Alan J. Kuperman's op-ed piece in December(1) was overly simplistic, misinterpreted the facts and used irrelevant examples in a vain attempt to support his view. Kuperman's arguments actually build the case FOR a preemptive strike against Iraq. Let's run through some of his examples and get to the real story.
First is his ridiculous example of the Soviet Union in the 1940s. This one is probably the most absurd, but we'll have a look anyway. Kuperman asks us to “imagine” the United States being faced with the threat of nuclear weapons development from the Soviet Union. Well, I ask you to imagine if the United States had acted preemptively, not in the late 1940s when it was too late, but earlier. Kuperman argues the costs would have been too high had the United States acted. Sure, in 1949. But what about 1936, when Stalin was murdering 20-30 million innocents? Unfortunately, America sat on its isolationist hands and instead ended up in the most costly and risky arms race in the history of the world and near nuclear annihilation. Yeah, the Cold War was a real Nirvana.
The U.S. policy of containment against the Soviet threat that Kuperman exalts is fundamentally different from the containment policy toward Iraq. As Kenneth Pollack so aptly notes in his recent book The Threatening Storm, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was aimed at keeping the Soviets within their own borders and preventing them from spreading communism elsewhere. The goal was not disarmament. In Iraq, containment policy means not just keeping Iraq within its borders, but also disarming the country(2). Unfortunately, it's in the area of disarmament that containment has failed miserably.
Next, Kuperman argues that the preemptive strategy will backfire making all sorts of unsubstantiated claims that have no historical precedents or relevance. Let's run through them all to clear this up. Kuperman argues that the first-strike strategy will likely “cause the wars it ostensibly seeks to prevent.” That sounds like a pretty good point, especially quoting the game theory specialist Schelling. However, that argument assumes that Iraq would have to take preemptive action, which U.S. coercive tactics are trying to stop. Given that most pundits and pacifists claim that Saddam is not suicidal, that prospect is fairly remote(3). Starting a war with the United States would actually legitimize U.S. military action – both in public opinion and under the United Nations Charter that allows for self-defense.
Third, he claims that rogue states like Libya can be reigned in without risky invasions. True, Col. Muammar Qadhafi was reigned in after the bombing of Tripoli in 1986, but that same strategy has not worked with Saddam. For the past 12 years, U.S. and British planes have flown patrols over the U.N. sanctioned “no-fly” zones, routinely getting fired upon and firing back with a consistency that should be distressing to those arguing for a containment policy. Despite our obvious policy of containment, all intelligence points to Saddam's continued efforts to develop WMD, including nuclear weapons. Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the UN gave ample evidence.
Worse, a continuation of a containment strategy will prolong the unnecessary suffering of the Iraqi people. Ten more years of containment could result in millions of deaths. Coercive threats and bombings worked on Qadhafi, and even Milosevic in Yugoslavia, but that same strategy has failed to work with Saddam. We are still at the same spot as we were at the end of the 1991 Gulf War.
Better still, the most recent run-around that the UNMOVIC weapons inspectors have gotten over the past three months only reinforces the futility of continuing a policy of containment. Interestingly, Bill Clinton tried the containment approach so beloved by Kuperman with North Korea, and that cannot be classified as anything but a colossal failure. Certain leaders lack the morality and integrity to respond to negotiations and formal agreements. We discovered that with Kim Jong II. Fortunately, we already know Saddam falls into this category, so we should have the intelligence to recognize that a different approach is needed. Saddam appears to only understand once his nose is bloodied, so logic leads us to a more coercive approach that utilizes military force if necessary. Read Pollock's account of Iraqi challenges and concessions between 1992-2002 and this pattern is clearly evident.
Now we move to Kuperman's “copy-cat” argument that other states may take a cue and act preemptively. History tells us otherwise. In 1967, Israel conducted preemptive strikes against neighboring Arab states. According to Kuperman, this should have triggered a rash of preemptive wars, however one glance at the history books shows this didn't happen. Further, in 1981, the Israelis acted preemptively again when they destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osirak I, effectively preventing Saddam from developing nuclear weapons at the time. Oddly enough, again, no wars broke out, the sky didn't fall, and better still, potential proliferation of WMD was prevented.
Lastly, Kuperman argues that “history's most fundamental lesson” is that military force results in opposition rather than compliance. I guess Kosovo doesn't count in Kuperman's analysis. For all its flaws in execution, the threat of a ground invasion backed by heavy NATO bombings forced Milosovic to capitulate. Obviously, this may not work in every instance as the circumstances and political will of the world will vary, but in certain cases, coercive diplomacy, as General (Ret.) Wesley Clark calls it(4), can be effective.
One should never take war lightly. It is an inherently dangerous and risky venture that places many lives at risk. However, it sometimes is a necessary evil, even if this evil lies somewhere in the future. It is difficult to support Kuperman's arguments when the result could be a world where Saddam Hussein has nuclear weapons. Inspections are pointless, especially when led by a man who in 1991 declared that Iraq was clean of any nuclear weapons programs. Saddam has no intention of giving up his WMD – we should recognize this and act accordingly. Punch first.
1 See Alan J. Kuperman, “Should the US Punch First? No,” USAToday, December X, 2002, section A, p. 10.
2 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm (New York: Random House, 2002).
3 For example, Alan Bock, “Eye on the Empire: Weak Arguments for an Attack,” Antiwar.com, September 3, 2002. < http://www.antiwar.com/bock/b090302.html >
4 General (Ret.) Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), pp. 415.