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The Return of History

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The “return of history” can mean two very different things. It can mean the return of history as a discipline or mode of inquiry within the broader panorama of the human and policy sciences: or it can mean something more ominous, something rather like the Freudian “return of the repressed,” that is to say the return of dark, primitive forces which seemed to have been overcome by the steady onward march of progress. There is of course a connection between these two meanings. Interest in history tends to grow with insecurity, and periods of stability are less immediately interesting to study than periods of crisis and conflict. The greatest of English historians, Edward Gibbon, described history as “little more than the register of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind.”¹ Some historical references, it is true, have positive connotations; it is still a compliment to call someone a “Renaissance man.” But more often the return of history in colloquial language means something dark and nasty or dead. I’m reminded of the line in *Pulp Fiction* “I’m gonna git medieval on your ass”² and it’s not good news either if someone tells you “you’re history!”

In recent times the return of history as a serious preoccupation for other disciplines, for policy makers and opinion leaders, and the perception of its relevance to the present, has tended to wax and wane with the rise and decline of

confidence in the smoothness of the process of globalization and the spread of market-oriented democracy. So we have Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History* in a period of optimism, and Robert Kagan's reply, "The Return of History and the End of Dreams" (the subtitle is significant)³ in a period of pessimism. If there is one phenomenon that crystallizes the disquiet aroused by the "return of history" more than any other, it is nationalism. The political philosopher John Gray, reacting to the original article by Francis Fukuyama on "The End of History" in 1989, wrote that the break-up of the Soviet Union "will not inaugurate a new era of post-historical harmony, but instead a return to the classical terrain of history, a terrain of great-power rivalries...irredentist claims and wars."⁴ The historical sociologist Michael Mann has warned that the transition to democracy and "nation-building" can bring with them ferocious episodes of "ethnic cleansing."⁵ Even outside the former Soviet Union, the Yugoslav wars, and the evident revival of a long-suppressed nationalism in the newly emancipated states of Central and Eastern Europe, together with the birth of new nation-states such as Slovakia or Moldova, has forced Europe once again to take nationalism very seriously. And writers of history, as previously in the history of nationalism, have often been intimately involved with the search to create or reaffirm a sense of national identity. This can take positive forms, when it is linked, as it was in Poland and Hungary, with the revolt against an oppressive and hypocritical form of internationalism.⁶ I confess to a good deal of sympathy also with attempts to defend national or regional cultures against the levelling effects of globalisation. The Canadian writer John Ralston Saul in his prophetic book *The Collapse of Globalism* distinguishes between two types of nationalism: "a positive, civic form, one in which belonging brings the obligation to reach out and to imagine the other in an inclusive, multiple way. It can also take a negative form, above all ethnic, dedicated to belonging as an expression of privilege and exclusion."⁷ That great British patriot George Orwell reserved the word "nationalism" for mindless assertions of national superiority, which he detested.

Unfortunately historians have certainly not been guiltless even in recent times of promoting national conflict. In 1986 a memorandum from the Serbian Academy of Sciences warned that Albanian predominance in Kosovo was endangering one of the foundations of Serbian identity, the myth of the heroic if unsuccessful resistance to the Ottoman Turks. It helped to create the opportunity for Milosevic to exploit Serbian grievances; in 1989 he went to Kosovo to celebrate the 600th anniversary of the battle against the Turks, and declared that “The heroism of Kosovo does not allow us to forget that, at one time, we were brave and dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated.”⁸ The search for remote ethnic origins, to prove the antiquity of the nation, or to legitimize control over territory, and the demonization of neighbouring nations are common in the school textbooks of the new national states, in the former Yugoslavia, in the Caucasus, and in Central Asia.⁹ In Russia the void left by the collapse of Communism has been filled by a nationalism that can find a place both for the Tsars and for Stalin as architects of Russian greatness. Outside Europe things are arguably worse. Arab textbooks have ignored or abused Israel, and Israeli textbooks have minimized the forced expulsion of Arabs from Palestine in 1948. The Hindu nationalist BJP government in India tried to impose a vision of an Aryan spiritual unity going back to the dawn of history, while Pakistani textbooks have criticized the great emperor Akbar for his excessive tolerance of religions other than Islam. The Chinese government has accused Japanese textbooks of “exonerating militarism,” and of refusing to use the word “invasion” when describing Japanese actions in China in 1937.¹⁰ However, there have been some more hopeful developments. Remarkably, the NGO Prime (Peace Research in the Middle East) has produced a joint Palestinian-Israeli textbook.¹¹

