by Gianfranco Pasquino Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Bologna Center
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Since 1994 the Italian political system has been undergoing a political and institutional transition. Practically all the old political actors, especially the parties, have either disappeared or profoundly transformed themselves and, most important, a new actor, claiming not to be "political," has appeared: the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi.

Two major electoral reforms have also affected the functioning of the Italian parliamentary Republic. Moreover, generally speaking, "the rules of the game," above all the relationships between, on the one side, the government and parliament, and, on the other side, the judiciary, have become the object of tense and frequent controversies. Last but not least, the presidents of the Republic, most notably Giorgio Napolitano (2006-2013), have been increasingly obliged to shift from a sheer ceremonial role to become guardians of the Constitution against several attempts to manipulate its articles in a blatantly partisan way.

The fact that Berlusconi's coalitions have won three elections out of five: 1994, 2001, and 2008 clearly indicates two important elements. First, not only is Berlusconi excellent at campaigning, but he also provides more than satisfactory representation for many political and social preferences of large sections of the Italian electorate. He interprets, far more successfully than the center-left, the feelings, expectations, and even the hostility of a large part of Italians. To be more precise, Berlusconi is, at the same time, the product of Italian politics and society, part of the autobiography of the nation, and has been capable of shaping and writing a significant part of that story.

The second element is that, even though Berlusconi controls a large portion of television broadcasting, Italian politics remains highly competitive. The center-left has only itself, its fragmentation, and the litigiousness of its leaders to blame if it has so far been unable to provide a satisfactory and long-lasting alternative to Berlusconi's socio-cultural influence and political power. Apparently, the situation is in the process of changing as the election of the mayors of Milan and Naples, both broadly grounded in the center-left, clearly suggests.

Comparing Italy with all the other European democracies, a legitimate and appropriate procedure to learn and to understand more, one finds several striking differences. Italy is the only country where there is neither a Liberal party nor a Social-Democratic party. Only in Italy has the incumbent head of the government not had a previous political career and not occupied any elected office before becoming prime minister. In other European countries, rather small, xenophobic parties have tended to appear, but rarely attain governing positions. In Italy, the Northern League has frequently been in office supporting Berlusconi. Some would add that it has proved capable of steering the course of the government especially on the issues of immigration, fiscal policies, and devolution. Finally, both Umberto Bossi, the lifetime leader of the Northern League, and Berlusconi are "populist" leaders adroitly exploiting the anti-political feelings widespread in the Italian electorate.

Not only do populist leaders believe that their power derives from the electorate, but they also claim that the sovereignty of the people lies and finds expression (almost) exclusively in the government "elected" by people. Indeed, Berlusconi in particular, has shown his intolerance for all kinds of checks and balances, above all those constituted by the judiciary and by the President of the Republic. This is, indeed, a very poor conception of the complexity of contemporary constitutional democracies. Prime Minister Berlusconi has waged an endless, often embarrassing, always partisan, war against the judiciary, trying to approve an overall reform to trim its powers. He has also successfully obtained from his parliamentary majority several laws to escape his trials, for instance, extending the statute of limitations.

At the time of my writing, Berlusconi is a defendant in five trials accused of corruption, of having had sex with a minor, and of evading taxes. He has often bragged about his flamboyant style of life, including his famous allegedly "elegant" dinners with several young, available females he refers to as "escorts." Why, then, do Italians still vote for him? In fact, a pattern has emerged in which only a sizable minority (always less than 50 percent) of Italians vote for him and his political party. He, his party, his coalitions have never received the support of an absolute majority of Italian voters. His parliamentary majority is the product of the electoral law, drafted by his government, that provides a substantial majority bonus. As long as it remains divided the opposition does not offer an attractive alternative to those critical citizens who might change their vote and become decisive. Berlusconi's main propaganda line that he has saved Italy from the former and post Communists still resonates in the minds of very many voters, also because it contains more than a grain of truth.

A government led by someone who has never wanted to learn the art of politics and who must spend most of his time defending himself from his trials and attacking not only the opposition, but also all the checks and balances—including the Presidency of the Republic—cannot produce any improvement in the lives of and prospects for Italians. An opposition unable to formulate a decent and common strategy in order not only to oust Berlusconi, by all means a legitimate goal, but also to offer credible policy alternatives to the voters preoccupied by the disunity and the bickering of the two past short-lived experiments led by Romano Prodi (1996-1998; 2006-2008), can only bet on its lucky star.

A series of Eurobarometer surveys taken every six months with interviews, reveals that a majority of Italians express dissatisfaction with the functioning of Italian democracy at the same time as they interestingly suggest some personal optimism concerning their quality of life expectations. They also judge the functioning of democracy in the European Union more favorably than the functioning of their domestic democracy. However, the euro-indifference of the center-right government coupled with the frequent criticisms of the institutions and the decisions taken by the European Union have negatively affected the support that Italians have traditionally demonstrated for the political unification of the European continent.

In the short run, the question is whether the prime minister will be found guilty in one or more of his trials. However, he has already emphatically declared that he has no intention of resigning because "the judges cannot subvert the will of the people as expressed in the elections." Berlusconi's ageing process (he will be 75 in September 2011) may be a factor in the future of Italian politics, but he is most certainly looking to the possibility of being elected to the presidency of the Italian Republic in 2013. However, because of some turmoil within his party, the PdL, due to the serious defeat in the May 2011 administrative elections, his goal may be frustrated.

The phase of bitter confrontations among leaders and institutions is definitely not over. In the long run, it remains to be seen whether the feelings, beliefs, and interests nourished by a large sector of the Italian people and that are part and parcel of berlusconismo, will continue to affect, if not to determine, the course of Italian politics. A significant transformation of those attitudes and the appearance of a more widespread sense of the state and of civic values cannot be said to loom large on the future of Italy. They will require time and prolonged cultural and political commitments.

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