

Multi-Level Governance Beyond the Nation State: The End of Legitimate Democratic Politics?

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The Impact of Globalization and Individualization on the Global Environment

Today, democracy is being constantly challenged by the processes of globalization and individualization. Due to a changing global environment, nation states increasingly transfer elements of their sovereignty to transnational and international levels. Although the consequences remain unknown, the concept of democracy changes and the legitimacy of political decisions at the global level is put into question. Global decision-making procedures are increasingly influenced by non-state actors, civil societies and businesses alike, and often lack transparency, participation and efficiency. After analyzing the democratic potential of the concept of 'global public policy' based on a 'triangulate diplomacy' and the challenge of inclusion, the paper provides a framework of representative multi-level governance including the international, transnational, national and local levels. Within this framework, the concept of democracy changes and can no longer be associated with its original idea or with the ideal model of direct democracy. Instead, it is based on the principle of subsidiarity and a balance between participation, efficiency and transparency at the different governance levels. However, concepts alone cannot close the gap of increasing poverty rates around the world and inequality particularly between developing and developed countries. Therefore legitimate global politics are going to be limited in the next decades and the only way to establish a global civil society is to first close these inequality gaps.

The term globalization has become a buzzword nowadays, but it still lacks precise and complete definition.¹ Broadly defined, it refers to a wide range of continuous political, economic, social and cultural processes related to different levels of interaction across territorially defined boundaries. Anthony Giddens already in 1990 described globalization as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process because such happenings may move in an observe direction from the very distanciated relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of globalization as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space."² It is obvious that globalization is not merely an explanation for quantitative changes such as increasing international trade, capital flows or foreign direct investment. Qualitative aspects of globalization processes, including an increasing individualization within societies and emerging governance gaps, requiring new forms of regulation and governance from the international to the local level, are the subject of ongoing discussions.³ We can therefore argue that globalization refers to heterogeneous processes and developments involving different strategies and forms of cooperation. Many scholars have pointed out that globalization and international agreements lack efficiency, transparency and broad participatory mechanisms.⁴ Clark expresses his view in radical terms, claiming that "just as

globalization has led to the death of the national economy, it now entails the death of national forms of democracy, except in so far as the latter are restructured as part of a global system.”⁵ While some observers argue that the nation-state is becoming an institution of the past, this paper states that globalization requires new forms of governance and a representative framework in which the nation-state and governmental actors (governments and intergovernmental bodies) remain constitutive elements. Governance is changing and non-state actors are becoming increasingly important, because no single actor, public or private, has the knowledge, resources and capacity to solve problems unilaterally. In this context governance is understood as an *interactive process* between all relevant stakeholders.⁶ According to UNDP, governance is identified as “the set of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic, political and social affairs through interactions among the government, civil society and private sector. It is the way a society makes and implements decisions – achieving mutual understanding, agreement and action.”⁷ The question of whether forms of global governance are democratically legitimized has been asked by many different scholars. This paper aims to give a constructive contribution to the ongoing debate of the impact of globalization and individualization on the concept of democracy. In doing so, I will look at the changing global environment and the transformation of democracy. I will then analyze the global public policy concept and its implications for democracy at the international level. To answer the key question of whether the development of global politics implies the end of legitimate democratic politics, I will outline a representative multi-level system of governance that takes into account horizontal and vertical interactions at the international, transnational, national and local levels.

Governance and Democracy

As Diamond points out “never in human history have so many independent countries been demanding or installing or practicing democratic governance. Never in history has awareness of popular struggles for democracy spread so rapidly and widely across national borders.”⁸ Just a century ago – more than 350 years after the national state entered into the field – New Zealand was the only state to give both men and women the universal, equal and free right to vote. Around the year 2000 about 114 out of 191 states introduced democratic elections, meaning that almost 60 percent of the world’s population are able to elect their own governments.⁹ Nonetheless, problems of democratic transition and consolidation are widespread. Free and equal elections are the most important element for democratic transition and the key in building the basis for democratic consolidation. But they are only the beginning of a democratic state. Linz and Stepan argue that “democracy is a form of governance of a state. Thus, no modern polity can become democratically consolidated unless it is first a state.”¹⁰ Studying the transformations of democracy around the world, they identify five interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions that must exist for a consolidated democracy and a functioning state be able to ensure a balance of participation, efficacy and transparency in governance decisions. These elements are:

- a free and lively civil society,
- a relatively autonomous and valued political society,
- a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life,
- a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government, and
- an institutionalized economic society.¹¹

Although these elements are associated with democratic systems in the traditional nation state, it is crucial to keep them in mind when thinking about democracy beyond national borders and possibilities for legitimate global democratic governance.

