree of instability and recurrent crises.²⁵ Clearly, relative failure on the economic front has not helped Turkey's fortunes in its relations with the EU.²⁶ At a deeper level, however, Turkey's state-centric model of modernization has been subjected to a series of severe challenges notably from the rise of Kurdish nationalism and political Islam that appeared to threaten the underlying unity and the secular character of the Turkish state. The prolonged armed conflict with the Kurdish secessionist movement, the PKK has been costly not only for the Turkish economy, but also in terms of limiting

the prospects for democratic opening and a move to a more pluralistic society where cultural rights of different minorities are recognized and respected. This, in turn, has clearly exercised a negative impact on Turkey's relations with the EU. Similarly, Turkey in the 1990s with the resurgence of political Islam has faced a dilemma in terms of maintaining a secular state in a predominantly Muslim society within the confines of pluralistic and democratic polity.²⁷ Poland, in spite of its communist past and the importance of the Catholic Church, was a much more homogenous society. Consequently, it was not confronted with the kind of extreme identity challenges and conflicts that Turkey faced during the course of the decade.

On a more positive note, the economic liberalization and reform process as well as certain steps in the direction of further democratization continued in Turkey, albeit at a gradual pace. Nevertheless, in the absence of visible prospects for full membership, the EU anchor proved to be a weak anchor in terms of inducing the key domestic actors to undertake more radical steps in the direction of economic and political reform. The 1990s in Turkey also proved to be an important period in terms of the development of civil society. Whilst, Turkey did not experience the kind of massive Polish style mobilization from below, nevertheless the beginnings of a vibrant civil society could be detected in the 1990s. In retrospect, business-based civil society organizations, such as TÜSIAD, have emerged as key elements of the pro-EU coalition, pushing actively for EU-related economic and political reforms.²⁸

From the Turkish perspective, however, the decisive turning point came in December 1999. In EU's Helsinki Summit of December 1999, Turkey, the first time, was offered candidate country status.²⁹ Although no specific date for opening up accession

negotiations were given, the Helsinki decision had nevertheless striking consequences for Turkey's domestic politics. A tide of reforms were initiated between 2000 and 2002, which the powerful "anti-EU coalition" in Turkey found it progressively more difficult to resist.³⁰ Important reforms involving the abolition of death penalty altogether and extension of cultural rights for minority groups among others, which would have been unimaginable a few years ago, were accomplished during this period. At the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, Turkey moved one step further in its relations with the EU with the possibility of opening accession negotiations in 2005.

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND TRANSNATIONAL INFLUENCES IN A TWO LEVEL GAME FRAMEWORK: VIRTUOUS VERSUS VICIOUS CYCLES IN THE REFORM PROCESS

The analytical framework developed by Robert Putnam, popularly known as the logic of two level games emphasizes the tight inter-linkages that exist between domestic political considerations and foreign policy decisions and suggests that such inter-linkages have to be taken systematically into account in analyzing bilateral relations or conflicts. A modified version of Putnam's framework has particular value in investigating the diverse fortunes of Poland and Turkey with respect to the EU.³¹ In this framework, emphasis is placed on the systematic interaction of international influences and domestic political forces that can result in virtuous or vicious cycles in terms of progress towards EU membership.

A two level game framework draws attention to the importance of domestic political considerations in the candidate country in terms of its ability to satisfy basic criteria for full-membership. It also draws attention to the kind of signals provided by the EU to the individual candidate countries which has a profound bearing on the domestic politics of the country concerned and the speed with which a powerful pro-reform coalition can emerge and become effective in accomplishing EU related reforms over a relatively short space of time. The nature of incentives provided by the EU in the form of a definitive target date for accession negotiations or the scale of financial resources provided to facilitate adjustment in the interim period play a critical role in tilting the balance in the domestic politics of the candidate country in favor of the reformist elements. The process also works the other way round in the sense that the greater the commitment of the reforming elites to undertake major economic and political reforms, the easier it becomes to justify early accession of the country concerned to EU membership.

The systematic international-domestic level interactions that we have highlighted clearly explain why some countries like Poland have found themselves in a virtuous circle of reform and rapid progress towards EU membership whereas others such as Turkey or some of the lagging post-communities in Eastern Europe found themselves trapped in a vicious circle of delayed reforms and slow progress towards full membership. In more specific terms, a virtuous circle could be generated in Poland because the domestic political context both in Poland itself and in key EU states like Germany was conducive to Polish membership.

The homogenous nature of the Polish society meaning the virtual absence of divisive ethnic and religious conflicts, the weakness of the traditional elites following the post-1989 transition, and the unusual unity and commitment of the pro-EU coalition for a variety of historical reasons sent positive signals to the EU that, in turn, rendered the task of incorporating a country like Poland relatively easy and unproblematic from the EU's point of view. Similarly, the speed with which the EU was willing to incorporate Poland to its orbit, regardless of the country's communist past, made the task of reformers within Poland considerably easier.³² Arguably, if Poland had found itself in a less favorable international environment and in a state of relative isolation, the balance of forces could possibly have shifted in favor of the old elites or anti-reformist forces. Yet, with powerful positive signals from the EU as well as the EU painful economic reforms could proceed in a relatively smooth and uninterrupted manner. Furthermore, the definitive signals provided by the EU have also helped to provide the kind of protection that the foreign investors have been looking for and have helped to attract foreign direct investment on a substantial scale.³³ This again made the task of reformers considerably easier than it would otherwise have been the case.

In the Turkish case, however, a number of factors have collectively worked to provide more of a vicious rather than a virtuous circle, at least until recently. First of all, for cultural and historical reasons the domestic politics of EU countries were much less favorable to potential Turkish membership. Poland was more of a natural insider whereas Turkey was more of an important outsider from the EU's point of view. It was much easier to justify Polish membership to the electorates of key EU states whereas Turkish membership immediately raised the question of where do Europe's

borders precisely lie. The domestic politics of Turkey, again for specific historical reasons associated with its modernization project, raised serious identity conflicts resulting in serious political instability. Compared to Poland, the elites within the Turkish society were far more divided on the issue of EU related reforms.

