The Bush administration says that Saddam Hussein is deceiving the international community. It says that he is leading weapons inspectors in circles. It claims that, if the U.N. Security Council does not have the resolve to disarm Saddam, then the U.S. military will perform the task.

My question, in light of this conundrum, is: doesn't anybody remember George W. Bush's speech to the U.N. General Assembly last fall? In a forceful but introspective speech, Bush challenged the United Nations to retain its relevance in today's world. He suggested that if the United Nations failed to make a decision on how to deal with the threat that Saddam represents to the international community, it would be tantamount to an admission of impotence. This, Mr. Bush said, would be a bad thing. We want the U.N. to be a force to be reckoned with, he said. In an anarchic world, he claimed, we cannot afford to have the main international body be powerless to enforce its decisions.

What, then, does it mean to be “irrelevant”? In the context of the present scenario, it means that a country ignores the legitimate decision-making authority of the United Nations. That being the case, what Mr. Bush seems not to realize is that there are multiple ways in which the United Nations can be rendered irrelevant. Saddam not fully cooperating with inspectors is just one. However, the United States itself can take actions that, in the eyes of the rest of the world, might appear to dilute the effectiveness and legitimacy of the United Nations. Having allies such as the Gulf states, Italy, Spain and Turkey does not make the United States “unilateral” in the event that war occurs without the backing of the United Nations. It does, however, accomplish the exact feat that Mr. Bush sought to avoid last fall: it renders the U.N. irrelevant.

The message sent to the world by such an action is that the United Nations matters when it serves U.S. interests and does not matter when such a consensus does not exist. This is hardly an encouraging message. It seems an extension of the administration's “You're either with us or against us” mentality. But, as that famous (infamous?) advocate of realpolitik Henry Kissinger tells us, “In dealing with allies, briefings should not be mistaken for consultations.” In other words, the fact that our allies may not agree with us does not mean that they are “bad allies.” There has been much made of the growing rift between Europe and the United States in the aftermath of September 11th. I don't buy it. There is no difference in substance with regard to Iraq – everybody agrees that Saddam Hussein is a horrible dictator. The dispute is about timing. The issue is whether Saddam is an immediate threat to the world or not. So far, the Bush administration has offered scant evidence to support its claim that he is. Until it does, it should heed Mr. Bush's own advice and not render the United Nations irrelevant by ignoring the legitimate concerns of its members.