Transformations of Democracy

The term democracy goes back to the ancient Greece and implies two concepts: ‘demos – the people’ and ‘kratia – power and rule’ or as Abraham Lincoln phrased it “government of the people, by the people, for the people.”¹² Democracy is not a static concept and it has developed different forms depending on the context, society and people involved.¹³ This paper focuses on the third great transformation of democracy in the age of globalization.¹⁴ However, to understand recent developments it is crucial to outline briefly the first two phases: The first transformation changed the non-democratic city-state into the early democratic city-state during the first half of the fifth century B.C. The second transformation is known as the development from the city-state to the national-state on the basis of the Westphalian system. “Democracy came to be understood not as assembly democracy in the city-state, but as representative democracy in the national-state. As a consequence of that transformation in scale and form, a set of political institutions and practices, which taken as a whole were unknown to the theory and practice of democracy up to that time, came into existence.”¹⁵

The third transformation of democracy was indicated by increasing interdependence and globalization processes, particularly after the end of the Cold War, and it continues until now. Dahl argues that “just as earlier city-states lost much of their political, economic, social, and cultural autonomy when they were absorbed into larger national states, so in our time the development of transnational systems reduces the political, economic, social and cultural autonomy of national states.”¹⁶ Dahl is strongly in favor of sound democratic institutions, which would provide democratic control over transnational decision makers. Stronger democratic institutions could also help to provide a healthy democratic political life and while freedom and control might be lost on one side, they could be gained on others. The consequences and outcomes of the third transformation remain unknown and are subject of continuous debates around the world. Those dialogues, however, take place mostly in developed countries and therefore often ignore the interests and cultures of developing states in Latin America, Africa, parts of Asia and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, although we can identify these three “great transformations” according to Dahl, there are also smaller transformation processes, transition phases and the development of a wide range of different governance forms under the header of democracy.

- First, the Westphalian world order and the nation-state have not always been characterized by legitimized democratic politics.
- Second, democratic institutions (if they already exist in a country) and societies are not static and develop over time. Current transformations within nation-states as well as developing democratic institutions in new democracies are challenging the ongoing debate.
- Third, one must keep in mind the different forms and aspects of democracy, which could become part of a global governance system.

The question remains whether the people around the world are ready to establish a possible system of global governance based on democratic principles.¹⁷

“Governing without Government” or “Governing without Governance”?

In current debates, two questions have been asked about the consequences of globalization: Does globalization mean or imply “*Governing without government?*”, or even “*governing without governance?*”¹⁸ Does the current situation indicate that world affairs and world politics are managed and governed without government(s) or even without governance? This leads as well to the question of the establishment of a world government, which Kant already in the 18th century considered as not desirable and hardly practical.¹⁹ In recent debates few scholars judge the idea of a world government as realistic possibility; one exception is Dani Rodrik. Focusing on international economic integration, he argues that “if we had a perfectly integrated world economy, national jurisdictions would not interfere with market mechanisms. Transaction costs and tax differentials would be insignificant and convergence in commodity prices and factor returns would be almost complete. To reach this stage, we have to institutionalize federalism in a global scale to align jurisdictions with the market and remove the ‘border’ effects” (comparable to the United States today or the European Union in the future). He further states that “under a model of global federalism, at least the parts that matter economically, would be organized along the lines of the US system. National governments would partly transfer their power to supranational legislative, executive, and judicial authorities and a world government would take care of a world market.”²⁰ However, Rodrik concludes that this scenario, including the election of international politicians, is rather unrealistic in a short-term perspective when one takes into account ongoing financial and political crises such as the one in Argentina. Within the next 120 years though, he would place his bet on the emergence of a global federal system.²¹

Analyzing political and social aspects in addition to economic integration, most scholars are critical about the effectiveness and feasibility of a world government: Although nation-states have begun to transfer elements of their sovereignty to other levels, they do not want to give up their formal sovereignty as such. The process of the European integration is one example illustrating the difficulties involved in integrating a limited number of players. It has often been stated that a ‘democratic deficit’ exists regarding the legitimacy of decisions and the decision-making processes in Brussels. This does not suggest that European institutions are not legitimized *per se*. It implies that their legitimacy is seen as insufficient, which obviously is difficult to measure and depends on the expectations and the understanding of the governance system by its members.²² In addition, questions of national interest, which are related to state sovereignty, cannot be ignored.