Furthermore, Turkey, again for specific historical reasons, found itself in serious conflict with an existing EU member, Greece. All these factors helped to sustain mutual suspicions and made it harder to justify Turkey's inclusion in the EU within the domestic political spheres of the key EU countries. The weak signals provided by the EU for a long time, in turn, have strengthened the hands of the anti-EU forces and have rendered the task of the emerging reforming elements considerably more difficult compared to the situation that the reforming elites found themselves in Poland, for example. For a long-time, Turkey did not face the prospect of full-membership. Furthermore, it also lacked the kind of material resources that the EU has made available to Poland under the PHARE program.³⁴ It also did not face the kind of incentives, again until the recent Annan Plan, that have resulted in an equitable solution to the Cyprus dispute.

Lack of sufficient progress on the economic and democratization fronts have been mutually reinforcing processes. In this kind of highly unstable political and economic environment, Turkey also failed to capitalize on long-term investment in the same way as Poland or Hungary.³⁵ All these factors helped to produce a vicious circle of instability and slow reform for much of the 1990s. More recently, following the dramatic developments that have been occurring in the post-Helsinki era, we seriously

observe a transformation from a vicious circle to a virtuous circle in the Turkish context.

EXPLAINING THE IMPETUS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC REFORM: DOMESTIC POLITICS MATTERS

From a comparative perspective, four basic features of its domestic politics have played an instrumental role in Poland's relatively smooth transition to full membership. These include the historical legacy of an ethnically homogenous state, absence of threats to the secular nature of the state in spite of the importance of the Catholic Church, a strong and broad based civil society movement and a high degree of unity and commitment of the reformist elite to the project of EU membership. These four features are clearly interrelated in the sense that the absence of serious conflicts over ethnic and religious identity has prevented serious societal or intra-elite conflicts. Similarly, the fact that the reform movement was associated with a mass movement mobilized from below have rendered the task of the reformist elites considerably easier. Furthermore, a return to the old order was never a serious possibility considering the commitment of the post-communists to the new rules of the game and their overriding support for the EU membership.³⁶

The ethnic composition of the state constitutes a feature that clearly distinguishes Poland not only from Turkey but also from many other post-communist states. Poland has clearly reaped the benefits of being a broadly homogenous state. Minorities have accounted for a tiny fraction of Poland's population (approximately 1.3 percent).³⁷ Because of the homogenous nature of the Polish society, the issue of national

minorities has not been a crucial issue for the large majority of the Polish society. Consequently, the extreme forms of micro nationalisms and the nationalist backlash that this has created elsewhere have been absent in the Polish context. Furthermore, the Polish state in the context of the 1990s has been quite receptive to dealing with its peripheral minority problem, although admittedly the Polish-Jewish relations are still not entirely normal. It signed a number of international agreements aimed at protecting the rights of national minorities. In the Constitution various rights have been secured. Members of ethnic minorities have equality before the courts, freedom to identify themselves as members of a particular minority, language and cultural rights, the right to be educated in their mother tongue, the right for unconstrained formation of association and expression of opinions, and the right to maintain international contacts.³⁸ Considering the weight that the EU of the 1990s places on the protection of minority rights, the special advantages possessed by Poland deserve emphasis in this context.

Similarly, religion *per se* has not posed the kind of problems in Poland that has been such a divisive element in the Turkish context. In spite of the fact that the Roman Catholic Church has been a powerful actor on the Polish political scene, the separation of church and the state has been fairly automatic and threats to the secular character of the state has not been an issue. Moreover, Poland has been free from the kinds of unresolved questions regarding the public role and weight of religion that have been a continuous source of conflict in the Turkish context. The Catholic Church in Poland itself was broadly supportive of Poland's integration efforts with the EU. A visit by the delegation of Polish bishops to Brussels in 1996 served to change the picture of the Polish Church in Western Europe, but it was also a symbolic expression

of the Church's own interest in integration. Church dignitaries also responded to the fear frequently emphasized by Polish Catholic traditionalists, namely the loss of national identity, arguing that the goals of Christianity could be best served in the context of a United Europe.³⁹

Another important dimension of Polish domestic politics has been the unusual degree of elite unity and commitment on the path to EU membership. Those members of the old elites who could have acted as a counterforce to reforms and EU membership have been effectively sidelined and marginalized during the early stages of the transition process.⁴⁰ In the Turkish context, in contrast, the military and security establishment has continued to constitute a key element of the ruling bloc in Turkish society throughout the recent period.

Indeed, the weight of the military-security establishment in Turkish politics increased during the context of the 1990s at a time when the country was confronted with a militant secessionist movement as well as threats originating from religious fundamentalism. These elements of the ruling elite viewed EU demands for democratization and reform with certain suspicion arguing that such reforms would necessarily undermine the unitary and secular character of the Turkish state. The military-security establishment in Turkey, as a product of specific national circumstances, conceived of its role as “a guardian of the state” and was reluctant to give its powers and special privileges on the grounds that this would lead to national disintegration.⁴¹ Indeed, up to the present date the military-security arm of the Turkish state continues to be a key element of the “anti-EU coalition” in Turkey, playing an

obstructionist role with respect to the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue and the Cyprus conflict.

It is interesting to observe in this context the Europeanization process of Turkey from the early 1990s onwards have helped to produce a powerful rift within the elite structures or the dominant power bloc of the Turkish society. Big business in Turkey which has grown and matured under the support of the state, through its major interest association TÜSİAD, has emerged as a key element of the pro-EU coalition.⁴²

Business interests have clearly favored closer integration with Europe and have been far more receptive to the kind of political and economic reforms proposed by the EU.

The rift within the dominant coalition that had already started to open up in the context of mid-1990s became more evident following the Helsinki Decision of December 1999. The more favorable mix of conditions and incentives that Turkey faced after Helsinki helped to shift the balance of power in favor of the pro-EU coalition even further. Indeed, the primary impetus for reforms came from civil society organizations associated with various layers of the private sector. These organizations joining forces under an umbrella organization “The Movement for Europe-2002” became particularly vocal during the course of the summer 2002. Civil society organizations rather than political forces have been the principal driving force behind the critical EU-related reforms in Turkey in August 2002. In comparative terms, civil society in Turkey has not been as vibrant and pressures originating from below have not been as broad-based and widespread as in the case of Poland.⁴³

Nevertheless, the rise of the civil society in recent years has emerged as a decisive element of the pro-reform coalition in Turkey.