Perhaps the most successful example of historical collaboration to develop a more reasonable international dialogue about the past has been the common textbook written by French and German historians. The first volume dealt with “Europe and the World since 1945,” from a “cosmopolitan European perspective,”

but since then the project has extended backwards in time to the more controversial periods of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Some commentators on the first volume were pessimistic about the possibilities of reaching an acceptable compromise on the difficult issues involving Franco-German conflicts and the responsibility for the two world wars, but their fears seem to have been excessive. The second volume, for the period 1815-1945, is now available. In the meantime, 80.000 copies of the latter have been sold on both sides of the Rhine; the project's originality and high quality are reflected by its widespread recognition in the public sphere. The textbooks do not try to present an agreed version but rather to allow each side to learn from the other.¹² It's unfortunately true that such attempts to develop a shared vision of European history raise fresh difficulties. President Sarkozy does not seem to be an enthusiast, and we can generally expect that many national politicians will still try to impose their own national narratives. The first volume of the Franco-German textbook was attacked by the *London Times* as being anti-American and by some Polish historians as not giving enough importance to Poland. However, a project for a joint German-Polish history is now under way, and a start has been made on a remarkable project to write a multi-national history of the Balkans. So we can say that within Europe, the "return to history" need not mean the return to old rivalries, but instead the attempt to reach a common understanding.

Recent history writing does not seem to me in general to have played a negative role in promoting the various forms of national resistance to further European integration. Rather, by trying to show that nationalism and national identity have been subject to invention, redefinition and change, and have often been affected by contingent historical circumstances, historians have tried to foster a more sceptical and critical attitude. I'm thinking here of works like Linda Colley's *Britons*, or the multi-volume series on French national memory— *Les lieux de mémoire*— edited by Pierre Nora.¹³ This does not, of course, deny that the sedimentation of centuries of national history, as interpreted by past histori-

ans, continues to exert a strong, sometimes unconscious, influence on the conception that European nations have of themselves and each other. French elites are still inspired by the memory of the glory of the Napoleonic Empire, while in English popular culture there survives a deep vein of anti-European chauvinism, exploited by newspapers like the *Sun*, which lose no opportunity to remind their readers of Nazism when Germany is involved, and which even harked back to the Spanish Inquisition when England had a European cup tie against Spain.

As a historian, I would hope, of course, that the “return of history” could have a more positive significance, and that the function of historians might go beyond the negative one of showing up the questionable basis of national myths, an exercise that unfortunately often fails to have much impact on public opinion. What can the “return of history” contribute to our knowledge? In the first place, I think that it can be a warning against over-simplification, and against “the illusions of the epoch.” Historically informed economists are less likely to believe in the illusions of unlimited credit, political historians will have something to say about the limits of military power and the tendency of dominant states to overstretch their resources, and intellectual historians will be sceptical about the “end of ideology” or the definitive conquest of the world by Western values. Politicians often complain that historians offer no reliable guide to action. In one sense this is undoubtedly true. A knowledge of history is not a reliable source of short-term predictions. The historian AJP Taylor remarked, with typically corrosive wit, that Napoleon III, “like most of those who study history,...learned from the mistakes of the past how to make new ones.”¹⁴ Detailed history of political events is more valuable in giving a sense of how decisions can be arrived at, and of the more or less rational ways of decision-making, than in recommending particular courses of action. Ian Kershaw’s study of the “Fateful Decisions” of 1940-1941 is an excellent example. Ernest May, in his *Lessons of History* warned against the common tendency to apply the lessons of the last phase of history without asking how the world has changed since then, as you can see from the titles of his first