The transformations mentioned imply changes for the concept of state-sovereignty. MacLean finds, for example, that “globalization has constructed new non-territorial and non-sovereign forms of governance, while simultaneously confirming the sovereign state, transformed from its original historical form as the defining, territorially located site of central and legitimate government, to a new form of local and regional ‘subsidiary’ government.”²³ This statement implies two things: First, states as such will still play a crucial role in world politics, and second – according to the principle of subsidiarity – states will transfer elements of sovereignty and decision-making competences to both the local and transnational levels. The concept of subsidiarity states that responsibilities and tasks should only be transferred from a ‘lower’ to a ‘higher’ level of governance, if the ‘lower’ level is not able to provide adequate

solutions. In the case of the European Union the responsibilities are outlined in different treaties and were part of different reforms.²⁴

Rethinking Governance in a Global Context

Since a democratically elected legitimate world government does not seem to be a feasible near-term answer to globalization, a responsive system of multi-level governance seems to be a far more realistic perspective. This implies that there is no traditional model of democracy, which can be easily applied to all levels of governance at the same time. The diversity among countries, their citizens and political systems, as well as the differing understandings of concepts of democracy, power, economic development and cultural as well as religious backgrounds require flexible and appropriate approaches. Before characterizing a multi-level governance system, I will outline possible mechanisms for global governance and the concept of global public policy analyzing critically its democratic potential.

Global Governance and Global Public Policy

The concept of global public policy (GPP) has become one model for international cooperation.²⁵ Based on the idea of a “triangulate diplomacy” – which includes networks consisting of governments and international organizations, civil society actors, and the private sector – this concept might present one option to fill governance gaps at the global level and create a forum for an emerging global civil society. However, the question of the legitimacy of non-state actors has not been adequately addressed and many scholars are skeptical about the democratic and legitimate potential of those actors. Networks and their capacity to tackle problems effectively are reoccurring issues. The terms network, coalition or partnership refer to interactive processes and different formal and informal structures of cooperation. Similar to globalization, these terms are often used inconsistently. Networks are seen as innovative institutional arrangement and sometimes a panacea for problem solution.²⁶ Global public policy networks can be based on advocacy coalitions and intergovernmental processes; alternatively they are interpreted as part of international regimes (such as the International Ozone Regime among others).

In addition to the inclusion of divergent actors, implementation processes and links to the local level are particularly important for an effective model of global public policy. Reinicke (et.al.) argue that GPP networks are a potentially useful tool to increase the effectiveness of global governance through the inclusion of relevant stakeholders. Building on the fact that globalization increases political and economic liberalization and technological changes, they identify two governance gaps in global affairs that undermine the legitimacy of existing governance mechanisms within states and the multilateral system: an ‘operational’ gap and a ‘participatory’ gap.

The operational gap arises from the fact that a growing number of public-policy issues can no longer be effectively addressed in existing institutional frameworks, whether at the national or intergovernmental level. Environmental issues, such as the impacts of increasing forest degradation and climate change, are primary examples. It is obvious that national or regional approaches alone cannot solve these problems or deal with the consequences. It is not only necessary to link different issues, but also to come to solutions among different countries, particularly between developed and developing states.

The participatory gap is directly related to the operational gap: “As states and international organizations lose their credibility and legitimacy, (...) an acute participatory gap emerges in international governance. Private entities, business and civil society, many of which have successfully reorganized themselves on the transnational level, now operate in a governance vacuum.”²⁷ Global public policy networks aim to close these governance gaps and to create legitimacy by performing the following six functions:²⁸

1. Contribute to establishing a global policy agenda, and offer mechanisms for developing a truly global public discourse in which to debate this agenda.
2. Facilitate processes for negotiating and setting global standards.
3. Help develop and disseminate knowledge that is crucial to addressing transnational challenges.
4. Help create and deepen markets.
5. Provide innovative mechanisms for implementing global agreements.
6. Address the participatory gap by creating inclusive processes that build trust and social capital in the global public space by furthering transnational and trans-sectoral discourse and interaction.