The increase in the momentum of the Europeanization process in the post-Helsinki era has also affected the party system. Political parties in Turkey have been broadly supportive of European integration but have also expressed deep reservations concerning the specific conditions that needed to be satisfied for full-membership. In the post-1999 era however, a number of individual parties have increasingly have become part of the active pro-EU coalition. The first of such political parties was the “Motherland Party” (ANAP). The party was a minor partner in the coalition government formed after the elections of 1999. More recently, however, “Justice and Development Party” (AKP), which emerged as an outright winner in the elections of November 2002, has assumed an explicitly pro-EU stance. What is surprising in this context is that a party which has moderate Islamist leanings is also the political party that has established itself as the most active promoter of EU related reforms in the recent Turkish context.⁴⁴ The central point to emphasize here is that increasingly the prospect of EU membership provides a common sense of purpose to different elements in Turkish society and, hence, constitutes an influence working in the direction of compromise and co-existence. The EU has clearly been moderating force on the Islamists in Turkish society. Islamists, increasingly, conceive the EU as a means of consolidating their position in Turkish politics in their quest for extension of religious freedoms. They are also well aware, however, that the EU, being extremely unreceptive to religious fundamentalism, defines the very boundaries within which they can operate.⁴⁵

By the beginning of 2004, the “anti-EU coalition” in Turkey is seriously on the defensive. Key elements of the military-security establishment have rather reluctantly

endorsed reforms involving reduction in the powers of the National Security Council during the summer of 2003 which, in principle, involved a fundamental reordering of civil-military relations.⁴⁶ Furthermore, by early 2004 they have become considerably less vocal in their opposition to a solution to the Cyprus dispute proposed by the international community along the lines of the UN Plan.⁴⁷ Clearly, the Iraq War has also exercised a decisive influence in this context. The direct military presence of the US in the Middle East as well as strained relations between Turkey and the US over the issue of the deployment of US troops via Turkish territory have helped to push Turkey progressively closer to the EU during the course of 2003. This, in turn, coupled with the changing security environment has helped to undermine the power of the military-security establishment. The Iraq War has also led to a certain shift in the EU's perception of Turkey's geo-strategic significance with a corresponding need to convert Turkey's south-eastern border frontier of instability to a frontier of stability in the way as has been the case for Poland in the early 1990s.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EU ANCHOR AND THE UNEVEN MIX OF CONDITIONS AND INCENTIVES FACED BY THE TWO COUNTRIES

The EU anchor provides a powerful incentive for reform in transitional societies. The material and security advantages embodied by potential EU membership makes the EU a natural magnet for countries located on the European periphery. Yet, the intensity of the EU anchor varies from one country to another. Clearly, the EU itself is concerned with achieving a certain balance between integration and enlargement. The natural corollary of this concern is that the enlargement process should not disrupt the process of deepening within the EU which is taking place at the same time. The

priority, therefore, becomes that of incorporating relatively unproblematic cases which are not likely to cause problem once they are in the Union on economic, political as well as on identity and security grounds. As a result, the admission process involving the more problematic cases is pushed into the more distant future. An important consequence of the differential signals provided by the EU is that countries characterized by weak membership prospects due to their more problematic economic and political structures face weak incentives in terms of reforming their economic and political regimes. Such environments become more conducive to extreme forms of nationalism and resistance to reform by powerful elites on the grounds that such reforms tend to undermine national autonomy or sovereignty. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the political and economic trajectory of post-communist Eastern Europe concerns the enormous variations in performance among the so called transitional cases. For example, countries like Bulgaria and Romania have also found themselves in a similar vicious cycle situation as the case of Turkey. This variation, in turn, is due to certain extent an outcome of different historical legacies rooted in the domestic structures of these countries. But, at the same time, “distance from Europe” (not only in a physical sense but also in terms of the degree of perceived deviation from core European values) meaning how receptive the EU is in terms of incorporating these peripheral countries into its orbit, matters critically as well.⁴⁸

By 1993, it was certainly certain that in the absence of catastrophic failures Poland was on course to join the Union over a period of a decade. Indeed, this is what actually happened. Poland was clearly given a clear time-table and a highly favorable mix of conditions and incentives that rendered a major collapse on the way rather unlikely. This is not to say that progress towards full-membership was a totally

smooth and linear process. Problems have arisen on the way and concerns were raised in the Commission reports with respect to Poland's capacity to meet its membership obligations. For example under political criteria, attention was drawn to the need to improve the functioning of the judicial system and the need to fight corruption. Under economic criteria, Commission reports have frequently drawn attention to the need for reforming the pension and social security systems as well as overcoming the underdeveloped nature of the banking sector and financial services. Agriculture and the larger state-owned enterprises have also been identified as the two major challenges facing Poland not only in economic but also in social terms.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, by the time of the opening of accession negotiations with Poland in 1998, The Commission was of the opinion that "Poland presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities", and "Poland can be regarded as a functioning market economy".⁵⁰ In retrospect, it is quite interesting that Poland's large population size as well as its low per capita income by EU standards were not identified as serious constraints although such arguments have frequently been brought into the fore ground in the context of potential Turkish membership.

In contrast, Turkey, in spite of its much longer formal association with the Community has faced a comparatively weak EU anchor. From the EU perspective of the 1980s and the 1990s. There was no attempt to incorporate Turkey in the Eastern enlargement process initiated in 1993. The attempt to revive the Customs Union project at the end of the 1995, without the explicit prospect of full membership, constituted a weak external anchor that was not sufficient to induce a radical transformation in the attitudes and perceptions of the key actors involved. It is also

striking that the EC/EU failed to provide in the course of the 1980s and the 1990s a balanced set of incentives for the actors involved that would have rendered the resolution of the Cyprus dispute a concrete possibility. This was, in part, due to the fact that Greece as an insider within the EU could exercise its veto power. However, it would be misleading to attribute the continued stalemate in Turkey-EU relations totally to the Greek factor.