two chapters: “World War II: Preparing for the Last Peace,” and “The Cold War: preventing World War II.”¹⁵ Political discourse, on the other hand, too often uses historical examples for misleading analogies and simplifications. References to “Munich” and “appeasement” have repeatedly been used to discredit attempts at compromise made in quite different circumstances with quite different actors. A notorious example of this was Antony Eden’s identification of Nasser’s actions during the Suez crisis with those of Hitler and Mussolini in the 1930s, when, according to him, “Success in a number of adventures—Abyssinia, Rhineland etc...had persuaded Hitler and Mussolini that the democracies had not the will to resist.” It was hardly plausible to view Nasser as on the march to world dominion.¹⁶ More recently, in the days before the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, a group of British contemporary historians protested against the superficial use of historical analogies which pointed to the examples of Germany and Japan after WW2 to prove the possibility of successful “regime change” and democratization led by a foreign power: “Historians have much to say about the complexities of regime change. But history is not a supermarket, where decision-makers fill up trolleys of false historical analogies.”¹⁷

Good history, however, particularly history that deals with the long term, can uncover the origin of systems and beliefs that may otherwise be taken as natural and inevitable. It can teach policy makers to ask the right questions, and to expect the unexpected. Historians of a particular country can provide insights that generalizing policy sciences may have overlooked. The Bush and Blair governments’ lack of interest in the history of the earlier British occupation of Iraq, and even in the history of Saddam’s dictatorship, had disastrous consequences.¹⁸

On the other hand, generalist, long-term history is important in alerting us to fundamental shifts; there are rules in history, but the most important lesson is that they can always be changed. We are not likely to make much sense of the world of the twenty-first century if we believe that Europe has always been ahead of Asia in science and technology, or that its economic hegemony goes

back beyond the eighteenth century. To understand China we need to understand the immense depth of Chinese history. Historians of literacy and printing can help us to understand the changes brought by the new world of instant communication. By looking both at the very particular and at the very general, history can provide a sense of scale that may show up the shortcomings of current policy perspectives.

The most controversial question is: what is the status of history in relation to our assessment of the general trends that we may expect? I think Francis Fukuyama was right to place emphasis on the momentum of scientific and technical advance as something that has given history a direction for more than two hundred years. And he certainly accepts that nonetheless the train of progress can be derailed by war, religious belief or, one must now add, the climate. But what can the “end of history” really mean? Timing is important: beyond his intentions, Fukuyama fed into the climate of optimism and over-confidence created by the collapse of the Soviet system. But was this the “end of history,” or rather, less sensationally, the “end of the end of history?” A literal belief in the “end of history” would seem to involve a new form of teleology, ignoring the lessons of Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin. Can we really believe that, as Francis Fukuyama wrote in 1989, we had witnessed “not just the end of the Cold War, or a passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government,” or, as he wrote in 1992, that “a fundamental process is at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern for all human societies, in short, something like a Universal History of mankind in the direction of liberal democracy?”¹⁹ If we reject these formulations, this does not mean that we need to abandon the project of writing “Universal Histories” in terms of “the development of Freedom.” But I think that the Italian philosopher of history Benedetto Croce was absolutely right when he insisted that these histories could only be retrospective.²⁰ And we should remem-

ber that there exists a parallel history written in terms of the development of power.

In the meantime, we have to try to make sense of what we might describe as the new international disorder. First, the present financial crisis is significant way beyond its immediate repercussions for a number of reasons. It is a crisis that originates at the heart of the financial system of the leading economy, and reveals a radical insecurity in the process of globalization, since finance, far more than industry, has been the lead sector in the exploitation of the new technologies of communication. It is bound to reinforce the trend towards a more multi-polar world. This was in any case evident before the crisis, for political and strategic reasons, and the shortcomings of a “unipolar” American approach have of course been dramatized and accentuated by the disasters of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. I don’t think, however, that this will mean simply a return to the old kind of great power system. Here I think Fukuyama is right when— in a passage that shows how his work is rich in paradoxical insights— he argues that “theorists of international relations talk as if history did not exist.”²¹ The same can be said, ironically, of a certain type of historical analysis of diplomacy and relations between states, which is not sufficiently alive to the changing economic, technological and cultural environment within which they function. States and societies change, not only in their capabilities but also in their aspirations. As the historian James Sheehan asked rhetorically, with reference to contemporary Europe: “Where have all the soldiers gone?”²² The demilitarization of European states and societies is a truly remarkable phenomenon, which can be best appreciated by a reminder of how different it was in the past, even in the *belle époque* before the world wars.

However I would caution against too confident an assertion of the primacy of democratic aims; national and state rivalries are still capable of generating passion and of deflecting the course of domestic politics. And arguments that single powers will not find it in their interest or even their power to challenge the interconnected structures of globalisation are uncomfortably reminiscent of the simi-

lar arguments of Norman Angell's *The Great Illusion* on the eve of 1914.²³ As new great powers like China and India emerge they will demand recognition of their cultures and political systems as legitimate partners with the West. Competition for scarce resources is already intensifying global rivalries, and will require new techniques of co-operation if they are not to become unmanageable. The aim, as President Obama seems to have understood, must be to extend something like the European Concert of Powers to the world. It is important, though, to read the history of the Concert correctly. In its strong form, which lasted for only a few years after 1815, it was based on the assumption of a common commitment to the values of monarchical legitimacy. It soon became evident, in fact, that the British understanding of these principles was not compatible with that of the Holy Alliance.²⁴ However, as the historian Paul Schroeder has shown, the Concert in a weaker form survived down to the Crimean War, remarkably bridging the ideological chasm between liberal and conservative powers opened up by the 1830 revolution in France.²⁵ The idea even revived in the later nineteenth century, as the theoretical underpinning for the periodic holding of Congresses to settle international disputes and to prevent them involving the great powers in war right down to the eve of 1914.²⁶ It is the weaker form, which does not rest on the assumption of shared values, which can be the only practicable aim in the present. The success of the European Union, however, can provide a model of how convergence around a core of shared values and institutions can overcome a historical legacy of hostility.²⁷

Second, while we should not abandon an "optimism of the will" about progress, and may even concede ourselves a cautious optimism of the intellect, we cannot afford to ignore cycles, crises, and catastrophes, for as Keynes famously said, in the long run we are all dead. Economic historians may not be optimally useful in predicting economic crises, but they are more useful than mathematicians. If once upon a time historians were rightly reproached for their lack of economic education, now is the time to reproach economists for their lack of histori-

cal education. Naturally, not all historians and not all economists are guilty. Readers of Charles Kindleberger were at least not likely to believe that economic panics and crises had become a thing of the past.²⁸ The idea of political cycles between private interest and public involvement, proposed by Albert Hirschman,²⁹ seems to me a suggestive way of approaching the present-day shift in politics and mentality. Hirschman's study of eighteenth century thought also reminds us that when passion rules, interest becomes respectable, and the reverse is also true.³⁰

The pricking of the housing and credit bubbles reveals that many influential opinion-makers have been living in a bubble of their own. What will life be like outside the bubble, or to be more precise outside the cage of economic fundamentalism? Will we see the birth of a new form of romanticism and the cult of feeling?³¹ Or a new devaluation of reason, such as took place at the end of the nineteenth century? Intellectual and political cycles are often linked to economic cycles, and they influence the political solutions adopted, but they also have a rhythm of their own. The "revolt against reason" may have taken off in an era of depression, but it continued as a protest against the complacent pursuit of prosperity and peace, both social and international.

Happily, the politics of the 1930s cannot be explained uniquely by the Great Depression and the turn towards closed national economies, without taking into account the influence of imperialism and the First World War in developing ideologies— Communism and Fascism— which were well placed to provide persuasive alternatives to liberal capitalist democracy in a time of crisis. Yet the risk that violent reactions against globalisation may be a menace to the principles of liberal democracy in Europe, even in the West, is now, I think, very real. It was already apparent before the crisis in the reactions to mass immigration, which in Europe is actually still on a relatively small scale compared with the massive world movements of population before 1914. Even liberals may wish to question the assumption that the removal of all restrictions on the mobility of goods—material or cultural capital, and people is compatible with a stable and reasonably con-

tented society. The growing unpredictability of the climate both tests our immediate capacity to react to natural catastrophes like Katrina or the South-East Asian Tsunami, and raises the spectre of more long-term and profound catastrophes, of the sort described by Jared Diamond in his book *Collapse*.³² Political catastrophes may only interrupt the march of civilisation, but they can do so for a long time. The fall of the Roman Empire may have set back the material civilisation of much of what was Roman Europe by at least 800 years.³³ The intellectual historian Antony Pagden quotes an address made by an orator to the emperor Antoninus Pius in the second century AD: “Now a clear and universal freedom from all fear has been granted both to the world and those who live in it.” History had finally come to a happy and glorious end and the constitution of Rome represented the final, most perfect political form.³⁴ Well, it didn’t turn out like that. Moments of imperial complacency are particularly ominous, as the history of the British Empire also shows.

Finally, the economic crisis has perhaps diverted our attention somewhat from what seemed to be previously the most pressing problem, the relations between the “stable centre,” with peaceful Europe as its paradigm, and the “unstable periphery,” with its failed or failing states. The reappearance of piracy as a serious problem is a striking example of the return of history—in the negative sense—in a new guise. It seems likely that the economic crisis will raise new problems and create new areas of instability. In managing the difficult centre-periphery relationship local knowledge—that of the historian as well as the anthropologist—is particularly vital. Rory Stewart in his wonderful book about Iraq “Occupational Hazards” relates how he attended a presentation to a group of tribal sheiks by an officer learned in political science on the process of “capability-building” in a new democracy. He cited Cambodia, Russia and Nigeria as positive examples of his all-purpose method: when he got to Nigeria, two of the sheiks walked out.³⁵ This is just one instance of the absurdity of the application of models of modernization or “democratization” without attention to local context— and diagrams or power-

point presentations too often offer convenient short cuts that avoid the tiresome necessity of thinking through a complex subject.

If I have a general suggestion to make it would be that we should go beyond the preoccupation with the history of insurgency and counter-insurgency, or as they were once called rebellion and the restoration of order, and study the mechanisms by which a precarious peace was sometimes established and maintained, as for example in Afghanistan. Charles Maier's argument that all workable empires have relied on the co-operation of local elites is applicable outside imperial realms, in all situations in which there exists a notable technological, economic or cultural gap between centre and periphery.³⁶

I am drawing to a conclusion. You will doubtless have noticed that I have said little, except indirectly, about Europe and its possible futures, viewed in the light of history.³⁷ First of all, I think it should be obvious that enlargement has signified the union of "Europes" which have different roots, different social and political histories, and different religions. The differentiation in the development of Eastern and Western Europe, it can be argued, goes back to the sixteenth century, although the boundaries are blurred. Three historical factors can perhaps be specially singled out; the heritage of serfdom, reaching into the 19th century; the different traditions and experiences of the relationship between religion and the state in Orthodox Christianity, and the particular relationship between religious communities and the state among the peoples subject to the Ottoman Empire.³⁸ All these differences have, of course, been accentuated by the Cold War division between blocs. I am not pessimistically predicting a Huntingtonian "clash of civilisations" within Europe, but we should not imagine that we are dealing with the same Europe as at the time of Maastricht. However, I can remember when such an enlightened and intellectual politician as the Labour minister Denis Healey on a visit to the Bologna Center expressed his scepticism about democracy in the parts of Europe which he described as "south of the olive line"—Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece (of course the olive line actually runs

through these countries). On the whole, this scepticism has proved excessive, although the recent record of democracy in Italy and Greece, for somewhat different reasons, has not been encouraging. What this teaches us is that differences of mentality and political behaviour can be overcome within the European framework, and before the economic crisis I would have said that the reasons for optimism about the integration of central and Eastern Europe certainly outweighed those for pessimism. But the crisis will test to the utmost the strength of European institutions, and their ability to prevent a damaging regression of the Eastern European economies to an impoverished and peripheral status such as they suffered in the 1930s. Now I am at my real, final conclusion. I do have some clergymen among my ancestors, although, like my father, I have always tried to avoid following in their footsteps. But it can't be denied that the academic profession has something in common with the clergy, and so I hope that you will excuse me if I end on a note of piety. The very fine and theoretically ambitious historian of international relations Paul Schroeder in an essay called "International History: Why Historians do it Differently from Political Scientists" ends with the affirmation of a moral purpose of history which goes beyond even general political concerns. "By doing justice to the past we go further and deeper in finding out important truths about ourselves as human beings... We approach those goals which history has always acknowledged, if not always served, to make the strange familiar and the familiar strange, to expand the range and increase the depth of our understanding our understanding of what it means to be a human being."³⁹

NOTE:

1 Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed.D.Womersley, London Penguin 1994, vol.1 p.102.

2 I owe this quote to Brian Ward-Perkins, *The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization*, Oxford 2005, p.131.

3 Knopf 2008.

4 John Gray, *Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia*, Penguin London 2008, p.316.

5 Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge 2005.

6 See Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison and other essays*, tr. M.Latynski, University of California press, Berkeley 1985, p.220, 285 and passim.

7 John Ralston Saul, *The Collapse of Globalism and the Reinvention of the World*, 2nd ed.London 2009, p.245; see also Michnik, op.cit., pp.192-6.

8 Margaret Macmillan, *The Uses and Abuses of History*; London, Profile 2009, p.88.

9 See G.Procacci, *Carte d'identità.Revisionismi, nazionalismi e fondamentalismi nei manuali di storia*, Rome, Carocci 2005; Jeremy Black, *Using history*, London, Hodder 2005, pp.138-143.

10 P.H.Gries, *China's New Nationalism: pride, politics and diplomacy*; Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004, pp.74ff; for official resistance to the use of the word "aggression" in Japanese textbooks, see Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1994, pp.195-6.

11. Peace Research Institute in the Middle East, *Learning Each Other's Historical Narrative: Palestinians and Israelis*, 2007. The authors recognized that they were unable to agree on a common narrative. Even how to describe events could be an insuperable problem. "What is said to be a 'national catastrophe' on one side is depicted as a 'War of Independence' on the other'. Instead, they adopted the solution of printing the Palestinian and Israeli accounts in parallel columns, with a third column reserved for the student's note and questions. "The aim is to make clear, by confronting diverging interpretations...how conditional both narratives are and thus to foster self-criticism and mutual dialogue".