Theoretically, local participation brings legitimacy to the process, particularly in issue areas where global networks may be viewed as interventionist or as a source of interference in internal affairs. It may also assure the inclusion of local interests and needs, and strengthen transparency. However, as we can see in case studies on GPP networks, they often remain incomplete and only partly successful due to four reasons:

1. Global networks and arrangements in most areas and sectors are characterized by a confrontation between developed and developing countries (see among others the example of environmental negotiations in this paper).
2. Most international arrangements lack effective implementation and enforcement procedures and therefore remain incomplete.
3. Although networks may include various actors from different governance levels, decisions are always based on the idea of representation. The direct inclusion of all relevant stakeholders is not only unrealistic but also not necessary, as it will be pointed out again later. Therefore I argue that the idea of networks dealing with global governance issues can contribute to an international multi-level system, but it does not necessarily ensure efficacy, transparency or participation.
4. Closely linked to the third point, GPP networks foster the emergence of self-appointed elites mainly from the western developed part of the world.

Rethinking Democracy and the Question of Inclusion

The difficulty of inclusion is often a key factor in the debate on global governance. The global public policy approach aims at including actors, private and governmental alike from various parts of the world. However, as the example of the World Summit in Rio and following negotiations show us, important agreements can be reached (Agenda 21 is one example) through negotiation processes that lack transparency and in which it is not possible for all actors to participate.²⁹

Similar to Rodrik, but focusing on societies rather than only economic developments, Iris Marion Young proposes a global system of regulatory regimes to which the local level and regions relate in a federated system.³⁰ In international relations theory, according to Krasner, regimes are defined as “implicit or explicit norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.”³¹ This definition provides the basic ideas for Young’s regulatory regimes, which lay down rules regarding a vital set of issues that call for global cooperation. She mentions the following seven regimes, each having a distinct functional jurisdiction, with some need for overlapping responsibility and coordination:

- Peace and Security; Environment; Trade and Finance; Foreign Direct Investment and Capital Utilization; Communications and Transportation; Human Rights including Labor Standards and Welfare Rights; Citizenship and Migration.

The most important elements in the federal system are local government units. They are autonomous in the sense that their members construct their own institutions of governance as they choose, within limits of global regulation. The global level of governance can therefore be characterized as rather “thin” in the sense that it only lays down general principles regarding the sorts of issues mentioned above. Local institutions “thicken” them into administrable programs and rules by interpreting and applying them according to their own procedures, priorities, and cultural understandings. “Self-determination understood as non-domination, means a presumption of non-interference for autonomous units that are embedded in institutionalized relationships that protect them from dominative threats.”³² Global regulatory regimes should aim to minimize domination of both individuals and self-determining local units and actors. Furthermore, regulatory institutions should protect both individuals and groups from the domination of powerful private economic actors.


A vision of global governance with local self-determination ought to include democratic values and paramount institutions. Young criticizes existing transnational institutions and firms as rather undemocratic. She emphasizes the importance of UN reforms that should ensure democratic values beyond national borders.³³ Although this model establishes some linkages between the different levels, it remains unclear how they will be implemented. Crucial for the following analysis is the importance of the local level, which gives room to different cultures, traditions and stages of development, in addition to the global public policy approach. Taking this into account, the following section will outline a design for an international system of multi-level governance based on the key idea of representation.

The Representative International Multi-Level System of Governance

Relating the international multi-level system of governance to the concept of legitimacy, the framework faces the following challenge: “To be stable, democracy [and governance mechanism] must be deemed legitimate by the people. ... This legitimacy requires a profound moral commitment and emotional allegiance, but these develop only over time, and partly as a result of effective performance. Democracy will not be valued by the people unless it deals effectively with social and economic problems and achieves a modicum of order and

justice.”³⁴ To reach this ideal form over the long term, a world civil society would have to be established, which is questionable given the fragmentation and inequality existing in world politics today.³⁵ Keeping this in mind, the figure below visualizes very simplified the relationships among international, transnational, national and local levels and horizontal and vertical interactions between the actors involved.

The Global System of Multi-level Governance



According to the principle of subsidiarity, decision must be made at the ‘adequate’ governance level and implemented effectively. Whereas every citizen would theoretically have the opportunity to become actively involved in decision-making process at all governance levels, the level where a broad participation and inclusion can most be ensured is the local level. This leads to the following effect: the more indirect the level of governance, the more indirect is the level of representation. As Kleger (et.al.) analyzes with regard to the European Union, legitimacy can be direct or indirect depending on the governance level.³⁶ Although members of international institutions may not be officially elected, they can be considered as indirectly legitimate if they are delegated by elected representatives within a country. Democracy can be understood as purely representative, but due to the complexity with a changing grade in representation.³⁷ Supplementary analysis, research and case studies are needed to further develop these assumptions.