Moreover, Turkey failed to obtain material benefits in the form of financial aid from its partial association as a member of the Customs Union at a time when countries like Poland have received major sums of money from the Union designed to ease their way to full-membership. The absence of material resources has also reduced the incentives for full-scale reform in the Turkish context. EU democratic conditionality is a strategy of “reinforcement by reward” which works through intergovernmental material bargaining. Its efficacy depends on the candidate governments’ domestic political costs of compliance.⁵¹ Applying the argument to the Turkish case, the absence of material resources in the pre-1999 Turkish increased the domestic political costs of compliance and reduced the incentives for reform. Thus, there existed an anchor-credibility dilemma inherent in Turkey-EU relations.⁵² Turkish authorities interpreted the weak EU anchor as evidence of weak commitment on the part of the EU. Similarly, the EU interpreted failure to undertake reforms in sufficient depth as a sign of weak commitment on the part of the Turkish authorities. Hence, a vicious cycle developed.

It is also striking to observe, however, how this vicious cycle has gradually been reversed into a virtuous cycle in the post aftermath of December 1999. The Helsinki

decision involving the announcement of Turkey as a candidate country helped to change the incentive structure facing the key actors in Turkish politics quite radically. As a consequence Turkey has experienced an unprecedented series of reforms in the period 2000 to 2002. There is also a sense for the first time that the Cyprus dispute can be resolved in a peaceful and mutually acceptable manner. No doubt, the Helsinki decision reflected, in part, important changes that have been taking place within the domestic structure of the EU itself. Particularly important in this respect, was the growing political strength of European social democratic parties of the third variety that, with their vision of a multi-cultural as opposed to a purely Christian Europe, looked more favorably upon the prospect of full-membership. Similarly, changes in the domestic politics of Greece in recent years have also led to a radical reversal of a situation whereby Greece has been transformed from a fundamental veto player to a strong supporter of improved Turkey-EU relations. No doubt the end of the armed conflict with the PKK in February 1999 has also paved for an improvement in Turkey-EU relations.⁵³

DISAGGREGATING THE INFLUENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL FORCES: STATE VERSUS NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE GERMAN DIMENSION

Any investigation of the importance of transnational forces has to take into account that a multitude of such forces exist and often tend to work in such a way as to reinforce one another. This has been the clearly the case in the Polish context where in addition to the powerful and definitive EU anchor, other critical forces have been actively involved. The United States as well as key international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank has been actively involved in the Polish reform and

reconstruction process. For the United States, Poland as the country that set an example to the rest of the post-communist world was of vital importance and indeed, the US played an important role not only in terms of providing financial assistance but also contributing to the institutionalization of democracy in Poland.⁵⁴ Thus Poland, in particular, benefited from the presence of a double external anchor that was highly conducive to the reform process.

Turning to the Turkish case, the United States for key geo-strategic reasons has been an important supporter of Turkey both during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era.⁵⁵ Key international organizations like the OECD, the IMF and the World Bank have also been heavily involved in the post-1980 reform and liberalization process of the Turkish economy. Furthermore, the US has been an active supporter of Turkey's EU membership. Yet, it is fair to argue Turkey during the post-1980 era has been confronted with a strong US but weak EU anchor. This meant that the strong political conditionality associated with active EU involvement, hence, the pressure for democratization has been missing in the case of US influence which focused primarily on the economic and security aspect of the relationship.

Support provided by a key EU state often provides a decisive advantage to a candidate country in its quest for EU membership. France had a played a critical role in the relatively smooth transition of Greece to full EC membership in 1981. Similarly, Germany as a leading country in Europe has performed a vital role in the eastern enlargement process during the context of 1990s. The central point is that "ownership" of membership by a core country or set of countries matters. In the Polish context, Germany clearly "owned" Polish membership by providing vocal

support. In the Turkish case, such strong ownership of membership has been missing with none of the major countries providing active support for Turkey's membership and one country, Greece, performing the role of an active veto player for most of the 1980s and the 1990s. Recently, the pattern has been changing somewhat with some of the more peripheral members of the EU such as Britain and Spain that prefer a looser form of integration have emerged as active supporters of Turkish membership. What is even more surprising is the transformation of Greece to a position of the most active supporter of Turkey in its quest for full-membership. None of these countries, however, possess the economic and political weight of the Franco-German alliance within the EU. The latter's approach to Turkish membership has been somewhat ambiguous. In spite of a certain change of mood in Germany from 1999 onwards, Turkey has failed to attract the kind of definitive political and economic support that Poland has been able to receive from Germany during the course of the 1990s.⁵⁶

The rapprochement that took place between Germany and Poland in the context of the enlargement process has been quite striking. Although there were historically based problems between the two countries originating from the Second World War such differences were quickly set aside. Credit has to be given in this respect to the Polish political elites who have actively promoted an improvement in bilateral relations between the two countries. In November 1990, the two signed a treaty confirming the position of Poland's Western border. This treaty was followed by a Treaty on Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation of June 1991, which provided for official Polish recognition of its minority. From this point onwards there was a rapid development of diplomatic, trade and cultural relationships between the two countries. Indeed, Germany has played the role of an unofficial spokesman of Poland's interests in

Brussels and thus, “The road to the EU leads through Germany” became a phrase which gained common currency in Poland during the 1990s.⁵⁷

From the Polish point of view, the motivation for improving relations with Germany was clear given the obvious benefits of full membership. For Germany, the motivating forces were several. The first aspect was economic. Central Europe and particularly Poland, with its large market, represented a formidable market for exports and a favorable low cost site for relocation of investment by German firms. The geopolitical aspect is also important because enlargement will bring Germany from the periphery of the West closer to its center, and with Poland as a member of the EU, Germany’s eastern border will cease to be the frontier between stability and instability.⁵⁸ Also for historical reasons, the German elite felt itself in some way obliged to improve the lot of Poland and its people.⁵⁹

Finally, any discussion of the German influence has to take into account the importance of non-state actors. The relations between the two countries have involved not only interaction between state actors but also actors rooted in civil society.