- 12 Georg-Eckert Institut für Internationale Schulbuchforschung, www.gei.de/
- 13 Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837*, New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 1992; *Rethinking France (Les lieux de mémoire)*, ed. Pierre Nora, tr. M.Trouille, University of Chicago, Chicago, 2001-06.
- 14 A.J.P.Taylor, *From Napoleon to the Third International: Essays on Nineteenth-Century Europe*, ed. C.Wrigley, London, Hamish Hamilton 1993, p.279.
- 15 Ian Kershaw, *Fateful Choices: Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940-1941*, Penguin, London 2007; Ernest R.May, *“Lessons” of the Past: the Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, New York 1973.
- 16 Macmillan, op.cit, p.160.
- 17 *History News Network (Financial times* March 8 2003), Anne Deighton et al.; see also *ibid.*, “Historians Debate Iraq” (*Guardian* Feb.19 2003).
- 18 See the comments of Niall Ferguson, “We have the spectacle of a great English-speaking power occupying Iraq and more or less repeating history, precisely because it neglected to pay attention to it before”, www.bloomberg.com (*Washington Post* May 17 2004, interview by Celestine Bohlen).
- 19 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History” *The National Interest*, summer 1989; *ibid. The End of History and the Last Man*, Hamish Hamilton, London 1992, p.48.
- 20 B.Croce, *History as the story of liberty*, tr. S.Sprigge, London, Allen & Unwin, 1941.
- 21 Fukuyama, op.cit. p.246. His criticism applies particularly to the “realist” school.
- 22 James J.Sheehan, *Where have All the Soldiers Gone?: the transformation of modern Europe*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 2008.
- 23 Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: a Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage*, London, Heinemann 1914. (1st ed.1909).
- 24 Carsten Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe: a study in German and British international theory 1815-1914*, Harlow, Longman, 1970, pp.124-31.
- 25 Paul Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1994, pp. 799-804.
- 26 Holbraad, op.cit., pp.179-83.
- 27 The European Union shares with the Concert of Europe (after the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars) the characteristic of being an attempt to learn the lesson of a period of disastrous conflict; the greater disaster of the Second World War required a more ambitious solution. For the European Union and the lessons of war, see David P.Calleo, *Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.137, 154-5, and Sheehan, op.cit., passim.

28 Charles P. Kindleberger, *Manias, Panics and Crashes: a history of Financial Crises*, Macmillan 1978: see p.8 for his scepticism about the use of mathematical models.

29 Albert O. Hirschman, *Shifting Involvements: private interest and public action*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982; see also Arthur M. Schlesinger, *The cycles of American history*, London, Deutsch 1987, pp.23-48.

30 Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: political arguments for capitalism before its triumph*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977.

31 See Richard Bronk, *The Romantic Economist: Imagination in Economics*, Cambridge 2009.

32 Jared M. Diamond, *Collapse: how societies choose to fail or survive*, London Allen Lane 2006.

33 Brian Ward-Perkins, op.cit., pp.87-168; see particularly p.143 for his graphic picture of “the rise and fall of the Roman cow”.

34 Anthony Pagden, “The end of history or history all over again?”, in *Francis Fukuyama: the end of history revisited*, www.opendemocracy.net. Pagden notes that the universality of values is not the same as the universality of particular political institutions.

35 Rory Stewart, *Occupational Hazards: My Time Governing in Iraq*, Basingstoke & Oxford, Picador 2006, p.280: “An American democracy expert came from Baghdad to do ‘capacity-building’ with the local council. On a white board he drew an oblong on its side, to represent the council, and then beneath it four vertical oblongs, to represent its sub-committees. ‘He is drawing a dog,’ said a sheikh. ‘Are we back in primary school?’ asked another. ‘We are an ancient civilization’ said one cleric, “and they treat us like Congo cannibals”.

‘Welcome to your new democracy’, said the democracy expert. ‘I have met you before. I have met you in Cambodia. I have met you in Russia. I have met you in Nigeria’.

At the mention of Nigeria, two of the sheiks walked out.”

36 Charles S. Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and its Predecessors*, Harvard 2006, p.7

37 See L. Siedentop, *Democracy in Europe*, London, Penguin, 2000.

38 Tony Judt, *A Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe*, London, Penguin 1998, pp.46-52; Jeno Szucs, *Disegno delle tre regioni storiche d'Europa*, tr.F.Argentieri, Soneria Mannelli 1996.

39 Paul W. Schroeder, “International History: Why Historians Do It Differently than Political Scientists”, in *Bridges and Boundaries, Historians, Political Scientists and the Study of International Relations*, ed. C. & M.F. Elman, Harvard, Cambridge 2007, p.415.

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