Looking at the different models and possibilities for democratic theory beyond national borders, none of these approaches seem ready for implementation today. There is not ‘one theory of global democracy’ that can be applied and it is unclear when and whether there will be one.³⁸ It rather seems that all the different approaches have very essential and useful elements, all of which we must keep in mind when modeling the complex international multi-level system on the basis of subsidiarity. In the long term, a balance of power system could be based on agreements on the needs and responsibilities of each level. The challenge remains for “Western, well established democracies” “Southern democracies under construction” as

well as other countries to create a common international system that builds trust as a basis for legitimacy and democracy.

The performance of the local Agenda 21 is one example of the implementation of global agreements and shows the dynamic and shortcomings at national and local levels. This does not mean that every citizen participates actively in politics, but the mechanisms have to ensure that every citizen has the right and possibility to participate as she or he wants to. However, this process indicates both the importance of diversity and the need for an adoption of global agreements to specific local needs.

Conclusion: Political Fragmentation vs. Political Integration

Most of the ideas outlined above are still almost exclusively based on conceptual work. With political fragmentation, increasing inequality and growing poverty, one must be very optimistic to believe that a global governance framework can function in the future.³⁹ So far, the main players in the global governance architecture are the G7 countries, political scientists from the United States or Europe and of course the business community (overall dominated by white men). Looking at newer democracies in Latin America, for example, we can hardly speak of a “democratic culture,” one of the preconditions to achieving legitimacy. As mentioned above, the multi-level governance system only has a chance “to be considered as legitimate” by the world’s population and a chance of survival, if it allows a wide range of diversity and gives room to different cultures and religions – as long as those are not questioning the system itself, as, for example, international terrorism does. This would allow indigenous groups and women in the Andean region to be part of the same system as the businesswomen in New York City at Wall Street.

The current discussions about a European constitution and the introduction of the Euro are challenging and show first possibilities of democracy beyond national borders. But the historical development of European countries and the economic, political, social and cultural integration of the European Union cannot be transferred easily to global governance. However, we will be able to learn from these processes (although a world currency is hardly desirable) and move towards greater political and institutional integration in discussing some form of ‘world constitution’ (such as the Declaration of Human Rights) some day in the future. A lack of adequate governance mechanisms leads to a decreasing legitimization of world politics. Future challenges will continue to bridge the gap between political fragmentation on one side and integration on the other, and may increase the level of democracy and legitimization of world politics from the inside, in a possible framework of global governance. According to the terminology of consolidated democracies mentioned in the introduction, the relevant aspects of this framework may be a free and lively civil society, a relatively autonomous and valued political system, an institutionalized economic society, rule of law, and an effectively functioning bureaucracy.

Notes

¹ For working definitions see e.g. David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, *Global Transformations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

² Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass, Oxford: Polity Press, 1990) p. 64.

³ Joseph S. Nye and Johns D. Donahue, eds., *Governance in a Globalizing World* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

⁴ See e.g. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁵ Ian Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 155.

⁶ Like globalization, the term governance has been widely discussed among scientists. For an overview see Holger Mürle, *Global Governance* (Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden der Gerhard-Mercator-Universität-GH-Duisburg, 1998).

⁷ UNDP, ed., *The UNDP Role in Decentralization and Local Governance, A joint UNDP-Government of Germany Evaluation* (New York: UNDP) p. 27.

⁸ Larry Diamond, "Three Paradoxes of Democracy", *Journal of Democracy* vol. 1, no. 3 (1990) p. 48.

⁹ Wolfgang Merkel, „Der diskrete Charme der Demokratie“, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* no. 52 (December 30, 2001).

¹⁰ Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) p. 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹² Quoted e.g. in Heinz Kleger, I. Pawel Karolewski and Matthias Munke, *Europäische Verfassung* (Münster, Hamburg, London: LIT, 2001) p. 163.

¹³ Dahl defines at least five standards, which describe democracy: Effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, and control of the agenda and inclusion of adults. See Robert Dahl, *On Democracy*, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1998) p. 37-38. One distinction has often caused misunderstanding: The distinction between the concept of Polyarchy and Democracy – “rule by many” and “rule by all the people for the people” which we should take into account when analyzing concepts of transnational democracy. See Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis*, 5th edition (London: Prentice Hall, 1991) pp. 71f.