German civil society groups have emerged an active force in promoting stronger linkages with their counterparts in Polish society. This, in turn, has proved an additional element in the rapid consolidation of Polish democracy during the 1990s.

The role of German foundations in promoting democracy and reform in Poland and other key countries in Central and Eastern Europe has been widely documented.⁶⁰

Whilst the role of the German civil society organization in the Turkish context should not be underestimated, there is no doubt the intensity of their involvement has been much weaker in Turkey compared with their Polish counterparts.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Poland's transition to democracy was unique by being the first country among other CEECs that managed to bring down communist rule in a peaceful fashion and realize this change via a transformation of its civil society. During the course of the 1990s, Poland has made rapid progress towards EU membership. Rather paradoxically, on the other hand, Turkey that had established formal relations with the European Community from the early 1960s onwards experienced much more gradual progress towards EU membership. Today Poland is already member of the Union whereas in the Turkish case membership is now a serious but still a distant possibility. The present paper attempted to explain this paradox with reference to both domestic political factors and the nature of the signals provided with the EU as well as their mutual interaction. To be more precise, the domestic political environment of Poland in the 1990s was much more conducive to undertaking the kind of economic and political reforms demanded by the EU. Strong elite commitment to reform supported by mass mobilization of support from below played a crucial role in this respect. Furthermore, the EU facilitated smooth transformation in the Polish case by providing unambiguous and definitive signals on the path to full membership. Clearly, the interactions of domestic and external forces have helped to produce a virtuous circle in the Polish setting. In contrast, both the domestic political environment of Turkey and the signals provided by the EU were much less favorable from the Turkish point of view. Powerful elements within the Turkish state lacked the kind of deep commitment to EU membership, based on an inherent suspicion that the kind of reforms demanded by EU would contribute towards the disintegration of the Turkish

state. Similarly, the EU, in part for cultural and historical reasons, failed to display the kind of unambiguous commitment in support of Turkish membership. Civil society has been developing in Turkey during the 1990s but clearly, its power and influence was not comparable to the scale of civil society mobilization in Poland. Hence, its ability to challenge the established state in the direction of reform was considerably weaker.

Finally, it is interesting to observe the important changes that have been taking place in the recent period both in the nature of Turkish politics as well as the kind of signals provided by the EU. These changes have clearly helped to accelerate the momentum of economic and political reforms in Turkey thereby rendering the prospect of EU membership a strong possibility. This is, in part, due to the fact that the EU itself has been gradually evolving in the direction of a genuinely multi-cultural project, a process that has accelerated in the post- September 11 and the post- Iraq War global environment. In this kind of environment, it makes much more sense for the EU to incorporate a country like Turkey with a predominantly Muslim population and democratic credentials into its orbit. What is rather paradoxical is that religion and culture which, for a long-time, has been used as an argument to exclude Turkey from the EU integration process, have emerged as Turkey's new assets helping to bring it closer to the core of Europe. Hence, rather ironically, Turkey, with a much longer history of association with the Community, now found itself, since the beginning of 2000, on the same track that Poland has found itself effectively since 1993. From a comparative perspective, the recent Turkish experience clearly highlights the power and attraction of the EU in inducing large-scale reform even in environments characterized by widespread resistance to reform.

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¹ Atilla Agh, *Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and Balkans* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1998), 28.

² The most recent estimates of population size in Poland and Turkey are 38,641,000 and 68,618,000 respectively. 2001 figures derived from the 2003 World Development Report indicate that Gross National Income (GNI) in billions of dollars is 163.9 for Poland and 168.3 for Turkey. GNI per capita dollars in PPP emerged as 9,280 for Poland and 6,640 for Turkey. Source: The World Bank, "Sustainable Development in a Dynamic World: Transforming Institutions, Growth, and Quality of Life," *World Development Report 2003* (New York: the World Bank and Oxford University Press), 235. In the 2002 Regular Reports of the European Commission, percentage of gross value added in agriculture was calculated as 3.4 for Poland and 12.1 per cent for Turkey. The weight of agricultural employment in total employment emerged as 19.2 per cent for Poland as compared with 35.4 per cent for Turkey. Source: Commission of the European Communities, *2002 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession* (Brussels, 9 October 2002), 156 available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/pl_en.pdf and *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, (Brussels, 9 October 2002), 156. available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/tu_en.pdf. The superior economic performance of Poland from the mid-1990s onwards was highlighted by the fact that it was ranked as 66th with a score of 2.9 (Mostly Free) while Turkey was 119th with a score of 3.5 (Mostly Unfree) in Heritage Foundation's index of economic freedom in 2003. <<http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/>>. For a comparison of the economic structure of Turkey and the principal Eastern European countries see, Sübidey Togan and V.N. Balasubramanyam, eds., *Turkey and Central and Eastern European Countries in Transition : Towards Membership of the EU* (Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2001).

³ See in this context, Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, "Democratization in central and east European countries," *International Affairs* 73:1 (1997). Remaining weaknesses in Polish democracy even at the time of accession highlighted in the European Commission's *2002 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession* (Brussels, 9 October 2002), available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/pl_en.pdf> (05.09.2003)

⁴ 77.45 per cent of Poland voted in favor of joining the European Union and only 22.55 per cent voted against Polish membership of the EU in the referendum held on 7-8 June 2003.

⁵ Yet, one has to take into account the fact that considerable uncertainty surrounded Polish membership in 1994. Indeed, several months before the 2002 Copenhagen summit Poland still feared to be excluded in the first round. In fact, the entire strategy of the EU is to keep the prospect of membership open, but rather ambiguous. See in this context, Jan Zielonka, "Ambiguity as Remedy for the EU's Eastern Enlargement?" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*.12:1 (1998).

⁶ On the role of domestic and external factors in the democratization process see, Phillippe C. Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies," in Laurance Whitehead, ed., *The International Dimension of Democratization: Europe and Americas* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Geoffrey Pridham et al., eds., *Building Democracy? : The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe* (London: Leicester University Press, 1997) on the international context of democratization.

⁷ On the nature of the Polish society during the communist era and the role of the Catholic religion see Frances Millard, *Polish Politics and Society* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 6; Karl Cordell, "Introduction: Aims and objectives," in Carl Cordell, ed., *Poland and the European Union* (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), 2.

⁸ On the nature of the Polish economy and the significance of the private sector during the planned era, see Millard, *Polish Politics and Society*, 6.

⁹ See Cordell, "Introduction," 2 in this respect.

¹⁰ Regarding this process of transformation and the instrumental role of the EU in this respect, see Teresa Los-Nowak, "Contemporary Government Attitudes towards the European Union," in Karl Cordell, ed., 10.

¹¹ On the details of this process, see Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, 28.

¹² See Millard, *Polish Politics and Society*, 9.

¹³ See Agh, *Emerging Democracies*, 33.

¹⁴ On the nature of the institutional reforms in Poland see W. Andrej Jablonski, "The Europeanisation of Government in Poland in the 1990s," in Karl Cordell, ed., 127-141; and Millard, *Polish Politics and Society*, 36-53.

¹⁵ On the details of Poland's relations with the European Union see Linda Middletown, "Chronology," in Mike Mannin, ed., *Pushing Back the Boundaries : the European Union and Central and Eastern Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 328-338; Andrew Francis, "Poland: The Return to Europe," in Mike Mannin, ed., 302-303; Los-Nowak, "Contemporary Government Attitudes," 16; "Poland-European Union-Steps towards Integration," Delegation of the European Commission in Poland web page, <www.europa.delpol.pl>.

¹⁶ In this context see Mike Mannin, "Policies towards CEEC," in Mike Mannin, ed., 42.

¹⁷ See Los-Nowak, "Contemporary Government Attitudes," p19.

¹⁸ On the details of the post-1994 accession process: see Los-Nowak, "Contemporary Government Attitudes"; Middletown, "Chronology"; Francis, "Poland: The Return to Europe"; "Milestones in enlargement," Danish EU Presidency web page, <www.eu2002.dk>.

¹⁹ Possible the indirect coup of February 1997 could be added to this list. On the nature of Turkish democracy see, Ergun Özbudun, *Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation* (Boulder, CO : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000); Fuat Keyman *Türkiye ve Radikal Demokrasi (Turkey and Radical Democracy)* (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1999).

²⁰ Second wave democratization has been primarily concerned with the establishment of procedural democracy, meaning the ability to undertake free and regular elections as well as the creation of effective political institutions. Third way democratization of the more recent vintage, however, goes deeper and requires more substantive democracy in the form of a radical extension of civil and human rights and a fundamental reordering of state-society relations. In this context, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).

²¹ The history of Turkey-EU relations has been extensively investigated. See among others Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000); Meltem Müftüler-Baç, *Turkey's Relation with A Changing Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Ziya Öniş "An Awkward Partnership: Turkey's Relations with the European Union in Comparative-Historical Perspective," *Journal of European Integration History* 7: 13 (Spring 2001) among others. On Turkey-EU relations in the context of broader EU enlargement see the article by Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "Turkey in the EU's Enlargement Process: Obstacles and Challenges," *Mediterranean Politics* 7:2 (Summer 2002).

²² On the arguments leading to a rejection of Turkey's application in 1987 both on economic and political grounds see, Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community* (Brussels, 18 December 1989)

<<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adab//opinion.htm>>(25.01.2001)

²³ On the Customs Union see, Canan Balkır, "The Customs Union and Beyond," in Libby Rittenberg , ed., *The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?* (Westport Connecticut: Praeger, 1998).

²⁴ On the details of the liberalization process in the Turkish economy in the 1980s, see Ziya Öniş, *State and Market. The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective*, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 1998); Tosun Arıcanlı and Dani Rodrik, eds., *The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment, and Sustainability* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990)

²⁵ On Turkey's economic performance in the 1990s and on the nature and consequences of successive financial crises see Ziya Öniş and Barry Rubin, *Turkey's Economy in Crisis*, (London: Frank Cass 2003).

²⁶ On the importance of economic factors in constraining Turkey's relations with the EU see Mehmet Uğur, *The European Union and Turkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).

²⁷ On the challenges confronted by the Kemalist state and its specific model of nation building and modernization, see Reşat Kasaba, "Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities," in Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, eds., *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey* (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press,1997). See also the useful collection of essays in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, eds., *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey* (New York:

Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2002) for the challenges posed by Kurdish nationalism and political Islam to Turkish state and democracy during this period. Specifically for a critical examination of the Kurdish question in Turkey, see Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1997). For another useful survey of recent developments in Turkey's domestic politics, see Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102:2/3 (Spring/Summer 2003).

²⁸ For a valuable analysis of the development of civil society in Turkey, see Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, "Globalization, Civil Society, and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses," *Citizenship Studies* 7:2 (2003). Specifically on TÜSIAD, which is the representative of big business interests in Turkey, see Ziya Öniş and Umut Türem, "Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey," *Comparative Politics* 35: 4 (2002) .

²⁹ For an analysis of the various forces leading up to the Helsinki decision on Turkey's candidature, see Ziya Öniş, "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EU Relations," *Government and Opposition* 35: 4 (2000).

³⁰ The term anti-EU coalition embodies a specific meaning in the Turkish context. Groups which are part of this coalition, notably the military and security establishment are not against EU membership *per se*, but are opposed to the kind of conditions that are built into EU membership that are likely to undermine their power and status in society.

³¹ See Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games," *International Organization* 42:3 (Summer 1988). For a useful application of the logic of two level games as a basis for understanding Turkey's relations with the Middle East see Ali Çarkoğlu, Mine Eder and Kemal Kirişçi, *The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East* (London; New York: Routledge, 1998).

³² Asa Lundgren in a comparative study shows that EU political aid in terms of political institution building for an efficient democracy in Poland was much more extensive and varied than that of Turkey. Furthermore, political aid for supporting civil society by the EU managed to involve civil society groups within the EU and the country itself on the principle of partnership in the Polish case, thereby increasing integration between citizens of Poland and of the EU and providing grassroots support for reforms on the democratization front. However, EU aid to Turkey was channelled directly from the Commission to Turkish civil society groups, without any cooperation of any other organizations within the EU. See Asa Lundgren, "The European Union as a Democracy-promoter," in Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Persson, eds., *Civil Society Democracy and the Muslim World* (Papers read at a Conference held at the Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 28-30 October, 1996)

³³ FDI flows to Poland were 6,377 million ECU/Euro in 2001 and its GDP share was 3.2. Average FDI flows between 1997 and 2001 were 6,664 million ECU/Euro, and its average in per cent of GDP was 4.2. Source: Commission of the European Communities, *2002 Regular Report on Poland's Progress Towards Accession* (Brussels, 9 October 2002), 34.

³⁴ Turkey was unable to capitalize on ECU 1.5 billion financial aid as a part of Customs Union. The European Parliament froze the financial support in September 1996 due to the problems in the Cyprus question, human rights violations, democratization and the Kurdish problem. Furthermore, mainly because of

deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey, financial aid resources could not be activated due to lack of unanimity in the European Council. In this context, see Balkir, "The Customs Union and Beyond," 69-70. However, as indicated in the European Commission's *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress*, a new regulation concerning pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey became effective in December 2001. The purpose of this framework is to simplify procedures and to ensure an accession-driven approach to financial assistance to Turkey. The procedures for programming and implementing the pre-accession financial assistance programme now mirror those of Phare, i.e. a deconcentrated management system for financial assistance has been put into place with greater responsibilities for the Turkish Government. This new system has already led to an upturn in the rate of tendering and contracting in 2002 compared with previous years. Over €200m of previously programmed assistance is expected to have been contracted by the end of 2002. The regulation reiterates that during the current financial perspective the Commission's objective will be to maintain pre-accession financial assistance at a level double that enjoyed by Turkey in the period 1993-99. Poland, on the other hand, during 1990-1999 received a sum of over 2 billion Euro in terms of Phare aid funds. In 2000 Poland received a record sum of 484 million Euro within the Phare program and in 2001 - 468,5 million Euro. Poland also benefits from The ISPA program, which is a pre-accession instrument of structural policy, aimed at supporting large-scale investments in environmental protection and transport, and could receive between 312 and 385 million Euro per year. The SAPARD program is another instrument of financial aid addressed to EU candidate states. It is aimed at assisting in the modernization of agriculture and the development of rural communities. Within this program, in 2000 a sum of 171.5 million Euro was granted to Poland, in 2001- 175 million Euro and about 180 million Euro in 2002. The total value of the EU assistance granted to Poland by the end of 2003 could amount to 5.8 billion Euro. Source: Delegation of the European Commission in Poland, "EU Assistance to Poland," available at <<http://www.europa.delpol.pl/>>(05.08.2003).

³⁵ FDI flows to Turkey are 3,647million ECU/Euro in the year 2001 and it constitutes 2.2 per cent of GDP. Average FDI flows of 1997-2001 years is 1,416 million ECU/Euro and its average share in GDP per cent is 0.8. Source: Commission of the European Communities, *2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, (Brussels, 9 October 2002), 49.

³⁶ On the broad contours of Poland's domestic politics on these issues, see Grzegorz Ekiert, "The State after Socialism: Poland in Comparative Perspective," (Vienna: IWM Working Paper No. 6/2001, 2001); Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, "Authoritarian Communism, Ethical Civil Society, and Ambivalent Political Society: Poland," in *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore; London: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 255-293; Millard, *Polish Politics and Society*; Agh, *Emerging Democracies*; Cordell, ed., *Poland and the European Union*. On the strengths of Polish domestic political structure and its historical legacy in comparison with other post-communist transition cases, see Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Post communist Experience," *World Politics* 55 (January 2003).

³⁷ Commission of the European Communities, *Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Poland's Application for Membership of the European Union* (Brussels, 15 July 1997), 16.

<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/opinions/poland/po-op-en.pdf>> (04.08.2003)

³⁸ Andrzej Dybczynski, "The European Union and Ukrainian-Polish Relations" in Karl Cordell, ed., 193.

³⁹ For Catholic Church and its stance on the EU see, Elzbieta Stadtmüller, "Polish perceptions of the European Union in the 1990s," in Karl Cordell, ed., 36. Support of the Catholic Church needs to be qualified, however. As strong support for the EU accession process was provided by the Polish Pope, John Paul II. On the other hand, some of the most fervent Euro-skeptics launched their campaign via Radio Maria.

⁴⁰ On the relative insignificance of the military elites and civil-military relations in post-communist Poland, see Zoltan D. Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transitions and Beyond," *East European Quarterly* 26:1 (March 1992) and "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," *Comparative Politics* 30:1 (October 1997); Mark Yaniszewski, "Post-Communist Civil-Military Reform in Poland and Hungary: Progress and Problems," *Armed Forces and Society* 28:3 (Spring 2002); Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces and Society* 29:1 (Fall 2002); Dale R. Herspring, "Civil-Military relations in post-communist Poland; problems in the transition to a democratic polity," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 33 (2000); Elizabeth P. Coughlan, "Democratizing Civilian Control: The Polish Case," *Armed Forces and Society* 24:4 (Summer 1998).

⁴¹ On the role of the military in Turkish politics and the National Security Council, see the articles by Ümit Cizre, "Demythologizing The National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 57:2 (Spring 2003) and "The anatomy of the Turkish military's political economy," *Comparative Politics* 29: 2 (1997).

⁴² TÜSİAD published an important report on democratization in 1997 emphasizing a number of important changes designed to extend civil and human rights as well as changing the military-civilian balance in Turkish politics. The report has generated considerable controversy and generated negative reactions from the key components of the Turkish state. Bülent Tanör, *Perspectives on Democratisation in Turkey*, TÜSİAD Reports, TY/171/1997 (January 1997).

<<http://www.tusiad.org/english/rapor/demokratik/index.html>> (04.08.2003)

⁴³ On the unique features of civil society in Poland, see, Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, "Civil Society From Abroad: the Role of Foreign Assistance in the Democratization of Poland," *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs* (Harvard University: Paper No. 00-01, February 2000); Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, *Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989-1993* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999); Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, "(Post)totalitarian Legacies, Civil Society, and Democracy in Post-Communist Poland, 1989-1993," *Institute for European Studies* (October 1997); Gideon Baker, "The Changing Idea of Civil Society: Models from the Polish Democratic Opposition," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 3:2 (1998); Michael Bernhard, "Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe," *Political Science Quarterly* 108:2 (Summer 1993); Joerg Forbrig, "Civil Society: Poland, its Neighbours and Western Europe Compared," *Center for International Relations Warsaw, Reports and Analyses* 4/02 (9 October 2002); Janina Frentzel-Zagorska, "Civil Society in Poland and Hungary," *Soviet Studies* 42:4 (1990); R. Maria Markus, "Decent Society and/or Civil Society," *Social Research* 68:4 (Winter 2001).

⁴⁴ For a detailed exposition of the impact of the Helsinki Decision on Turkey's domestic politics, see, Ziya Öniş, "Domestic Politics, International Norms and Challenges to the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the Post-Helsinki Era," *Turkish Studies* 4:1 (2003). On the rise of AKP and some of the challenges it faces see, Ziya Öniş and Fuat Keyman, "Turkey at the Polls: A New Path is Emerging," *Journal of Democracy* 14: 2 (2003), to be reprinted in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner and Daniel Brumberg, eds., *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, forthcoming).

⁴⁵ On the recent moderation of Islamist politics in Turkey and the role of the EU in this respect, see Ziya Öniş, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-existence," *Contemporary Politics* 7:4 (2001).

⁴⁶ On the National Security Council, see recent article by Cizre, "Demythologizing The National Security Concept".

⁴⁷ The details of the UN or the Annan Plan on Cyprus are available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/annan.doc>.

⁴⁸ On the importance of the domestic-transnational linkages in explaining the wide variation in the economic and democratic performance of post-communist states and the relevance of the concepts of vicious versus virtuous cycles in this context, see Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, eds., *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol.2 International and Domestic factors* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁴⁹ The European Commission, *Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Poland's Application for Membership of the European Union*, 18 and 35.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 18 and 35.

⁵¹ Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, Heiko Knobel, "Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41: 3 (2003).

⁵² Uğur, *The European Union and Turkey*.

⁵³ The end of the armed conflict with the PKK was also important in providing a more conducive public opinion for reform in Turkey by helping to marginalize ethnic conflict as a source of threat to the unity of the Turkish state. See, Murat Somer, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context and Implications," *The Middle East Journal* 58 (forthcoming in 2004).

⁵⁴ Antoni Z. Kaminski, "Poland: Compatibility of External and Internal Designs," in Jan Zielonka and Alex Pravda, eds., *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Vol. 2 International and Transnational Factors* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 311-324.

⁵⁵ On the history of Turkey-US relations, see Kemal Kirişçi, "U.S-Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership," in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, eds., *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power* (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001). The relationship between Turkey and the US has experienced a setback in the context of the Iraq War. This setback could be a temporary phenomenon.

⁵⁶ An important point to emphasize, however, is that German support for Poland was always qualified. For example, it was Germany and Austria that insisted on a seven year transition period as far as labor movement was concerned with largely Polish labor in mind. On the development of Polish-German relations and the critical role that Germany's foreign policy has played in the eastern enlargement process, see, Henning Tewes, *Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe: Enlarging NATO and the European Union* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl

Kaiser, eds., *Germany's New Foreign Policy: Decision-Making in an Interdependent World* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave, 2001); Tadeusz Lebioda "Poland, *die Vertriebenen*, and the road to integration with the European Union," in Karl Cordell, ed.; Peter J. Katzenstein, *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Adrian Hyde-Price, "Building a Stable Peace in *Mitteleuropa*: The German-Polish Hinge," (The University of Birmingham, Institute for German Studies, Institute Discussion Papers, 2000/18, 2000); Elsa Tulmets, "Towards a multi-lateral enlargement policy? German assistance to Central and Eastern Europe at the crossroads with European aid programs," (Proposal for the 3rd Research Workshop of the 2nd European Political-economy Infrastructure Consortium (EPIC) Cohort of Doctoral Researchers, theme: political economy of Enlargement, 28 August 2002) available at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/EPIC/documents/C2W3.htm>.

⁵⁷ Lebioda, "Poland, *die Vertriebenen*, and the road to integration with the European Union", 165.

⁵⁸ Roland Freudenstein, "Poland, Germany and the EU," *International Affairs* 74:1 (January 1998).

⁵⁹ Lebioda, "Poland, *die Vertriebenen*, and the road to integration with the European Union", 105. The main reason in historical drive has been the formulation of *Ostpolitik* of Germany in 1970s to pursue *Deutschlandpolitik*, which was an attempt to improve relations with East Germany. Willy Brandt, who was Foreign Minister and the Chancellor between 1966-1974, realized that the establishment of closer contacts between two German states required an improvement of relations with Eastern Europe, and initiated *Ostpolitik*. For further detail about *Ostpolitik*, see Rolf Steininger, "The German question, 1945-95," in Klaus Larres, ed., *Germany since Unification: The Development of the Berlin Republic* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 16-18; Klaus Larres, "Germany in 1989: the Development of a Revolution," in Klaus Larres, ed., 35-36.

⁶⁰ On the role of German foundations see, Dorota Dakowska, "Beyond Conditionality: EU Enlargement, European Party Federations and the Transnational Activity of German Political Foundations," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 3:2 (2002); Ann L. Phillips, "Exporting Democracy: German Political Foundations in Central-East Europe," *Democratization* 6:2 (Summer 1999); Sebastian Bartsch, "Political Foundations: Linking the Worlds of Foreign Policy and Transnationalism," in Eberwein and Kaiser, eds., 206-220; Stefan Mair. "Germany's Stiftungen and Democracy Assistance: Comparative Advantages, New Challenges," in Peter Burnell, ed., *Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization* (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 128-150.