¹⁴ Robert Dahl, “A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 109, no. 1 (1994) pp. 23-34.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁷ Various conferences mostly in Europe and the United States are forums to discuss these issues.

¹⁸ See for example: R.A.W. Rhodes, “The New Governance: Governing Without Government” *Political Studies*, vol. 44, no. 4 (1996) pp. 652-667; Wolfgang H. Reinicke, *Global Public Policy*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998); James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Lothar Brock, „Staatenpolitik in der Weltgesellschaft: ‘Government without Governance’?“, in Wolfgang Glatzer, ed., *Ansichten der Gesellschaft*, Frankfurter Beiträge aus Soziologie und Politikwissenschaft, (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1999) pp. 261-273.

¹⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden* (Leipzig: Reclam, [1795] (1954).

²⁰ Dani Rodrik, “How Far Will International Economic Integration Go?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, volume 14, no. 1 (2000) pp. 182-3.

²¹ Rodrik argues that the framework of global governance should be an alliance of those who perceive themselves to be the ‘losers’ (environmental and labor groups etc.) from economic integration and those who perceive themselves as the ‘winners’ (exporters, multinational companies ...). Part of this process will be to make international policymakers accountable through democratic elections. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

²² See e.g. several contributions to Beate Kohler-Koch, ed., *Regieren in entgrenzten Räumen* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998) and Heinz Kleger et.al. (2001), *Ibid.*

²³ John MacLean, “Philosophical Roots of Globalization and Philosophical Routes to Globalization,” in Randall D. Germain, ed., *Globalization and its Critics* (London: Macmillan, 1999) p. 62.

²⁴ See e.g. Heinz Kleger et.al. (2001), *Ibid.*

²⁵ Wolfgang H. Reinicke, *Global Public Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998).

²⁶ See e.g. Wolfgang H. Reinicke and Francis M. Deng, *Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance* (Washington, DC: IDRC, 2000).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10. Kaul et.al. furthermore identify three key weaknesses in current arrangements for providing public goods: A jurisdictional gap, a gap in participation, and an incentive gap: The jurisdictional gap is defined as the discrepancy between the global boundaries of today’s major policy concerns and the essentially national boundaries of policy-making. The participatory gap results from the fact that we live in a multi-actor world, but which is internationally still primarily intergovernmental. And the incentive gap emerges, because moral suasion is not enough for countries to correct their international spillovers or to cooperate for the global public good. See Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A. Stern, eds., *Global Public Goods* (New York: Oxford University Press) pp. 450-451.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Chapter 3.

²⁹ See e.g. the implementation process of Agenda 21, the difficulty and still ongoing discussion of a Global Forest Convention within the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF). See e.g. Astrid Harnisch, *Global Public Policy Networks and International Forest Management – A Case Study*, February 20, 2002, <http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net>.

³⁰ Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 267.

³¹ Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) p. 2.

³² Young, p. 259.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Diamond (1990) p. 49.

³⁵ Michael Zürn, "The Challenge of Globalization and Individualization: A View From Europe" in Hans-Henrik Holm and Georg Sörensen, eds., *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) p. 158, Figure 8.1.

³⁶ Kleger et.al. (2001).

³⁷ Even the 'ideal form' of direct democracy and the concept of Rousseau did only include formal citizens in political life. People without the right of citizenship were excluded like women or poorer people, however, they have also been affected by political decision. Therefore we can argue that even this concept contains representative elements.

³⁸ As Rodrik points out in a paper prepared for a conference on 'Globalization and Democracy' mentioned above, there is no "one way". In his third principle for democratic governance of globalization, he points out that "democratic institutions differ in their social and institutional arrangements, for reasons of both historical accident and genuine differences in national preferences. (...) The need for institutional diversity applies with even greater force to developing countries." See Dani Rodrik, *Four Simple Principles for Democratic Governance of Globalization*, October 10, 2001, <http://www.demglob.de/rodrikpaper.html>.

³⁹ World Bank Chief Economist Nicholas Stern commenting on the new World Bank study "Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World" published in December 2001: "Globalization has often been a powerful force for poverty reduction. But too many people have been left by the wayside." This exclusion is mainly due to "the weakness of governance and policies in the non-integrated countries, to tariffs and other trade barriers with which poor peoples are confronted when they try to enter the markets of rich countries, and to the decline of official development aid" World Bank, ed., *Development News Press Review*, Thursday December 6, 2001. See also discussions during the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre.